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PREFACE
A scholarly work is a good example of compound labour. The author starts off
by reading books and articles by other authors, and subsequently tries to find
his own position. During this process, colleagues at conferences and at other
universities provide the support he needs. Finally, he attempts to write a
scholarly work of his own. The way in which I tackled and finally completed
this study is no exception to that rule, and I would like to take the
opportunity to thank at least some of the people who helped me in finding my
own position, and writing this book.
First of all, I would like to thank my promotor Jdrg Clombowski for his
support during all the yeats of my study of socialism and comparative
economics. He critically reviewed my work, and helped me to conceptualize my
work. Together, we wrote an article on planning failure, which formed the
basis of the fifth chapter of this study. Moving from Tilburg University to
the University of Groningen, while I was working on this study, meant that I
was lucky enough to have two groups of colleagues and friends at hand to
discuss my work with. In Tilburg, I worked with Marinus Verhagen and Marco
Wilke, and in Groningen, Herman Hcen and Beppo van Leeuwen were good
substitutes. I would also like to thank Ceorge Vredeveld, Hans van Ees, and
especially Ceorg Tilmann, for their invaluable comments on draft chapters.
Anne McDonald went to great trouble correcting my English, and to improve the
readability of the fínal version of this study.
My transfer to the University of Groningen resulted in my working in
Hans-Jiirgen Wagener's department. I appreciate the opportunities that
Hans-Jurgen offered me in the continuation of my study, in which to benefit
from his knowledge and experience in the field of comparative economics. I am
grateful too that he was also willing to join the committee of approval.
Finally, I would like to thank Jiirgen Backhaus, Bart LeBlanc, Andrei Markov
and Karel Veragtert for their willingness to take a seat on the committee of
approval.
Groningen, January 4, 1994
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The collapse of the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe in 1989 marked the
end of a social experiment which had started some 40 odd years before in the
smaller countries of the region and over 70 years ago in the Soviet Union.
During this period an attempt was made to build an economic system in which
the decisions, with respect to the production and the distribution, were
centrally planned rather than left to the interplay of supply and demand on
the market. The justification for this experiment is a combination of
economical and political arguments which is founded in the socialist
tradition of the late 19th and early 20th century. These arguments include a
critique on the private ownership of the means of production and on the
decentralized coordination of production via the market. It was theorized
that the private ownership and the market coordination caused the
exploitation and alienation of the workers by the capitalists.
A direct allocation and distribution would turn all labour into social
labour; bringing the economic units into the hands of a single owner and
directing them according to a single plan would eliminate competition, which
in turn would eliminate economic crises. A planned economy would be much more
efficient than a market coordinated economy because it would use all the
available resources and it would distribute its product more equally. The
social ownership of the means of production would also eliminate conflicts
and create a mutual interest in the development of the productive forces.l
1 For a thorough discussion on the concept of socialism, see Knaack
(1983), Kolakowski (1978), Selucky (1979).
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This study is limited to the systems of centrally planned economies as
they existed prior to 1989, the year in which it became obvious that the
people within the centrally planned economies definitely wanted another
regime and found the courage to venture along the long and slippery road
towards a market economy. This study dces not deal with this process of
transformation, but still, we are quite convinced that it is very useful to
study the operation of the centrally planned economies and analyze their
failures and successes. This study is of some importance because the
transformation process is „path dependentn and the structural and behavioural
idiosyncrasies of the old system do play a part in this process (Wagener,
1993). To study the operation of the centrally planned economies is also
important because they were extreme forms of planning and show the problems
that come with planning in an extreme form. This experience can possibly be
used in a planning process of a more limited form, for example within the
boundaries of a firm or any other type of organization, but also in the case
of intervention of the state in the operation of a market economy.
A formal description of an economic system starts with drawing an
organizational chart of the decision making hierarchy and formulating the
discretionary powers which are attributed to each of the authorities which
can be distinguished within the hierarchy. An important factor, to decide on
the authority over production decisions, is to be found in the ownership of
the means of production.Z In the socialist economies of Eastern Europe the
foundation of the economic systems is based on socialist ownership. It is the
state that exercises the authority and that determines the use of the means
of production. Therefore, socialist ownership has to be interpreted as state
ownership (Brus, 1975, Brunner and Meissner, 1980). This gives the state the
opportunity to set goals and to allocate the means of production in a way
2 Of course, there are other factors which determine the basis on which
authority is built. Historical developments are important, philosophical
principles play a role, as do social and political phenomena (Angresano,
1992).
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that maximizes its goals.
In order to make the proper decisions which optimize their goals the
decision makers have to be provided with the information on the availability
of resources, the state of technique, and the outcome of the productive
processes. In the centrally planned Eastern European economies the flow of
information is embedded in the planning process, which runs along the lines
of hierarchy. The lower echelons have to provide the centre with the
information on production technology and available resources, while the
centre passes on information to the lower echelons with respect to the output
that is to be produced.
The motivation structure describes the driving forces within an economic
system. It cannot, however, be described as a set of rules and institutions
as is the case with a decision-making structure or an information structure.
Rather, it operates implicitly within the decision-making structure and the
information structure. The decision-making structure, the information
structure and the motivation structure are interdependent and the motivations
of all actors within the economic system are an important factor in the
successful operation of the system. With respect to the motivation structure
in the socialist economic system it is difficult to characterize the driving
forces. Within the theoretical foundation of socialism it is believed that
the community is a fellowship of common sentiments, interests, intentions,
ideas and values (Selucky, 1979). This conviction is pazt of the political
program with which the communists took over and started to organize the
decision-making and the information structure. The communists claimed that
they were acting in the interest of society as a whole.3
This claim justified the centrally planned organization of the economy
and it enabled the communist party to dominate the decision-making structure.
However, if we do not accept an a priori coincidence of the communist
3 The justification for the de facto authority of the communist parties
within the economies of Eastern Europe is based on interpretations of Marxian
legacy (Hardach, Karras and Fine, 1978, Kolakowski, 1978, Nove, 1983).
4 C11AP"TE'It 1
interpretation of the interests of society then we must reexamine the
economic system. In that case we can analyze the communist party as an
interest group which tries to realize its own particular goals and analyze
the consequences of the existence of different interest groups. The
widespread support, to abandon central planning and transform the economy
into a market economy, suggests that there were indeed distinct interests
within the socialist system. An interesting explanation for the stagnation of
the centrally planned system, which uses the existence of several interest
groups, is given by Olson (1992).4 It applies a theory of interest groups
which was developed to explain the growth and stagnation in capitalist
economies, to the centrally planned economies. Within this approach, economic
growth is expected to be high if there is an interest group, or a single
authority, which has an encompassing interest in the growth of the economy as
a whole (Olson, 1982). In the Soviet Union before the 1970s this group could
have been the Politbureau, which would explain the high rates of growth of
the Soviet economy. The bureaucratization of the Soviet government might have
reduced the dominant position of the Politbureau, and the increasing
complexity of the economy coupled with the dependency of the central
authority on information that was provided by the ministries and firms,
enabled the latter to create distributive coalitions which slowed down the
rate of growth.
Olson's use of the concept of interest groups is one of the approaches
within the neo-classical framework of individual rational behaviour which try
to explain the structure of economic organization. Other approaches focus on
the structure of property rights (Furobotn and Pejovich, 1972)5, information
costs (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) or transaction costs (Coase, 1937, 1960,




Surular contnbutions are given in Murrell and Olson (1991) and Nagy
The structure of property right is closely linked to the structure of
decision-making power.
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of approach from the other. Eggertsson (1990, xiii) understands all of them
as levels in what he defines as Neoinstitutional Economics. At the fist
level, the structure of property rights and forms of organization are
explicitly modeled but are treated as exogenous and the emphasis is on their
impact on economic outcomes. At the second level, the organization of
exchange is endogenized. Exchange within firms, across formal markets, and in
non-market institutions is organized by means of contracts that constrain
economic agents. At the third level, attempts are made to endogenize social
and political rules and the structure of political institutions. The
neoinstitutional economics questions why institutions are established and how
they adapt to the behaviour of their constituents and, vice versa, how
constituents adapt their behaviour to the existence of institutions. An
important contribution of this approach is that it enables us to evaluate the
effectiveness of the economic organization from the point of view of the
motivation of people or groups of people.
To a large extent, the theory of central planning is based on the same
assumptions as neoclassical economics, complete information, rational
behaviour, harmony and so on. The existence of problems is blamed on factors
outside the dominant coordination systems rather than within the central
planning or the market system itself (Knaack, 1983). The attempt to
endogenize institutions, as is done for neoclassical economics, can be very
useful within the analysis of centrally planned economies as well. Within
this system the planner holds most of the property rights, only labour power
is owned by the workers. Workers, however, are legally compelled to offer
their labour in the labour market, in which all demand for labour is
exercised by the planner. The planner, on the other hand, is legally obliged
to offer work to all workers. Therefore, it is the planner who determines the
use of the means of production, but his property rights are limited. In a
complex economy, it is impossible for the planner to be fully informed on the
production possibilities, the availability of ineans of production et cetera.
Therefore, the planner is dependent on lower echelons in the planning
hierarchy to provide him with this information. If these lower echelons do
s ctlA1~ i
not share the planner's goals they may find it in their interest to send
distorted information to the planner.
This provides an interesting field of study. The failure to build a
successful and stable socialist society can be evaluated in a number of ways.
In this thesis we concentrate on the relationship between the planner and two
other actors, the managers of the firms and the workers. We assume that the
planner formulates the goals for the central plans and defines the failure to
build a socialist society as being a failure by the central planner to build
an economic system in which the centrally determined plans realize the
formulated goals.s The way in which the institutions of the centrally planned
economy created a situation, in which the central planner was unable to
control the development of a system to serve his own ends, must also be
analyzed. The institutional setup, obviously, has provided the other actors
in the system with the opportunity to act in such a way as to frustrate the
planner's goals. The planner, apparently, has been unable to induce other
actors to behave in such a way as to maximize the goals he has set.
The relationship between the planner and the managers of the firms is
important in the process to determine the plan goals and to realize the plan.
The managers, who are seen as the representatives of the firms, have to
provide the planner with the information he needs to be able to draw up an
optimal plan. They are also responsible for the output and, thus, for the
realization of the plan. However, due to a well-known phenomenon in the
centrally planned economies, i.e. the hoarding of labour and material within
firms, the planner is not always able to use all available means in the way
he sees fit. Thus, the managers' behaviour limits the planner's
possibilities. This raises a lot of questions with respect to the motivation
s We do not explicitly discuss the nature of the planner's goals. The
planner himself may very well claim that these goals are objectively
determined by the necessary development of history or reflect the goals of
the people. Others, e.g. the workers, may be led to believe that the planner
in fact aims to realize personal goals and has actually realized these goals.
We only concern ourselves with the officially formulated goals.
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of the managers and the strategies they use. It also raises questions with
respect to the relationship between the planner and the managers whenever the
planner is unable to force or to induce the managers into taking a certain
kind of action.
Production is the process in which material inputs and labour are
transformed into outputs. In the socialist economies the planner has
concentrated on the planning of output of producer goods (Nove, 1980, Cregory
and Stuart, 1990). Within the theories of planning, little attention is paid
to the position of the workers in the production process. There is an
implicit assumption that the workers will perform. However, workers in the
centrally planned economy are little motivated to do their job and to produce
goods of good quality.7 This raises the question of why workers do not
contribute to the realization of plans, plans which the planner maintains are
in their interest. It also, as in the relationship between the planner and
the managers, raises questions with respect to the relationship between the
planner and the workers. Why is the planner unable to force or to induce the
workers to act in the interest of the planner and what motivates and induces
the workers to act contrary to the planner's interest?
These relationships between the planner and the managers and the
workers, respectively, are the core of this thesis. The major problem that we
deal with is the way in which motivations and strategies of the managers and
the workers affect the operation of the economic system in which the goals
and rules are determined by the planner. This study of the operation of
centrally planned economies is divided into five parts. Because production
and allocation of output are important issues in an economic system, we first
discuss, in chapter 2, the organization and the coordination of production.
We discuss two approaches, the neoinstitutional approach, which operates
~ The bad quality of output cannot be attributed to labour alone. Bad
quality of machinery and inputs can also be toblame. The point we want to make
here is, that the workers themselves, to a certain extent, could improve the
quality of their work.
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within the framework of neoclassical economics, and the socialist approach.
The point of departure in the neoclassical approach is the behaviour of
economic individuals. However, most of the economic decisions are not being
made by individual economic actors, but within organizations, such as firms,
the state or interest groups. The question of why individuals join forces and
establish such organizatioiis, which to a certain extent limit their
discretionary powers, is approached with the help of neoinstitutional
economics. The socialist approach departs from a critical review of
capitalism and evaluates institutions as an alternative for the allocation of
the means of production through the market. In its most extreme consequence
the concept of ~one nation one factory" is developed, which describes the
entire economy as if it were one single firm. This concept facilitates
recognizing the central planning of production. In chapter 2, we discuss this
central planning concept from the point of view of neoinstitutional
economics. This results in an approach of the centrally planned economy as a
hierarchy with firms, rather than as a pure hierarchy.
The Soviet Union was the first state to try to build an economic system
along the lines of socialist thought and this is taken as an example of a
centrally planned economy in chapter 3. Although the communists gained power
in 1917, it took until the 1930s before the economic system, with its
centrally planned structure, was firmly established. During the 1920s, the
developments within the Soviet Union were in turmoil. The peasants'
reactions, for example, had, on several occasions, forced the communists to
adapt their policies. These reactions were the subject of open discussion on
the theory of a socialist economy as well as on the actual developments in
the Soviet Union at that time. In this chapter, we discuss some of the issues
that were important in these debates, as they return time and again in the
analysis of the operation of a centrally planned economy. We also describe
the formal economic system of the Soviet Union along the three substructures,
i.e. the decision-making structure, the information structure and the
motivation structure. We also give a brief description of the actual
operation of the economy along the lines of the three substructures, as this
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was very often quite different from the formal system. We focus on the
position of the managers of the firms and discuss the position of the
workers. This enables us to formulate the positions of the planner, the
managers and the workers in more detail. It also enables us to find evidence,
to explain the failure to fulfill the plans. We use this evidence the
subsequent chapters to formulate plausible abstractions of the centrally
planned economy and to analyze the operation of the centrally planned economy
in a more formal way.
As we have said, the planner depends on the managers of the firms to
provide him with the information he needs to plan the economy and to actually
realize the plans. Therefore, it is important to take a closer look at the
position of the managers in the centrally planned economy. From the evidence
that we present in chapter 3, it is clear that the managers operate with
their own preferences which may be distinct from the planner's preferences.
An important incentive for the managers is their personal income and we
assume that they will want to maximize this income. The problem for the
planner then is how to motivate the managers to abide by his rules. He has
to find a suitable mechanism which will provide the managers with a maximum
income whenever they act in the interest of the planner. A number of possible
principal agent models are discussed in chapter 4. We start with a
description and a discussion of a simple incentive model and extend this
model in different ways to meet the criticism with respect to the basic
model.
In chapter 4, we focus on the relationship between the planner and the
managers of the firms. In this discussion it is assumed that the managers are
opposed to the planner and that they act as a team with the workers. Of
course, this is not an entirely realistic assumption. The firms are
organizations with a centralized decision-making structure, and the managers
are the dominant decision-making powers within these structures. Thus,
instead of seeing the firms as the lowest level in the decision-making
hierarchy, as is done in chapter 4, we take one step further and consider the
level of the workers as the lowest level in the decision-making hierarchy.
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This is done in chapter 5, where we assume that the planner and the managers
form a team, with the planner's objective function, which interacts with the
workers as independent actors. In this chapter Lhe workers' preferences are
taken as a point of departure. We assume that workers try to maximize a
utility function in which the level of consumption and leisure are variables.
The planner has to find a mechanism which will provide the workers with
maximum utility if they decide to act in the planner's interest. We develop a
model in which the workers maximize their utility by deciding how to divide
their time among the production process, shopping and leisure. We use this
model to discuss the relationship between the planner and the workers and
discuss some options for the planner on how to influence the behaviour of the
workers.
In both chapter 4 and 5, the planner opposes only one type of actor,
i.e. either the managers or the workers. This leaves out the option that the
workers oppose the managers. We could use the incentive framework as
discussed in chapter 4, to formulate the relationship between the managers
and the workers. We could also simply change the labels. This, however, would
not do justice to the importance of some of the characteristics of the
centrally planned economy, most notably the shortage of consumer goods, with
respect to the operation of the centrally planned economy. For this, it would
be better to use we had better used the model in chapter 5. However, in
chapter 5, the managers are part of the team with the planner. So, we use
chapter 6 to present a simple model of a centrally planned economy with three
actors, the planner, the managers and the workers. This allows us to address
the relationship between the workers and the managers. The main purpose of
the model, however, is to discuss the interdependencies between the planner,
the managers and the workers at the same time.
CFíAP"TEE2 2
T11E CASE FOR CENTRAL P[.ANNINC
2.1 Introduction
In Thomas More's Utopia everything is run successfully with a small number of
laws and regulations to an extent that virtue comes before all other things,
that everyone gets plenty, although people live in community of property
(More, 1979). The characteristics that describe Utopia can be recognized in
nineteenth century ideas on socialism.l There exists an obligation to work,
although the division of labour has disappeared. There is no rule of a small
number of people over many others and there is d'~rect and even distribution
of revenues. Competition among people is ruled out.2 Marx and Engels (1964)
add a political program to the concept of socialism. They maintain that
previous socialist writers, such as Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen failed to
recognize the active role the proletariat would play in the realization of a
new socialist society. They substitute the personal dedication of an idealist
for the revolutionary role of the proletariat.
Although neither Marx nor Engels left a blueprint of socialism, they
were, in several instances, quite explicit on the specifications of
i In this thesis we do not distinguish between socialism and communism.
2 Kolakowski (1978), links these ideas to a combination of the French
revolution and the industrial revolution. The conviction that man is destined
to live in a harmonious society ís also an essential characteristic of
Christian thought.
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socialism. Engels (1978, 330-335) foresaw state ownership of the means of
production, whereas the proletariat controled the state. The production of
value was done away with, and the anarchy of social production was replaced
by planned and conscious organization. According to Marx (1975, 316-317)
there is no role for the law of value in a socialist society. Society would
directly calculate how much labour, means of production and food it can use
to realize its goals. Brus (1972) deduces a rough outline for the socialist
economy which can be regarded as a point of reference for the later attempts
to build socialist economies in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
countries. This outline consists of five features. First, the social
distribution of labour is directly and ex ante regulated. Second, the labour
input are directly determined. Third, supply and demand are equalized in
physical units. Fourth, the social product is distributed according to the
satisfaction of general needs, while at the same time the fund intended for
individual consumption is in accordance with the amount of contributed
labour. Finally, saving and investment is decided upon centrally.3
If we describe this model according to the three components which
describe an economic system, i.e. the decision-making structure, the
information structure and the motivation structure, the emphasis appears to
be on the information system. The most explicit reference is given to the
development of an alternative way of coordination. The law of value ceases to
function, the intermediate role of money is abolished, and the allocation of
means and the distribution of products is done in a direct, ex ante way. The
decision-making structure does not receive any particular attention. The
workers own the means of production and manage everything quite simply, but
how decisions are reached remains unclear. There seems to be no room for
contradictions which might explain the absence of any reference to
motivation. It is not surprising then, that the arguments for central
3 The five points in this general model of socialism are easily
sustainable by corroborating statements from Marx' and Engels' writings.
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planning are predominantly found in literature with respect to the
coordination mechanism. The discussion focuses on the alternative of the plan
versus the market as instruments to realize an efficient allocation of ineans.
However, both planning and market coordination require rules and
regulations. Even if we assume that there are only individuals, who for every
transaction have to turn to the market, that decision-making power is fully
decentralized and one can only determine the use of one's own property, we
need some rules to determine what one's property is. The other end of the
spectrum relates to a dictatorship, where a central authority holds all the
property rights, and decides on the allocation of ineans. This dictator must
have instruments to allocate the means. These extremes, however, do not
exist. Market economies in principle recognize individual sovereignty, but
many decisions regarding the allocation of ineans are taken within
hierarchical organizations. Planned economies aim to realize planner's
preferences, but the neglect of individual preferences may severely frustrate
the realization of the plan, as individuals may engage in unplanned, market
activities. Therefore, arguments with respect to planning have to include the
perspective of decision making as well as motivation.
In this chapter we discuss the arguments that are important with respect
to the evaluation of the operation of hierarchies, and in particular, of a
centrally planned economy. In section 2.2, we elaborate on central planning
as an alternative for the market, in the allocation of ineans. We present
traditional arguments which focus on the problem of information. We see, that
the problem of information cannot be dissociated from the organization of the
decision-making structure. Therefore, in section 2.3, the point of focusfocus
is turned to the rationality of planning from a perspective of
decision-making structures. We take a neoinstitutional point of view to
discuss why economic actors are motivated to hand over decision-making power
to hierarchies and to discuss the limitations of hierarchies. There, we focus
on the hierarchy of the firm, in which economic actors cooperate to produce
an output. In section 2.4, the point of focus is turned towards another type
of hierarchy, i.e. the socialist state. The socialist state can be seen as a
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kind of superfirm, which turns the entire economy into one firm. This is the
basic concept of a centrally planned economy. We use the arguments presented
in 2.2 and 2.3 to discuss this socialist concept of a fully centralized
economy.
2.2 Market socialism and the problem of information
As early as in 1908, the Italian economist Barone set out to compare an
individualistic regime of production with a collectivist regime. The optimum
for the individualist regime, where the data consists of the amount of
capital possessed by each individual, the production functions, and the
individual preferences, is widely discussed, but standard in economic
theory.4 The ministry of production in a collectivist state has to solve the
problem of combining individual and collective services in order to procure
the maximum welfare for its people (Barone, 1935, 265). The criterion of
welfare has to be established by the community, on certain ethical and social
criteria and involves a certain formula of distribution. Barone shows that
the system of equations of the collectivist regime is the same as that of
free competition. The collectivist regime will also result in a general
equilibrium.
He also shows that in order to generate maximum welfare it is necessary
that the benefits of the collectively owned resources are being given to the
people as a supplement to income, rather than being distributed indirectly,
by means of free services of collective property. This would demand the
introduction of new equations into a determined system and thus, make it
impossible to solve the system of equations. Barone rejects the deduction of
9
A note on the conditions of equilibrium in Barone, and other
contributions, can be found in Bergson (1935), (1948).
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a part of the collective revenue by the ministry of production to create new
capital. As the individuals may save part of their earnings anyway,
consumption may decrease more than necessary without a compensation in future
increase in consumption. A better solution would be, to promise a premium on
savings for the construction of new means of production.
Although it would be a tremendous task, there are no theoretical
obstacles to calculate an equilibrium. However, Barone formulates a practical
objection for a collectivist regime, which concerns the economic variability
of the technical coefficients. The ministry of production would have to
determine the economically most advantageous technical ccefficients, which
can only be done by means of a large scale experiment.
Mises (1935), formulates a similar argument in his criticism of
socialism. If production goods cannot become subject to exchange, as there
use is decided upon via a plan, it becomes impossible to determine their
value, and thus, to determine the most efficient use they can be given.s
Mises' argument goes further, as he considers the market to be the only
institution that is able to determine the value of producer goods. No one can
know all the production possibilities and pass correct value judgements. The
market enables reducing all goods to a common denominator, i.e. money.
Calculation in natura can embrace consumption goods only, it fails when it
comes to deal with goods of a higher order (Mises, 1935, 104). The formation
of prices in a socialist economy has been the subject of numerous
contributions in the 1930s (see Bergson, 1938, 1948, De Kort, 1984, Lavoie,
1985a).6
Lange (1938), formulates the large scale experiment which Barone called
5 The argument, that exchange is necessary to determine the value of the
means of production, can be read in Pierson (1935) who arrives at this
conclusion through a study of international trade.
6 Bergson discusses these contributions from the perspective of static
equilibrium, while Lavoie has a more institutional approach and stresses
economic rivalry.
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for to determine the economic values of inputs and outputs.T In this system a
central planning board (CPB) announces prices and wages to which individual
economic actors can respond. There is freedom of consumption as well as
freedom of work. Like in the market, the prices are parametric, and are,
initially, fixed arbitrarily by the central planning board. The production
units have to operate under two rules. They have to minimize costs, and they
must determine the output level at the point where marginal costs equal the
established price. Production units may borrow capital from the CPB at a
fixed interest rate. The planner monitors the economy closely and adjusts
prices upwardly of goods that are in excess demand at the prevailing prices,
while goods that are in excess supply at the prevailing prices are priced
lower. This process is repeated until an equilibrium is reached. This
iterative solution, to arrive at the most efficient allocation, is similar to
the Walrasian auction model. Lange explicitly adds an institution and rules
to the general equilibrium theory.8 What then, is the advantage of the
institutionalization of the market economy?
Lange formulates two advantages in his so-called model of market
socialism over the individualistic regime. Firstly, if the factors of
production are state owned, the socialist society does have a margin in
determining Lhe income distribution, as long as this social dividend is
independently divided from the reward for labour as a factor of production.9
' To decide between alternatives economically one needs to have a scale of
preferences, one needs to know the terms for supplying the alternatives and
one needs to know how many means are available. According to Lange, Mises'
view on the meaning of prices, as an exchange rate of goods on a market, is
too limited and, therefore, shifts the problem to the institutional plane.
8 For example, the rules that apply to the production units are explícit
formulations of what is supposed to happen in a competitive market.
9 This condition is added, in Lange (1938), to his primary contribution,
which was published in the Review of Economic Studies in 1936~37 in response
to criticism by Lerner (1936). Lerner argued that a division of social
dividend proportional to wages, as Lange was suggesting, would draw undue
attraction of workers to the higher paid occupations which entailed a greater
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It would mean that income distribution would be dissociated from an
historical distribution of production forces, which had developed
independently with respect to the conditions of maximízing welfare. A second
advantage, according to Lange, is the internalization of externalities; the
CPB can take all alternatives into account. In an economy with private
enterprises, the entrepreneur only considers the private costs. The prices do
not reflect the social costs of production. We return to this issue in the
next section.
In Lange's model, the CPB is able to determine the rate of accumulation.
Thus, this rate no longer necessarily reflects the consumers' taste with
respect to their time preferences of income spending. Lange recognizes this
but argues that in capitalism the dependency of the savings rate on the
division of income will result in an irrational rate of accumulation and that
the arbitrary 'socialist' rate may very well prove to be more rational than
the capitalist one.lo The real danger, according to Lange, lies in the
bureaucratization of economic life, rather than in the impossíbility to
allocate resources. La.nge foresees however, the same danger in monopoly
capitalism. Whereas officials in socialism would be subject to democratic
control, directors of private monopolies would not be subject to anything.
Lange does not elaborate on the political processes which would control the
bureaucrats. His model of market socialism lacks a theory of the state. The
CPB is a neutral organization which coordinates the allocation of the means
social dividend. Since there would be a free labour market, the distribution
of labour would no longer be optimal. The modifications made by Lange to his
work as a response to Lerner's comment resulted in a final solution proposed
by La.nge to the problem of pricing in a socialist state. This became famous as
the Lange-Lerner solution.
lo La.nge (1936) finds Lerner's (1936) contention very interesting when
Lerner argues that in fact a socialist economy would be better equipped to
determine an optimal rate of accumulation, as it would be able to take
consumer's time preferences into consideration much more than a capitalíst
society would. Also, Lerner argues that in socialism there could be a
democratic governmental machinery where consumers could cast a vote.
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of production to maximize consumers' preferences. It is superior to the
market because of the calculation of social costs and because it prevents
wasted investments. T'here is no reference to the democratic process which
should determine the future development.
A more centralist approach towards the coordination problem is advocated
by Dobb (1953), who challenges the absolute primacy of consumer sovereignty,
as there may be doubt with respect to the rationality of their market
behaviour. Dobb also points to the public goods, which he terms 'collective
wants', which cannot be satisfied by individuals as separate units. The
existence of externalities in private consumption provides a third argument
to challenge consumer sovereignty. With regard to the 'market' solution to
the economics of socialism, Dobb criticizes the decentralized decision making
in socialist enterprises as a leading principle with respect to investments.
For example, a deaease in the the interest rate, below the equilibrium rate
of interest, by the state, to induce investment, would set off a cumulative
investment drive. During the construction period of investment projects, the
price level of finished products will rise, and thus, the profits of
industry. This would raise the equilibrium price for capital and the state
would have to increase the interest rate in order to prevent a cumulative
investment drive. However, by doing so the state would damage its future
ability to influence the behaviour of industrial managere by reducing the
rate of interest becasue these managers would be expecting a quick increase
of the interest rate. It is difficult to influence the long term investment
through changes in the short term rate of interest. Therefore, Dobb suggests
that it would be better to allocate funds directly through central authority.
They could be allocated to uses that would reflect the social preferences in
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a more direct way.ll'12 Although Dobb does not trust the rationality of the
consumers in the market, he does not go into the rationality of the consumers
in the democratic process. Like Lange's modei of market socialism, Dobb's
central planning lacks a theory of the state.
The market socialist solution to allocate means is rejected by Hayek
(1935) for reasons of feasibility and because the substitution of the market
by a planner will result in a dictatorship. Hayek accepts the theoretical
argument, that values can be determined without the intervention of the
market, but he argues that the amount of information required to calculate a
solution is far too voluminous to be mastered by a central planner.13 A second
argument is, that most of the knowledge that is actually utilized is by no
means 'in existence' in the ready made form. Most of it exists in a technique
of thought which enables the individual engineer to find new solutions
rapidly when he is confronted with a new constellation of circumstances
11 Brus (1972) and Lerner (1936), both point to the fact that Dobb's
position moved from being close to the position of Lange during the period of
the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the Soviet Union, to his favouring
centralized solutions in the 1930s, when in the Soviet Union allocation
decisions were made via centralized plans.
12 Wagener (1979), distinguishes between an ex ante and an ex post
sovereignty. He agrees with Dobb, that consumer sovereignty ex ante with
respect to investment decisions is unthinkable. However, consumer freedom is a
necessary condition to evaluate investment decisions. The contributions of
Lange and Dobb supplement one another. Lange develops a control mechanism
without conditions for stability, whereas Dobb concentrates on a stable
coordination system without clear conditions for control.
'a This argument is basically an empirical argument which can only prove
itself in practice. Lange (1964 ), responds to it by expressing an optimistic
evaluation óf the development of computers. The solution of the system of
simultaneous equations could be calculated by the computer. Cottrell and
Cockshott (1992), criticize this point because Lange's optimum requires the
consumer preferences to be known in advance. They do conclude, however, that
the computation of the labour content of each product in the economy, which is
the basic social unit of account, is entirely feasible. This means that a
balanced plan can be calculated without trial and error and only the
adjustment of the balanced plan to the consumer preferences is left to an
iterative process in historical time.
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(Hayek, 1935, 210-211).
Hayek comments on the same issues as Dobb concerning the consumer
sovereignty and the decentralized decision making in socialist enterprises,
but they arrive at opposite conclusions. The elimination of the market as a
means of coordination, will inevitably lead to a dictatorship. In a socialist
economy, the allocation of ineans will have to be performed within a
hierarchical structure, and the economic agents are no longer subject to a
market regime. The first problem that arises is choosing who wíll make
decisions on the use of the resources if they are all owned by the community?
The second problem then, is which criterion will be used to determine the
success or the failure of a socialist entrepreneur? In a market economy the
rules on how to put a capitalist out of action are clear and equal to all.
The market is a corrective institution as well as an information processing
one (Lavoie, 1985b). In a socialist system the penalty is less clear and not
necessarily equal to all. It will have to be the central planner who
exercises the rights to allocate the available means according to his
assessment of the preferences of the people, or according to his own
preferences. This violates the freedom of people. According to Hayek, the
planner is not just a coordinator, but has preferences of his own. Because
the market is eliminated there are no instruments to correct the planner.
Hayek does not have much faith in the democratic process to substitute for
the market as a controlling instrument, but, like Lange and Dobb, he does not
go into the characteristics of these democratic processes.
In Lange's model of market socialism, the CPB substitutes for the
market. The planner acts as a Wakassian auctioneer, who collects and
processes information about the preferences and the production possibilities
in the economy and determines the prices for all means of production and
consumption. Although the prices are centrally planned, the model of market
socialism is a form of coordinative planning which endeavours to solve the
problem of price determination in socialism. The socialist entrepreneurs have
to sa,tisfy the needs of the consumers. The CPB does not play any role in the
operation of the firms, but tries to achieve that the firms satisfy consumer
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needs by means of price manipulation. I.ange dces not discuss the organization
of the CPB itself. The democratic supervision over the Board is also above
scrutinization. Several important problems arise in the operation of market
socialism. Firstly, it is questioned whether the CPB is able to collect and
process all the necessary information. With the help of modern computers this
problem might be solved. Secondly, as Hayek points out, there is also a
qualitative aspect to the processing of information in that the information
has to be interpreted before being useful. This means that the economic
system itself is important in the evaluation of the information.l' Thirdly, an
important issue concerns the lack of attention with respect to the position
of the planner. Is he a neutral coordinator, a director in the interest of
the people or a dictator? Does he have personal preferences or not? If the
planner exercises the property rights on behalf of society we would then need
to consider on which basis the planner is allowed to exercise these rights.
2.3 The firm as an alternative for the market
La.nge, in his presentation of market socialism, concentrates on coordination;
the function of the price mechanism is substituted by the CPB. Although
consumer sovereignty should rule and the most efficient allocation of the
means should reflect the maximization of welfare, Lange sees a distinct role
for the CPB. The core of the argument is in the existence of external effects
and in the future path of the economy. Lange dces not develop these
arguments. He 'does not elaborate on the question of why people will allow the
CPB to determine the prices. Neither does he elaborate on the production
process. The production of goods is left to socialist entrepreneurs who do
14 This argument can be illustrated with examples from the present day
transformation in Eastern Europe, where people are not familiar with the
complete contents of all information that becomes available to them.
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not depend on the planner with respect to the use of the means of production.
And neither does he discuss why an individual would take up the position of a
socialist entrepreneur.
It is commonplace to say that in all societies the allocation of ineans
is, to a large extent, organized outside the scope of market transactions.
Within firms all kind of ineans are brought together and transformed in the
production process into other products. In the traditional neoclassical
economics and in the socialist tradition alike, the enterprise is a black
box, it is not a subject of analysis. At best, in the socialist tradition,it
is described as the capitalist's instrument to exploit the workers. Coase
(1937),is among the first, from a neoclassical point of view, to
systematically analyze the existence of the firm. His basic argument is that
the price mechanism is not a costless operation, the entrepreneur has to
determine the appropriate prices and he has to negotiate agreements.
Therefore, it may be cheaper to draw up long term contracts in order to avoid
these contract and information costs. Other reasons for long term contracts
could be to avoid the risk of not being able to find a suitable trading
partner in the future or to avoid the risk of considerable price
fluctuations. The prime question then becomes, why does the entrepreneur not
organize any additional long term contracts? Does it pay to substitute the
entrepreneur as the integrating force for the market? Coase is primarily
interested in the size of the firm and he weighs the cost of organizing one
extra transaction within the firm against the cost to effect a market
transaction. Therefore, a firm will be larger the less the costs of
organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increase in the
transactions organized, the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes
and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an increase in the transactions
organized, the greater the lowering in the supply price of factors of
production to firms of a larger size (Coase, 1937, 396-397).
Coase does not, however, elaborate on the specific characteristics of a
firm. He dces not explain under which circumstances the costs of managing
resources is lower than the cost of allocating resources through market
THE CASE FOR CENN'IRRAL PLANNING 23
transactions. According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972, 777) long term
contracts between an employer and an employee are not the essence of the
firm. The managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a
deceptive way of noting that the employer is continuously involved in the
renegotiation of contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties.
They place two key demands on an economic organization: metering input
productivity and metering rewards. If, for the production of a good, several
types of resources are used and the product is not just a sum of separable
outputs of cooperating resources, it becomes difficult to determine the
marginal productivity of a factor of production. In this case there is team
production, and there is only the marginal productivity of a team. Team
production will be used if it yields an output sufficiently higher than the
sum of separable production to cover the costs of organizing and disciplining
of team members (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, p. 779). An entrepreneur has an
incentive to start up a firm if the gains of disciplining team members,
coming from a reduction in shirking, exceed the costs involved in monitoring
the individual inputs, and if the entrepreneur is entitled to these residual
gains. As it becomes impossible to meter the marginal product of a team
member, the individual may have an incentive to shirk, as the costs of this
kind of behaviour can be imposed on the other membera of the team. It is,
therefore, necessary to develop organizations and procedures which secure the
correct behaviour of each of the members. In order to be able to discipline
individual members the entrepreneur must have the right to change the
contribution and performance of the members, without altering the
contribution of others. He must also have the right to expand or reduce
membership, or terminate or sell the team. In short, the entrepreneur must
have full property rights of input of the members of the team. Of course, his
power is limited, because members are free to leave the team.
A firm, however, is somewhat broader than the production of a team. It
is an assemblage of resources under a contractual nexus not all owned in
common. Some of these resources aze independent, and not specific to the
firm. They will not value the right of control very highly as their wealth is
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independent of the firm's performances. Other resources are firm-specific and
place a higher value on the right to administer. The resources that are most
dependent on the performance of the team place a higher value to the control
of the direction and administration of the team than those, who find their
alternatives unaffected by the success or failure of the team (Alchian and
Woodward, 1987, 119). Therefore, in a competition to form teams and choose
contractual arrangements, they are able to buy general, independent resources
who prefer prespecified rewards and non-administrative rights.
An important contract in the f irm is the labour contract.IS Usually,
these are long term contracts where the employer buys a service potential
from the employees (Franke, 1987).16 This gives the employer options in the
use of the labour services. A particular feature of the labour power,
however, is that the service potential and the actual service cannot be
separated from one another. We can describe the labour power as a capacity,
held by the workers, which does not disappear if the workers use this
capacity. This is different for the owners of capital assets who usually lose
control of their assets when they sell the right to use their inputs. They
have to change the terms of the contract in an explicit way. This is much
less so in the case of labour services, because the vendor of the labour
potential himself has to execute the decisions that are rightfully made by
the buyer of this potential. The labour contract is an incomplete contract
which allows problems of moral hazard to arise (Alchian and Woodward, 1987,
Kotowitz, 1989). The labourer dces not have to seek control over the firm via
ls
In neoclassical theory, it does not make a difference whether capital
hires labour or the other way around. However, in practice it is capital that
hires labour, which suggests that capital is more dependent on the success or
failure of the firm. This is understandable if we distinguish between stock
and capacity. Labour is a capacity, which does not usually lose its value if
the firm fails. It can sell itself in the market again. Capital is a stock
which dces lose its value in the market if the firm fails.
ls This formulation is close to the notion of labour power in Marx (1975)
which is distinct from labour itself. Labour is the consumption of labour
power in the production process.
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renegotiation of the contract as he is able to alter the terms informally, as
long as this goes undetected.
An economic agent, seeking maximum utility for himself is tempted to act
to the detriment of others in situations where they do not bear the full
consequences or, equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their
actions due to uncertainty and incomplete or restricted contracts which
prevent the assignment of full damages (benefits) to the agent responsible
(Kotowitz, 1989). In situations of competitive markets there is not much
ground for opportunism, however, when non-competitive situations prevail it
becomes possible to earn gains at the expense of others." In those cases a
group can be superior to a market in ex ante screening and ex post
monitoring. On the other hand a group itself is limited by conditions of
bounded rationality. Bounded rationality refers to the limited capacity of
the human mind to formulate and solve complex problems (Williamson 1975).1B A
group offers advantages with respect to the condition of bounded rationality
as it is better able to bear risks and to deal with uncertainties in an
adaptive and sequential way. Internal organizations, furthermore, economize
on bounded rationality because efficient codes for transmitting information
are more apt to evolve and be used, and uncertainties are reduced because
expectations converge more easily. It is impossible to inform everyone about
everything, and the time needed to reach a joint decision can not be used for
other purposes. A firm has to find an organization which saves on the
communication and the decision making within the firm, but still is more
efficient than a coordination via the market, with all its information costs
and uncertainties. This will involve hierarchy. Whether a set of transactions
" Opportunism refers to the lack of honesty in transactions in order to
gain an individual advantage.
18 Williamson refers to his approach of the firm as new institutional
economics, which is somewhat different from the neoinstitutional economics as
it is defined by Eggertsson (1990). Williatnson includes behavioral factors,
such as bounded rationality or satisficing behavior to the micrceconomic
approach, while Eggertsson stays within the rational-choice model.
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is executed via the mazket or within a firm depends on the relative
efficiency of each mode.
From a neoclassical point of view, the cooperation within the firm of a
private nature is that individuals bundle their property rights and aim to
yield a revenue for the participants. Because the point of depazture is the
utility maximizing agent, the problem of decision-making power and of
information is discussed from the perspective of the motivation and the
behaviour of individuals. Because of the transaction costs, it may be more
efficient for agents to conclude contracts for longer periods. However,
because contracts are sometimes incomplete, i.e. people and organizations are
restricted for reasons of bounded rationality and so on, problems of moral
hazard and opportunistic behaviour arise. The firm can be more efficient than
the market in the allocation of the means of production, but faces problems
of its own. These kinds of problems can also arise in the socialist planning
model, which in fact is built on the notion that one could organize the
entire economy as if it were one firm. The next section will discuss this
model of the socialist economy from the point of view of the arguments that
are developed in this and the previous section.
2.4 One nation one factory. The role of the state in the economy
As was indicated above, the point of reference to discuss the attempts to
build a socialist economy can be found in Brus' rough outline for the
socialist economy. The attraction of this system is to be found in the direct
allocation of ineans. As a coordination system it would eliminate the ind'~rect
and ex post coordination of the market. As a decision-making structure it
would eliminate the multitude of owners who would have to compete in the
market. And because in a socialist society the workers would own the factory
there would be no exploitation. It would increase the efficiency of the
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productive processes.19 The implicit assumption in this model is that all
workers in socialism would act as if they were all members of a team, a team
the size of the state. The central planner is the manager of this team and
coordinates the production process in the interest of the members of the
team. This is a matter of division of labour. In Marx (1981) it is suggested
that everyone could take on this task in a rotating matter, as everyone would
be capable of performing every task.~ Lenin (1973), does not go this far, but
describes the planner as a kind of statistical bureau, which performs this
coordinative task in a neutral way. Within the model of central planning
which is the practical interpretation of the rough outline of a socialist
economy there is no political function for the state.21
The framework of transaction costs can also be helpful to explain the
role of the state. Eggertsson (1990, 15), summarizes activities that give
rise to transaction costs to include: -the search for information about the
distribution of price and quality of commodities and labour inputs, and the
search for potential buyers and sellers and for relevant information about
their behaviour and circumstances; -the bargaining that is needed to find the
19 The direct allocation of ineans in a centrally planned economy is often
referred to as the one nation one factory system to point out the analogy that
within a factory the allocation of ineans is also of a planned character (Brus,
1972, Knaack, 1983, Selucky, 1979).
~ Nove (1983) criticizes this perception of the division of labour. It may
be possible to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the
evening and be a literary critic after dinner. But if this sentence is
rewritten into, men will freely decide to repair aero-engines in the morning,
fill teeth in the afternoon, drive a heavy lorry in the early evening and then
to go cook dinners in a restaurant, it looks a trifle nonsensical (Nove, 1983,
46-47).
21 Marx dces have a political theory of capitalism, which is based on the
conflict of class interests. The revolutionary force of the proletariat
clashes with the capitalists, who use the state as an instrument to suppress
the people. Lenin adds the role of the communists as the avant-garde of the
working class in the process of eliminating the state as an instrument in the
hands of the capitalists. Once the proletariat, or its avant-garde, seize
power, the state loses its functions and just withers away.
28 C1IApTER 2
true position of buyers and sellers when prices are endogenous; -the making
of contracts; -the monitoring of contractual partners to see whether they
abide by the terms of the contract; -the enforcement of a contract and the
collection of damages when partners fail to observe their contractual
obligations; -the protection of property rights against third party
encroachment. Transaction costs, thus, are a generalization of all the costs
that are involved in the decision concerning the coordination of economic
activities within or outside the reach of organizations. The reduction of
transaction costs is beneficial for those who want to engage in economic
activities. They have an interest in the lowering of transaction costs, such
as the protection of property rights (as in patent rights), or the exclusive
use of trade marks, or the reduction of information costs (such as the
uniformization of ineasures) and the introduction of a trustworthy currency
unit. The reduction of transaction costs is also beneficial from a social
point of view.
If there were no transaction costs nothing would stand in the way of an
optimal allocation of ineans. This refers to the distinction between private
and social costs as is present in Lange's argument for a CPB. In the absence
of transaction costs it would be possible to arrive at an allocation of
resources that takes into account the social benefits and social costs no
matter who is liable for these costs (Coase, 1960). Actors will bargain with
each other. The unit that has to pay the costs, stemming from activities of
another, might be willing to pay up the amount of the costs to this
originator to abandon his activity. This compensation payment is an
alternative cost for the originator of the initial costs. All costs and
benefits become internalized. The state is important in the reduction of
transaction costs. Taking a narrow view of the role of the state it could be
argued that the state owes its right to exist to its contribution to the
lowering of transaction costs.
In those cases where the individual firm will not start to produce a
service because it is difficult to collect a price from the users, the state
may step in to initiate production. The state possesses other means of income
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to pay for this service. It can tax its citizens to finance the production of
services which it considers an important contribution to the social welfare.
The state corrects market failures. Also, the state steps in to protect the
property rights of economic actors in many ways, for example, in patent
rights or in the exclusive use of a trade mark. An important function of the
state is to lower transaction costs. The state interference in the use of the
currency and the uniformization of ineasures reduce the information costs, the
legal system describes patterns of behaviour which reduce contract costs and
the costs of enforcing a contract.
Thus, within the institutional supplement to the neoclassical framework,
it is possible to understand the role of the state from another perspective
than its position in the class struggle. However, it is difficult to consider
the state as a bundle of resources under a contractual nexus not all owned in
common. First, the citizens are part of the state by birth and do not have
the opportunity to opt out.22 They do not voluntarily bundle their property
rights, which reduces the individual position of power. Second, the functions
of the state are performed within the responsibility of elected politicians.
The state, unlike an entrepreneur, is not justified by the earnings that
result from the act of organization. State revenues are supposed to accrue to
all citizens alike. What is lacking in the institutional economic approach is
an explanation for the emergence of the state itself. An initial explanation
can be found in the combination of a property rights approach with an
analysis of interest groups (North, 1981, 1990, Eggertsson, 1990). The
development of the state itself can be analyzed as the outcome of conflicts
between interest groups that strive to control the state and to collect the
revenues that accrue out of state activities.
ZZ The events in the German Democratic Republic in 1989, show that
emigration can become an important factor in the acceptance of state policies
by the population. This option, however, is due to the exceptional
circumstances that all citizens of the CDR automatically received West-German
]citizenship, which provided them with an alternative.
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There is similarity between the free consumption of a service, due to
the difference between private and social costs, and the shirking by team
members. Both are free riding (Olson, 1965). If it is possible to consume a
service without contributing to it, no rational-behaving individual would
contribute to the production of this service. The cooperation to provide the
service has to be forced or induced by selective incentives. Small groups
have an advantage over large groups in the provision of collective action as
opportunistic behaviour is more easily detected, and also because social
values play a more important role. Social cohesion contributes to collective
action. Collective action may be used by special interest groups to seek
gains at the state level. This is possible because of bounded rationality of
individual citizens, who are not aware that their interests are violated by
special interest groups. Olson (1982), extends this analysis to explain the
economic development of nations. His argument includes the collusion of
numerous special interest groups on the state level, and the existence of
encompassing special interest groups. The latter refers to the situation
where groups encompass a substantial portion of the societies of which they
are a part (Olson, 1982, p. 48). These organizations have an interest in
society prospering as a whole, besides the appropriation of a large part of
the income. The conflict of interests sets a process of consensual bargaining
in motion to agree on a joint course of action and on how the costs of this
action are to be shared (Olson, 1982, p. 53). Consensus is required to
prevent free riding. If bargaining is infeasible, collective action requires
constitutional procedures. the reduction of the bargaining costs and the
continuation of the collective action induces the members not to block
collective action.
The emergence of interest groups is used by Eggertsson (1990) to
supplement the naive theory of property rights, which refers to the attempts
to explain the development of exclusive property rights without explicitly
modeling social and political institutions (Eggertsson, 1990, p. 250). Within
the naive theory of property rights it is assumed that the state will create
a general framework that permits the individuals to maximize the wealth of
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the communities. The interest group theory of property rights takes the
fundamental social and political institutions of the community as given and
seeks to explain the structure of property rights in various industries in
terms of interaction between interest groups in the political market. The
weakness of the theory, as Eggertsson acknowledges, is that it dces not make
clear what the state is, except an aggregate of competing interest groups who
somehow reach an equilibrium in the political market. The state is not
considered to be an institution with interests of its own.
In the centrally planned economies the communist parties could be
regarded as encompassing organizations, which had an interest in the growth
of the economy. They boasted that they regarded themselves as representing
the interests of the working class, the entire nation, or the patriots, all
the women and all the young people, etc (Nagy, 1991, p. 273). We can, in that
case, identify the communist party with the central planner. The encompassing
features were gradually lost and the communist parties became a particular
mixture of special-interest organizations and collusions. The conflict of
interests resulted in lobbying and bargaining on all levels.~ The logic of
collective action also points to the importance of the group size. An active
involvement in the decision-making process and the formulation of common
goals is easily attainable within a small group. It is easier to exert
control over members of small groups and enforce the required behaviour. In
large groups, and society is a large group, it is more difficult to control
members and individuals tend to take a free ride. The conception of a
socialist economy builds upon the logic of small groups in which one would
expect a high level of motivation from the individuals partaking in the team.
The communal spirit, however, dces not go without saying in large
groups. The model of the socialist economy and its practical interpretation
in the centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe, erroneously applies the
~ Examples of the functioning of several interests groups are also given
by Skilling and Griffith (1971).
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community concept for small groups to large groups. It neglects the
motivation of individuals as being an important factor in the operation of
the economy, it oversimplifies the process of decision making and it
misjudges the problem of the quality of information. Therefore, we have to
analyze the failure of the communists, to impose their policies on the
economy as systemic failures, rather than policy failures.24 We cannot
describe the economies of Eastern Europe as if they were one firm. There are
firms that can be defined as autonomous, micro-level centrally-planned
organizations with some degree of hierarchical governance (Ben-Ner and
Neuberger (1988, p. 840)). Economic activities are performed by firms within
a centrally-planned system and in a market economy. The firms, in a socialist
setting, still have to decide how to implement the plan and to decide on the
use of labour, capital and material resources. The central planner cannot
possibly organize every detail of the economic process, which is explained
via the concept of bounded rationality. He depends on the managers of the
firms to provide the necessary information. This gives rise to the problem of
moral hazard. Opportunist behaviour is an even more important threat here
than it is in a market economy (Sacks, 1988). In a market economy, enterprise
managers have numerous alternative business partners and, therefore, are less
vulnerable to opportunism. In a planned economy, enterprise managers do not
have the choice of alternative suppliers. Therefore, they have to engage in
strategic manipulation of information in order to get favourable input
allocations and desirable output targets (Sacks, 1988, p. 868). The position
of the managers of the firms is described extensively in the next chapter
where we we turn our attention to the actual operation of the Soviet economy.
We describe the discretionary powers of the managers and the interdependency
between the planner and the managers. We analyze how the managers can use
24
Marxist critics of the socialist countries described them as aberrations
of the original socialist principles, the communists did not represent the
interest of the working class. (See e.g. Bettelheim u.a., 1974.) The problem
then is reduced to a matter of democratic representation.
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their discretionary powers to realize their personal goals and thus frustrate
the planner's goals. In this chapter we also discuss the position of the
workers whom the planner has to take into consideration.
CIIAPT'ER 3
A PLANNED ECONOMY: TI~ EXAMPIE OF T[~ SOVIE'I' UNION
3.1 Introduction
An economic system is the result of historical developments in which social
and political processes and philosophical principles play important roles. At
the same time, the evaluation of existing systems is important in the
development of ideas concerning the ideal set of arrangements within an
economy. The developments in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union are important in the analysis and discussion on socialism, as
well as on planning and planning failure. In this chapter, we present some
constituent elements of the Soviet Union as an example of a planned economy.
It is the first attempt to build a socialist economic system. The countries of
Eastern Europe and other socialist countries such as China and Cuba built
their economic system according to the model of the Soviet Union.l Especially
during the first decade of its existence, there were extensive discussions
within the Soviet Union on economic policy issues and the institutional setup
of the economy. Also, in this period there were several attempts to structure
the economy in different ways.
These discussions ánd developments provide useful insights into factors
that are important in the functioning of systems. They ase the subject of
section 3.2. The period covered, runs from 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized
i Of course, there are differences between the individual countries due to
different backgrounds and different social and political processes.
power, until 1928, which marks the beginning of the centrally-planned and
fully-controlled economy. The new rulers quickly ended the Russian
participation in the first World Waz, but then, in its place, they faced a
Civil War. Their mad dash for power was contested by the so-called White
Russians, who were supported by the allied forces of the World War, France and
Great Britain. By 1921 the economy was facing enormous problems. Agricultural
output showed a decline, and so too did industrial output. The organization of
the economy was chaotic. In 1921 the Communists abandoned the communization
policy and accepted a retreat towards an economy with much more market
elements. The period 1921-1928 is known as the NEP (New Economic Policy), and
shows an increase in production, most notably in agriculture. In this period
too, there was a lively discussion about the path of development that the
Soviet Union should take. The events and the discussion in the 1920s are
important, because they point out the interdependencies between different
groups in the economy and tell us something about the conditions which must be
met if we want to install a successful, planned economy.
The NEP ended in 1928 when the collectivization set in and the first Five
Year Plan was formulated. This marked the beginning of the centrally-planned
economy that the Soviet Union was about to become and which other communist
countries were to copy. In section 3.3 we briefly sketch the lay-out of the
planning system. This system aimed to gain political control over the economy
and can be seen as the Soviet interpretation of the concept of 'one nation one
factory'. We describe the decision-making hierarchy and the planning
procedures. We also develop an analytical framework, in which we define, the
positions of the planner, the managers and the workers. We also reexamine the
concept of 'one nation one factory' and discuss the existence of firms as
economic units, with boundaries that are clearly delineated and with
significant decision-making autonomy. This framework enables us to disentangle
the complexity of the centrallyplanned economy and allows us to concentrate on
specific relationships. We can also use this framework to position the
abundant literature with respect to the operation of the centrally planned
economies.
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Within the framework, which distinguishes only three types of actors in a
centrally planned economy, we can describe three kinds of principle agent
relationships, the planner versus the managers, the planner versus the workers
and the managers versus the workers. Of course, these relationships between
two actors are intertwined into a complex three-actor relationship. The focus,
in section 3.4, is on the actual operation of the planned economy rather than
on its design. We use the operation of the Soviet economy as an example.
Because the firm has decision-making autonomy within the planned economy and
the autonomy of the firm lirriits the control of the planner, we have hadto
study the way in which the firm uses its discretionary powers. A starting
point in this section will be the motivation that drives the enterprise
d'~rector, or manager of the firm, which is the term that will be used here.
The operation of the firm depends on the motivation structure of its manager.
The firm, however, has to realize the goals that are set by the planning
authorities, which we conveniently refer to as the planner. Although the firm
itself can have distinct goals and instruments and it can operate as a unity
within the decision-making structure, the processes within the firm can exert
considerable influence on its operations. Therefore, we include a discussion
on the motivation and the strategies of the workers.
3.2 The rise to Soviet power
3.2.1 The period of War Communism (1918-1921)
When, in 1917, the Bolsheviks declared the Soviet Union to be the first
workerss and peasants' state in the world, they did not have a very clear
~
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blueprint of the future.2'' Their ideas of the future represented an
ambivalent juxtaposition of long-run utopian objectives and short-term
realistic expedients (Fainsod, 1953). The long-run objectives were those of
Marx and marxians, and included the abolition of alienation, oppression,
exploitation and domination. These objectives were shared by socialists in
other countries as well. The short-term expedients were the problems of
establishing Bolshevik power (Fainsod, 1953, Nove, 1989). The new state found
itself in a war with Germany, which was quickly ended, and in a Civil War that
lasted from 1918 to 1922. The economy had totally collapsed, and the
Bolsheviks had to spend time and effort to gain control of the entire country
and to eliminate political, and economic opposition.
The early measures that were taken by the Bolsheviks included a
land-reform bill which redistributed to the peasants the right to use the land
. No one was to be allocated more than he could cultivate.4 Workers' councils
were given strong powers; they were permitted to supervise production and
their decisions were binding. The owners of the enterprises were expected to
provide all information upon request. Banks were nationalized and a Supreme
CouncIl of the National Economy (VSN[Qi) was set up which was supposed to guide
and coordinate economic policy. These measures were conceived in order to
guarantee the power of the working people over the exploiters, and as a first
step towards the complete conversion of the factories, mines, railways and
2 Lenin had written rI'he State and Revolution', which came closest to a
concept of political communist rule August-September 1917. Bukharin and
Preobrazhensky wrote ~he ABC of Communism', which formulated a blueprint of a
communist society, in 1919.
3 The Bolsheviks were only one faction in the broad spectrum of the left
wing movement in Russia in the first two decades of the 20th century. (The
Soviet Union was not officially established until 1922.) They were a small
group of well organized revolutionaries that eventually succeeded in
identifying communism with bolshevism.
4 Nove (1989), emphasizes that the land reform was not so much initiated
by the authorities, as it was an act by the peasantry which the authorities
accepted and thus legitimized.
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other means of production and Lransport, into the property of the workers' and
peasants' state (Nove, 1989, p 43).
In June 1918 a degree was promulgated nationalizing all factories. This
marked the beginning of the so-called period of War Communism which Nove
(1989, 64-65) characterizes as: (1) An attempt to ban private manufacture, the
nationalization of nearly all industry, the allocation of nearly all material
stocks, and of what little output there was by the state, especially for war
purposes. (2) A ban on private trade, never quite effective anywhere, but
spasmodically enforced. (3) Seizure of peasant surpluses. (4) The partial
elimination of money from the state's dealings with its own organizations and
citizens. Free rations, when there was anything to ration. Nove adds a fifth
characteristic which puts the period of War Communism in a somewhat different
perspective. It is the enforcement of the above, by applying terror and
arbitrariness, expropriations and requisitions, in an effort to establish
discipline, with party control over trade unions, a siege economy with a
communist ideology, a partly-organized chaos.
Both in agriculture and in industry, the policies of War Communism caused
difficulties. The requisitioning of agricultural production induced the
peasantry to hold back production and to reduce the area of cultivation (Dobb,
1966)S. The peasantry started to oppose the new regime. The centralized
allocation of supplies and the ban on private trade resulted in a reduction of
production as the central planner was unable to control the vast territory and
only held limited information on the numerous enterprises. The system was
chaotic. Certain enterprises, mainly if they were important for military
purposes, were given priority in the allocation of inputs and workers and
could function relatively well. Other enterprises suffered, which provoked the
5 The Soviet Government was more or less forced to turn to the requisition
of agrícultural produce, because the increasing inflation made it difficult
for the Covernment to obtain resources through the market. The shortage of
manufactured goods increased when the peasants increased the demand for these
goods to avoid depreciation in the value of their monetary assets (Dobb, 1966,
97-103).
40 CHAPTER 3
reaction of widening the category of priority enterprises. This led away from
efficient planning. The scarcity of capable administrative personnel and the
lack of political sympathy led to open hostility towards the new regime.
Within the enterprises, attempts were made to decrease the powerful position
of the workers' councils. In 1918 the workers' control of the railway system
ended when the railways were placed under strict centralized management. Also
in 1918, a decree was issued stating that all able-bodied persons were
compelled to work and a Commission for Universal Labour Service, headed by
Trotsky, as created to mobilize workers.
The workers' councils were merged with the trade unions. Within the trade
unions, however, the Bolsheviks lost support to the largely non-communist rank
and file. The Menshevik influence increased through their program for free and
secret participation of all workers in all elections, freedom of speech and
press for all workers' parties and abolition of terror.s The Bolsheviks gained
control during 1921 by closing down congresses of trade unions where
Mensheviks dominated and through repression against workers who protested in
strikes and demonstrations, opposing the measures that limited the powers of
their elected committees (Schapiro, 1984).7 The centralization of the railways
brought about a discussion on the role of the trade unions within the
communist party. Syndicalists opposed the employment of non-communist
specialists who were to provide technical and managerial advice. Lenin adhered
to the idea of hiring specialists, because he saw it as an instrument to raise
productive efficiency. Syndicalists also opposed the growing habit of the
s The Menshiviks were another faction in the left wing movement. See
Kolakowski (1978) for an account of the discussions within the Russian left
wing movement.
~ Ruble (1981, 9-10) argues that trade union organizations that had been
in operation since 1905, lost whatever support they had to the workers'
councils after the Revolutions of 1917. In order to maintain their authority
within the factories they needed outside support which resulted in a coalition
with the Bolsheviks. See also Dobb (1969, 451) on the relationship between the
trade unions and the Communist Party, that was dominated by the Bolsheviks.
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central party organs, i.e. of substituting nomination for the methods of
election, and the increasing party control over industry at the expense of the
unions. Syndicalists advocated administrative decentralization and d'uect
democracy in industry. There was strong support, within the party, that trade
unions should not have any independent function in the state, but should be
subordinate to the Party and state authority. This discussion peaked in 1921
at the tenth party congress, where Lenin formulated a compromise allowing for
some union independence, but within the confinements of the party and
government policies (Schapiro, 1984, Ruble, 1981). Another attack on the
position of the workers' councils and the trade unions was the principle of
one man management which was advocated by Lenin together with his plea to
employ non-communist specialists. He gradually won support for this principle,
and in 1920, the ninth party congress accepted Lenin's view in principle.
The communists defeated the White Russians in 1920 by driving them out of
important industrial and agricultural areas and a peace treaty was signed with
Poland. This established the communist rule. Yet, the government did not have
great support. At the tenth party congress, in 1921, the party discipline was
strengthened within the Communist Party by the ban on factionalism. The
non-Bolshevik opposition groups were driven underground by 1922.s In the
economic field, the peasants resisted the compulsory procurements by reducing
production. The workers resisted the centralization of power. They also fled
from the factories as a result of the low and equalized wages. Absenteeism was
high, sabotage was widespread and strikes became common (Cregory and Stuart,
1990, 57). To top it all, the economic situation was disastrous. Industrial
production had dropped to 2096 of the prewar level, and agricultural output to
6496 (Cregory and Stuart, 1990, 58). There were uprisings in the countryside as
well as in the cities and the communists were more or less forced to retreat
from their policy of direct control and to revert to market exchange as a
8 The non-communist political organizations were rendered ineffective and
impotent by late 1918.
coordination principle. They did so in 1921, when they introduced the New
Economic Policy (NEP).
3.2.2 The perlod of NEP (1921-1928)
The most important feature of the NF,P was the reintroduction of the market.
The system of requisition in agriculture was replaced by a proportional tax of
the peasants' net produce in kind.9 The peasants were allowed to market their
products and sell to either the state or other buyers. This meant that private
trade was legalized. This was followed by freeing the enterprises from the
centrali2ed supply of inputs and acquisition of outputs. The extreme
nationalization of small enterprises was reversed, although only a small
number was returned to the former owners, and the nationalized enterprises
were granted financial and commercial autonomy. The commanding heights of the
economy, however, e.g. fuel, metallurgy, foreign trade, banking and
transportation, remained dependent on centralized allocation (Nove, 1989,
Cregory and Stuart, 1990). The economy recovered during the 1920s, although
this recovery was not without problems.lo The industrial sector lacked the
working capital needed to make a quick recovery possible. There was no food
and no raw materials. In agriculture, the effect of a famine which had struck
the country in 1921 as a result of low crops was still evident a year later.
The agricultural production recovered in the second part of 1922 and in
1923. Because the increase in industry was much slower, another crisís
occured, which became known as the 'scissors crisis'. Because of the
agricultural shortage in the first part of 1922, agricultural prices increased
9 In 1924 the 'in kind' tax was replaced by a monetary tax.
lo It took until 1926 for both industrial and agricultural production to
reach the prewar level of 1913.
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relative to industrial prices. The urban population had to spend more income
on food, which reduced their ability to buy industrial products. The shortage
in agricultural output also reduced the peasants' income, despite the
increased prices, and, therefore, industries could not even market the small
output they had produced. In response to the lack of raw materials and food,
the output programs for a number of industries were reduced in the spring of
1922. The harvest in 1922 was fairly good. Both developments set in a
reversion of the price ratio between agriculture and industry. The terms of
trade improved for industry until they reached their peak in October 1923.11
The adverse development of the price ratio narrowed the market for industrial
goods in the villages and the peasants responded by decreasing the supply of
agricultural products in the market.
The crisis wa most likely caused by the more rapid recovery of
agriculture, vis-à-vis industry, and through the institutional structure of
industry and trade. Although trade was liberalized, the government was still
the principal buyer of grain and thus had a large control over the price,
which was kept low. Syndicates were formed within industrys which also
controlled a large part of their markets. By affecting monopolistic behaviour
to improve the terms of trade, the syndicates reduced sales. They defended
this policy by pointing to the high costs of production. Production was very
inefficient and the enterprises still lacked working capital. In response to
the peasants' reaction and the increasing unrest in the countryside, the
government, in the autumn of 1923, decided upon measures to shift back the
price ratio in favour of agriculture. Grain prices were increased and industry
was pressed to lower its prices.12 These policy measures contributed to the
11 If one graphs out the industrial prices and the agricultural prices with
the index for industrial prices versus agricultural prices, set to 100 for the
prewar situation, the pattern will look like the blades of an open pair of
scissors.
12 The pressure on industry was exerted in three ways: Credit to industry
was rationed, which forced them to market stocks; Maximum prices were
announced; Interventions with imported goods were used to undercut industrial
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narrowing of the gap between agricultural and industrial prices and prevented
a crisis in industry.
With respect to the position of the workers, the discussions on the trade
unions in 1922 resulted in the adoption of a La,bour Code which defined a trade
union as an association of citizens working for gaín in undertakings,
establishments and enterprises, public or private (Dobb, 1966, 454-455). Trade
unions represented the interests of the wage-earners in relation to the
management and in relation to the governmental bodies. Membership increased
during the decade. Collective agreements defined wages and working conditions.
Other measures with respect to the position of workers included an eight-hour
working day, two-weeks paid holidays and social security benefits (Nove, 1989,
105). Towards the end of the decade the government tightened its grip on the
economy. The discussion on the role of the trade unions, as representatives of
the interests of wage-earners or as the transmission belts of the state, was
reopened. There was an increasing demand for labour, most notably skilled
labour, while wage differentials were small. The new labourers who came from
the villages were not used to the factory disciple. Labour discipline had been
slackening, absenteeism and labour turnover increased. Industrial managers
complained that the trade unions did not help discipline the labour force.
During NEP the communist party had succeeded in gaining the dominant
positions in the trade unions. This facilitated the turnaround in trade union
policies. Unions did not stress collective agreements any longer and slowly
turned into organizing bodies for socialist emulation (Ruble, 1981).la The
liberal policy towards the peasantry was also ended. Due to the increases in
both rural and urban incomes and the continuous policies of price cuts, a
situation of shortages had emerged in which the urban population had an
advantage over the peasants in acquiring the industrial goods, as the urban
prices (Dobb, 1966, 173).
la Ruble (1981) defines socialist emulation as the various methods used to
stimulate productive action through cooperative action.
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markets were closer to the factories. The peasants responded in a traditional
way by reducing the marketization of agricultural produce. Further price
reductions by the government, in order to economize on its budget, increased
the reluctance of the farmers to sell. This spurred the government in 1928 to
close markets and to confiscate crops. This was the prelude to the
collectivization of agriculture in 1928. Another development of importantance
was the experience that was gained in planning. Although trade was liberalized
during the NEP and a private trading sector developed, the state trade
organizations dominated trade. The VSNHk still controlled production and
distribution of some key commodities. The duplication of activities by several
agencies involved in planning was taken away and Gosplan was already involved
in the formulation of enterprise plans.14
The periods of War Communism and New Economic Policy can be characterized
as periods in which successes and failures in the Bolsheviks policies relieved
each other. The communization policy in the early period of War Communism
initially ensured the peasants' support for the communist take over, but the
grain procurements caused resistance. The peasants' withdrawal from the market
during the 'scissors crisis' forced the government to intervene in the price
development and in the monopolistic behaviour of the nationalized firms. With
respect to the position of the workers, the Bolsheviks only gradually got a
position in the trade unions. The industrial development was greatly hindered
by the workers' indiscipline and high labour turnover rates. It took until the
end of the 1920s before the communists had such a firm grip on society that
they were able to impose their plans for a collectivization of agriculture and
for the introduction of Five Year Plans as the guiding principle for economic
development.ls
14 Gosplan was installed in 1921 as a staff department of the Council of
Labour and Defense, which was the effective economic cabinet at that time
(Nove, 1989, 60-61).
ls And even then the peasants resisted the forced collectivization and
reacted not only by holding demonstrations, but also by slaughtering cattle,
3.3.3 A theoretical debate on the socialist development
The events in the period of War Communism and the NEP were accompanied by
discussions on the course of action that had to be taken in order to turn the
Soviet Union into a socialist country. As already indicated the policies and
strategies during the periods of War Communism and the NEP were partly adopted
as a reaction to events and partly fitted in a general program to establish
socialism. The course of this program was the subject of lively discussions
within the communist party. Some of the liolsheviks were deeply shocked by the
retreat from War Communism, others saw it as a necessary retreat, but were
concerned with limiting its consequences and resuming the building of
communism at the earliest possible date. There were others who welcomed the
end of War Communism, as they saw in it an unavoidable series of excesses
(Nove, 1989, 69). The developments during the first years of communist rule
initiated debates on the best strategy for long term development. An important
discussion concentrated on the optimal rate of growth of industry and is dated
between 1924 and 1928 (Erlich, 1971, Gregory and Stuart, 1990). The problem of
industrialization had occupied the discussants before, but the 'scissors
crisis' had pointed to the capacity limits of the economy. The industrial
capacity had been decreased by the World War and little investment had taken
place in the early NEP years. There was a need and a desire to raise
industrial capacity, but the capacity effects of investment would only be felt
after a while, while the income-generating effect would be felt immediately.
This caused an inflationary threat, whereby the terms of trade would again
shift against agriculture with all the known consequences.
concealing crops, thieving and so on (Nove, 1989). For a thorough account of
the collectivization and its consequences, see also Conquest (1986).
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There was agreement in the debate about the necessity to industrialize
the country, but positions differed on the rate of industrialization and on
the way to realize the rate of industrialization. Bukharin, who represented
the 'right wing' in the debate, stressed the political coalition of the
workers with the peasants as an important factor in the development of a
socialist economy.ls He feared that an increased rate of industrialization
would result in the peasants refusing to produce the necessary agricultural
products, as they had done before. By allowing the peasants to 'enrich'
themselves there would not only be sufficient agricultural production, but it
would also increase the demand for industrial products. It was, therefore,
important to pay fair prices to the peasants and to develop the agricultural
sector. The industrial development had to be geared to those industries that
produced goods that were in demand by the peasants. Bukharin continuously
stressed the importance of economic equilibrium. In a series of articles in
the second half of the 1920s,he critized the fast increase of industrial
construction which created a deficit of consumption goods, building materials
and foodstuffs. The high rate of investment created a demand for industrial
goods which the industry itself was unable to satisfy (Dobb, 1969, 203-204).
Although he depended on the private farmers to determine the rate of
development, Bukharin trusted that the cooperative sector would prove itself
to be superior to the private sector, which would encourage the peasants to
organize themselves in cooperatives too (Erlich, 1971, 30).
Preobrazhensky, on the other hand, who was the representative of the
'left wing' in the debate, opposed the development of the private sector from
the start.l' In analogy to Marx' primitive capitalist accumulation,
is The debate took place in journals and party meetings. A summary and a
discussion of the debate is given by Erlich (1971) and Dobb (1966 ) among
others. Bukharin (1970) summarizes his ideas on the economy in a period
transformation (from capitalism to socialism).
17 One of Preobrazhensky's reactions on Bukharins ideas on the socialist
accumulation is reprinted in Preobrazhensky (1965). In this work
Preobrazhensky sets out his ideas on the socialist development.
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Preobrazhensky advocated a socialist primitive accumulation to build the basis
for a rapid development. In the capitalist system the market economy had
replaced the feudal system to condition the accumulation process. In the
socialist system the development of the state sector should substitute the
feudal system. The focus had to be on building production capacity in order to
increase supply of industrial products and to be able to absorb the
unemployment that would result from the increasing efficiency in industry and
agriculture. Preobrazhensky was awaze that supply had to decrease in the short
run to allow for the construction of industry. He was also aware of the danger
of the peasants' reaction. A direct tax would lead to a rupture with the
peasants. The accumulation had to be financed via the instrument of price
setting. The state had to use its dominant position in the market to set
prices that would favour the development of industry. Prices for industrial
goods should not be set too high as this would attract private enterprises,
but they should be high enough to absorb all purchasing power (Erlich, 1971,
57-58). International relations should be monopolized by the state to reduce
the influence of the capitalist structure in the socialist accumulation
process. The capitalist countries were not to be allowed to invest d'~rectly in
the Soviet Union, but to import capital was acceptable and could contribute to
the rate of accumulation. Export revenues had to be channeled as much as
possible towards industry.
A third position, to the 'right side' of Bukharin, was taken by Shanin,
who like Preobrazhensky opposed the idea of balanced growth, but argued
against a high rate of growth for industry because the income-generating
effect would increase demand in Lhe short run, while the capacity generating
effect would be noticed only in the longer run. Investments in agriculture
would be cheaper and show a much faster result. Within industry the emphasis
should be on light industry rather than the capital intensive heavy industry.
The development of the agricultural sector should be used to increase exports
which would generate a flow of currency allowing for the import of capital
goods. A further azgument in favour of the development of agriculture is the
peasants' higher propensity to save compared to the workers.
A P1.ANNED ECONOMY: T[)E EXAMPLE OF TI~ SOVIET UNION 49
The positions converged towards 1928, but the discussion became
irrelevant with the collectivization campaign. Preobrazhensky's view
prevailed, industrialization at the expense of domestic resources, but the way
it was executed was radically different from Preobrazhensky's proposals.
Stalin, who had gained control over the communist party, decided to
expropriate the peasants and forcefully procure grain surpluses. This campaign
was supported by an ideological attack on the kulaks, the 'rich' peasantry,
which was said to obstruct the building of socialism. All available resources
were channeled into the construction of heavy industry. The way in which
Stalin pursued the industrialization of the Soviet Union was diametrically
opposed to the policies that were advocated by Bukharin, Preobrazhensky or
Shanin. It is to be noted that these participants in the so-called
industrialization debate also held important positions in the party structure
and were involved in every day politics as well. They were all opposed to the
use of violence to attain the aim of industrialization.
The dominant position of the communist party in society and the dominant
position of Stalin within the party were important conditions in allowing the
collectivization of agriculture and the adoption of the first Five Year Plan
in 1928.1B The opposition to these policies could be suppressed. This marks the
beginning of the centrally planned economy which was developed in the 1930s in
the Soviet Union and adopted in the Eastern European countries after the war.
1B It is notable that the dominant position and the centralized
organization of the communist party was not challenged within the party ranks.
3.3 The institutional setting of a centrally planned economy
3.3.1 The economic system of the Soviet Union
During the 1930sthe communist party succeeded in establishing a centrally
planned economy within the Soviet Union. The decision-making structure was
centralized. All ownership of the means of production was entirely in the
hands of the state and all economic decisions were made on the state level.
The firms, which were the basic units of production, were subordinate to the
branch ministries. The ministries were subordinate to the Council of
Ministers, which was answerable to the Supreme Soviet. The decision-making
hierarchy is depicted in figure 3.1.19 In this section we will briefly discuss
the major decision-making bodies in the Soviet Union. There is also a brief
discussion on the decision-making structure within the firms and the official
information structure in the centrally planned economy as being the benchmark
cases for the operation of the economy.
The Supreme Soviet was the highest organ in the state structure. It
consisted of two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the
Nationalities, and the members were elected in a general election. However, it
was a very large body, which assembled too seldom to be a very effective
institution to govern the economy. Its major concern in the economic policy
was the determination of the Five Year Plan which functioned as the guidance
for the long term development of the economy. The decomposition of the Five
Year Plan into the operational Year plans was left to the Council of
Ministers, with the aid of the planning bureaus.
ls
This section is based on descriptions in numerous books and articles, of
the institutional organization of the Soviet economy. In the book department
see for example Cregory and Stuart (1990 ), Hewett (1988 ), Hough and Fainsod
(1979), Kuschpeta (1974), Zimbalist and Sherman (1984).
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The Council of Ministers was elected by the Supreme Soviet as was a Presidium
which represented the Supreme Soviet in between its assemblies. The Council of
Ministers, a large body itself, also elected a Presidium.~ The plans
formulated by the Council of Ministers and the planning bureaus were passed to
the ministries, which had to decompose them into operational plans for the
firms. These ministries represented the decision-making power towards the
firms. But the ministers found themselves in a dual position because at the
same time, they were held responsible for the results of their firms (Gregory
~ There were already approximately 60 branch ministries, while the
chairmen of the important planning bureaus had ministerial status as well
(Kuschpeta, 1974).
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and Stuart, 1990, 167). The ministries were usually divided into different
administrative units that were responsible for sub-branches of industries. The
firms were at the bottom of the decision-making hierarchy, they had to execute
the plan.
The state was dominated by the Communist Party which, by constitution,
was the single permitted party in the state. Thus, the agenda in the
legislative and administrative state bodies was de facto determined by the
party. The party itself was organized in a centralist way and operated as a
unity.21 The organizational structure of the Communist Party was very similar
to that of the state. The highest organ was the Party Congress, its members
were elected. The Congress also met infrequently and elected a Central
Committee to attend to affairs between Congresses. The Central Committee,
which only met twice a year, in turn elected a Politbureau to handle every-day
business. The Politbureau, where all the major decisions were made, was in
fact the most powerful body in the party and in the state. It enforced party
discipline among members, who had to pass a committee of approval to become a
member in the first place. This gave the central organs of the Communist Party
an extremely powerful position in determining policies. Another factor,
contributing to the powerful position of the party was the nomenclatura
system. Most administrative positions could only be occupied by persons
approved of by the party. Usually, they were party members and were thus
subject to party discipline. A third instrument with which the party could
establish its influence was its presence in almost all organizations. In all
organizations there were party cells, whether they were ministries, firms,
municipalities or something else. With respect to economic decisions the party
not only determined the direction of economic development, which was highly
Z' The leading principle in decision making in the Communist Party was the
same as in the state structure, democratic centralism. According to article 3
of the Constitution (1977), thís meant that all organs of the state, from the
bottom to the top, were elected; that these organs were accountable to the
people; and that decisions made by the higher organs were also binding for the
lower organs.
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biased towards heavy industry, but also exercised great influence in the
execution of the plans within the firms.
The leading principle in the organization of the firm in the Soviet Union
was that of one-man-authority (Andrle, 1976, Fainsod, 1953, Ruble, 1981). The
d'~rector, however, was assisted by staff inembers, with whom he formed a
structural management unit.22 The general d'uector, however, bears full
responsibility for the execution of all the state directives. The director
also had to maintain close relationships with the representatives of the
Communist Party and the trade unions in the firm. Together, they formed the
troika that divided the responsibilities for the operations of the plant. The
party supervised the managers' activities and engaged in propaganda work among
the work force and enforced labour discipline. Via the nomenclature mechanism
it exercised a considerable influence on the appointment of firm executives.
Berliner (1957) and Andrle (1976) find that there was an amiable relationship
between management officials and party officials, where they took joint
decisions and each used their own channels to the benefit of the firm. The
position of the trade unions was less clear. It was closely related to the
dominant position of the party. Although trade unions were formally
independent organizations, they had to submit to the leading role of the
party. They had a function in the observance of the labour laws and
administered a number of social programs. Their main task, however, was to
mobilize the masses to secure advance in all branches and to (over)fulfill the
economic plans (Godson, 1984). The workers in a Soviet firm were allowed to
skip ranks and directly contact the general director with complaints and
suggestions. Trade union and party officials tried to discourage this. As the
party and the trade union were involved in the firm management, and had
important functions in the mobilization of the workers and the raising of
22 A structural management unit consisted of a chief engineer, a chief
accountant, a chief of the planning department, a chief of the purchasing
department and maybe some others, depending on the size of the firm and its
industry (Berliner, 1957).
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production, the workers did not have many instruments with which to pursue
their interests within the decision-making structure. They could only exercise
influence in a more informal way. High rates of turnover, absenteeism, slow
pace of work and bad quality of work became informal workers' instruments to
influence the decision-making process.
In a centrally planned economy the communication ran through
administrative procedures and along lines of hierarchy rather than via the
horizontal links of the market economy. Firms did not communicate with each
other directly, but only by mediation of the plan. Firms did not respond to
consumer demand either. The information structure was geared to build and
execute a plan. The traditional planning procedure as it functioned in the
Soviet Union is described in figure 3.2.~











A plan was formulated by the planner and reflected his preferences. This plan
~ Considering the definition of the planner in the next section we will
use the planner for the entire decision making hierarchy, other than using the
ministries and the firms. The top part of figure 3.1 and the structure of the
Communist Pazty should be plotted in the box of the planner.
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bore a high level of aggregation and it was sent down to the ministries for
disintegration into firm plans. In the so-called counter planning phase the
firms were then allowed to reflect on these concept plans. They were supposed
to state to the ministries their requirements which, according to them, were
necessary to realize the plans. This information was passed on to the planner
and used to reformulate the plan which was then in a final stage again and was
passed down in the hierarchy to the firms. These final plans for the firms
were rather detailed and contained indicators for the production of outputs,
the increase in productivity, the number of workers that could be hired, the
input requirements etc. Of course, this is only a highly stylized and formal
presentation of the planning procedure. To indicate that the information was
not just in one direction at any specific time, it is indicated that
bargaining processes, where information is exchanged in a direct
confrontation, occurred between firms and ministries and between ministries
and planner to support the administrative procedure. It can be added that
firms did have direct contacts with the planner as well.
As indicated before, the communist ideology expected the people to work
diligently once they owned the means of production, although the property
rights were exercised by the avant garde of the working class, the Communist
Party. In the formal structure of the centrally planned economy the planner
was somewhat more realistic and set up a system of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
rewards. The workers received a wage and other material rewards, such as
vacations and housing. There were also moral rewards such as the election of
'worker of the month' to stimulate the workers to put more effort into the
production process.
Before discussing the actual operation of the centrally planned economy
from the perspective of the motivation and the information and decision-making
structure, we will first simplify the complexity of the Soviet system by
presenting a model of the centrally planned economy with only three actors.
This enables us to get a firmer grip on the importance of the interactions
between the actors and enables us to formulate more formal models of the
centrally planned economy.
3.3.2 A planned system with three actors
Within the institutional setting of a centrally planned economy many actors
were involved in the process of drawing plans and in executing them. As there
were numerous levels in the decision-making structure, the position and
function of the intermediate actors was often ambivalent. A ministry had to
take orders from the Council of Ministers, but issued plans to its branch
firms. Similarly, the director of a firm was subordinate to his ministry, but
was superior to his staff and the workers. For the workers, the director
represented the planner, while for the ministry the d'uector represented the
firm. Workers had to execute the orders from their d'~rector, the director had
to execute the plans from the ministries and the ministries had to execute the
plans from the Council of Ministers. The success of central planning,
therefore, would depend on the way planning authorities were able to solve a
series of consecutive principal agent problems 24 The Council of Ministers
(principle) had to design a set of rules which motivated the ministries
(agents) to act in the interest of the Council of Ministers. The ministries
(principles) had to design a mechanism to induce the managers of the firms
(agents) to act in the interest of the ministries and thus in the interest of
the Council of Ministers. The managers of the firms (principles) had to
formulate such rules that the workers (agents) would act in the interest of
the managers and subsequently in the interests of the ministries and the
Council of Ministers. However, it is too simple to describe the operation of
the centrally planned economy as a sequence of principal agents problems. The
character of these principal agent relationships are of a quite distinct
Z' For a concise description of the principal agent problem, see Stiglitz
(1989).
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nature. They involve different types of problems, they are mutually
interdependent, and divergent relations between those who formulated the plans
and those who had to execute the plans can be distinguished. In figure 3.3,
therefore, we distinguish three different levels of principal agent relations
in a centrally planned economy and we discuss each level separately.
In this figure, we still distinguish four types of actors. The planner
can be seen as a summary for the decision-making hierarchy that determines the
goals and the contents of the plan, i.e. the decision-making hierarchy as it
is described in figure 3.1 together with the decision-making hierarchy of the
Communist Party.~ The ministries are defined as above. The managers are the
same as the d'~rectors of the firms and the workers are the employees of the
firms. The planner is always the principal, while the workers are always the
agents. The position of the ministries and the managers depends on the focus
of attention.
We can, therefore, describe three different types of principal agent
relationships. If we concentrate on the position of the ministry as an agent,
we are primarily interested in the relationship between the planner and the
ministries. We see the ministries as the responsible units for the realization
of the planned production. However, the ministries are not directly involved
in the actual production process, they mediate between supply and demand of
inputs and outputs between the firms. Therefore, we do not pay much attention
to level A of figure 3.3 and we take the planner and the ministries together
so that we are left with only three types of actors in the centrally planned
economy, the planner, the managers and the workers. It is, however, important
to keep in mind the ambivalent position of the ministries as it helps to
understand the relationship between the planner and the managers. So, let us
~ In this study, the political processes that were important to determine
the goals of the central plan are taken as a datum. The institutions that
played a part in the formulation of the plan at the political level will be
summarized as the planner. The planner formulates his preferences and draws
the plans that have to be executed.
briefly discuss the position of the ministries.
figure 3.3 Principal agent relatio nships in a
centrally planned economy
principal (planning) H agent (production)




planner ministries H managers wor ers
p anner ministries mana ers H wor ers
The position of the ministries is an ambivalent one. Although they are not
directly involved in the organization of the production process in the firms,
they do formulate the plans for the firms. They disintegrate the highly
aggregated plans they receive from the planner into operational plans for the
firms and they coordinate the supply of inputs for their firms (Gorlin, 1985,
Granick, 1980). Thus, they form the linking pin between the planner and the
firms, which brings them into an ambivalent position. Towards the fin-ns, they
represent the authorities, towards the planner, they represent the firms and
they are held responsible for the results within the firms. To be able to
realize the plans, the individuai ministries very often form a conglomerate of
firms to reduce the dependency on the operation of firms outside their
contro1.26 They also form close links with their firms and develop a
~ The vulnerable position of the ministries leads to a strong tendency of
integration to avoid the risk and uncertainties in the procurement of inputs
for its firms. One could say that the ministries face high transaction costs
and, therefore, prefer to control as many stages in the production processes
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paternalistic relationship towards them (Kornai, 1980). On the one hand the
ministries try to force or induce their firms to increase their production or
improve the quality of their outputs, on the other hand they are prepared to
stand by the firms against the planner and, because they themselves are held
responsible for the fulfillment of the plans, they are willing to bail out
firms in trouble. We explain that this ambivalent position contributes to the
planning failures in a centrally planned economy.
The second type of principle-agent relationship is the one between the
planner and the managers. We focus on the fulfillment of the plans as they are
formulated for the firms and find a clear cut separation between the level of
planning and the level of production. Production occurs within firms where all
employees are supposed to act as a team and are represented by their manager.
The plans are drawn up outside the firms, but the managers can exercise some
influence in the planning process. The managers have some discretionary powers
in both the planning process and in the production process. In the planning
process they have to provide information, while in the production process they
have to work. In both, they are able to behave opportunistically, which
contributes to the failure in realizing the planner's goals.
The managers of firms in a centrally planned economy are in an ambivalent
position. They are subordinate to the ministry from which they receive their
plans and towards which they have to account for the firms' results. In this
role they defend the interests of their firms. The firms, however, are
hierarchies within themselves and the managers are the principles within the
firms who must ensure that the employees help to fulfill the plan. In this
position they represent the interests of the planning authorities.
The third type of principal agent relationship that is described in
figure 3.3 is between the managers of the firms and the workers. This brings
the problem of the determination of the principal. If we are interested in the
operation of the economy as a whole, i.e. if we consider the centrally planned
as possible.
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economy as one single firm, the planner becomes the principal. The centrally
planned economy, however, is a hierarchy with firms rather than a pure
hierarchy (Ben-Ner and Neuberger, 1988).27 The intermediary levels enjoy
autonomy in devising some of their own rules and deriving independent goals
for themselves, which limits the ability of the higher levels in the hierarchy
to determine the activities of the lower echelons. We can identify an economic
unit as a firm if its boundaries are clearly delineated and it has significant
decision-making autonomy. This applies for economic units in centrally planned
economies. The management of a socialist firm has to decide how to implement
its plan. It has to decide which parts of the plan are given priority, it has
to decide how to utilize labour, capital, and raw material inputs, it has to
decide how to distribute the benefits et cetera (Ben-Ner and Neuberger, 1988,
p. 842-843).
We can, therefore also limit ourselves to the operation of a single firm,
in which case the principal is the manager of this firm. The manager, however,
is limited in his discretionary powers versus the workers, because the
employment relationship in a centrally planned economy is a special one.~ All
the means of production are state owned and, therefore, there is in fact only
one employer, the state. Wages are determined on a central level and the
managers of the firms do not have many discretionary powers in this respect.
Neither can they dismiss workers, as the state guarantees full employment and
the workers are very well protected. The position of the manager opposite the
workers, therefore, is not very strong. So, we prefer to define the principal
at level C as the planner and discuss the workers' strategies with respect to
their effect on the realization of the central plan, rather than on the
Z7 Ben-Ner and Neuberger (1988, p. 842), define a pure hierarchy as a
structure in which the production units are completely dependent on one head
for instructions regarding all activities they carry out. These activities are
designed by the head on the basis of information transmitted by all units.
~ Brus (1975), provides an excellent analysis of the employment
relationship in a centrally planned economy.
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decomposed firm plan.
The distinction between the levels of attention enables us to structure
the different types of analysis and the discussion on the operation of a
centrally planned economy and the failure of the planner to attain his goals.
A few remarks on two important schools of thought, with respect to the
operation of the socialist economies, may illustrate this point. One of those
schools is the economics of shortage, with Kornai as its most outspoken
representative, which we position primarily on the level B in figure 3.3. The
other school can be labeled as the disequilibrium economy and is advocated by
Portes, among others, which we associate with an analysis on the level C in
figure 3.3.
Kornai (1979, 1980, 1986) develops an analysis for the socialist
economies in which the so-called paternalistic relationship between the
planner and the managers plays a dominant role. This relationship induces the
managers to work with soft budget constraints, because they know that they
will be bailed out if they run into trouble with respect to the realization of
the plan. If managers are not induced to organize their firms efficiently they
will develop an insatiable demand, which will lead to shortages. These
shortages will appear both in the sphere of intermediaries and consumer goods.
Kornai argues that the firms also suck away products from the consumer
markets. Consumers are faced with hard budget constraints and cannot compete
with the firms.29
Portes (1980, 1981) concentrates on the relationship between the pianner
and the households. The planner wants the workers to supply the necessary
labour to realize his goals. As long as the workers are willing to supply more
labour as a reaction to wage increases, the planner can get more output simply
by increasing wages and employing more labour with the same supply of consumer
goods. This may induce the planner to formulate an unbalanced plan, although
29 In a dispute with Gomulka (see Gomulka, 1985) Kornai (1985), argues that
there is a large set of products which can be used by households and firms
alike, for example energy, food, cars, space, stationary et cetera.
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with this strategy he creates shortages on the consumer goods market. The
aggregate demand increases due to the wage increases, while aggregate supply
of consumer goods may fall behind if the planner prefers to increase the
supply of producer goods. The households will accumulate money balances which
they expect to be able to spend at some time in the future, when the
constraint on consumption is relaxed (Portes, 1981, 569). The focus in this
kind of analysis shifts to the reaction by the workers or households, i.e. to
the trade off between the supply of labour and the supply of consumer goods.
Portes, therefore, is primarily concerned with the question of whether or not
one can observe repressed inflation in the socialist economies, and the
households' reaction to it.3o
Although both approaches study the same phenomena in the socialist
economies, they find it difficult to communicate with one another. On the one
hand, Kornai (1980, 150-151) rejects the netting out of shortages and slacks
in a shortage economy, as is done in macroeconomics. According to him, it is
inadmissible within the institutional setting of a planned economy. In a
resource constrained economy, shortages and slacks are complementary factors.31
If one of the resources in the production process proves a bottleneck, others
remain unutilized at the same time (Kornai, 1979, 804). Shortage cannot be
described as a macro aggregate, it is a collection of millions of sub
micro-level elementary shortage events. Thus, it is impossible to do socialist
macroeconomics. Kornai takes a behaviouristic approach and he concentrates on
the position of the managers. On the other hand, Kornai's emphasis on the soft
budget constraint, as the cause for the runaway demand, is criticized by Bajt
3o Repressed inflation is a situation in which, at existing wages and
prices, the aggregate demands for current output and labour services exceed
the corresponding aggregate supplies, so purchases of goods and services are
rationed (Barro and Crossman, 1974, cited in Portes, 1989).
31 An economy is resource constraint if the effective constraints to
increase production is given by the available physical resources (Kornai,
1979, 804).
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(1991) and Nell (1992) for putting the world upside down.32 According to them,
the planner's expansion drive generates an excess demand which leads to
inefficient production which requires soft budget constraints to continue
production without interruptions.33
The contrast between the shortage school and the disequilibrium school
arises because the points of references are quite different. In Kornai's
approach workers hardly play any role, he concentrates on the manager's
behaviour to explain the inefficiency of the centrally planned economy.
Kornai's point of reference are the preferences of the managers. The managers,
however, are part of the decision-making hierarchy and a discussion of their
position is inextricbly bound up with the institutions of the centrally
planned economy. In Portes' approach there are no firms, there is just
aggregate supply and demand. The workers are not concerned with the operation
of the plan, they just want to earn an income and buy products. The point of
reference in this approach are workers' preferences. Because the workers do
not belong to the decision-making hierarchy, there exists a consumer goods
market and a labour market. This approach has a much more general nature. The
approach that is indicated in level B of figure 3.3, which is more or less
used in the shortage approach, is a more restricted one than that which is
indicated in level C of the same figure, which is more or less advocated by
the disequilibrium approach.34 We concern ourselves firstly with the limited
32 Portes dces not discuss Kornai's work in itself, but responds to
Kornai's criticism of his approach. Bajt (1991) and Nell (1992) are cited here
because both criticize Kornai from a macrceconomic point of view, i.e. by
emphasizing the importance of aggregate demand.
33 Bajt also points to inefficient labour input which leads the firms into
financial problems. The nonexistent ownership control over management and
consequently the deficient managerial control over labour intensifies the
problems of separability of outputs, shirking and free riding (Bajt, 1991, 7)
34 ~ye deliberately use the term more or less to indicate that there are no
sharp borderlines. There have been attempts to use elements of both to explain
the features of centrally planned economies. Kowalski (1986, 1988}, for
example tries to incorporate elements from the disequilibrium approach into
approach and discuss the relationship between the planner and the managers.
3.4 The actual operation of a centrally planned economy
3.4.1 The importance of the motivation structure: the managers
The description of the institutional setting of an economic system starts with
the decision-making structure, followed by the information structure. We are
interested, however, in the question of whether this institutional setting
suits the purposes, i.e. dces it help to realize the planner's goals? The
actual operation of the economy depends on the effort that the economic actors
are willing to make and on the interdependencies and interactions between the
economic actors, which are mediated through the institutional setting.
Although the official socialist doctrine expects full cooperation from
the managers and the workers in the realization of planned goals, there exists
a considerable gap between the system as it is designed to operate and the way
the system actually operates (Hewett, 1988). Two large interview projects,
conducted over a time span of thirty yeazs indicate that the managers of the
Soviet firms engage in activities that frustrate the planned character of the
economy (Berliner, 1957, Linz, 1988a, 1988b). This calls for attention with
respect to the motivation of the managers. Berliner (1957) explicitly deals
with this matter as he was surprised by the frequency with which his
respondents, Soviet managers that were exiled from the Soviet Union, referred
to premiums as an incentive to choose between alternatives in running the
firm. Managers were motivated to maximize their personal income, and did not
refer to the planner's preferences as a cause for action. It was the planner's
problem to design an incentive system that paid high premiums to the managers
the shortage approach, Brada and King (1986) go the other way azound.
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that were fulfilling their preferences. The managers used their discretionary
power to maximize their own incomes. Their main strategies were to send biased
information to the planner, for example they underestimated the production
possíbilities of their firms, and to engage in informal activities in order to
fulfill the plan, for example, they would create reserves of stocks and
capacity.35 They were able to use these strategies because they possessed
exclusive information on the production possibilities of their firms. They
sent distorted information to the planner in order to receive plans that were
easy to fulfill. They did not report reserves in order to fulfill plans more
easily. The manager in this report is very much a rational individual
maximizing his income and the focus is very much on the competition between
the managers and the planner.3s
A somewhat different approach to the motivation of the managers is taken
by Kornai (1980), who challenges self-interest by the manager as a motive for
action. Kornai (1980, 62), chooses a behaviouristic approach towards the
motivation of the managers and argues that the average firm manager tries to
do his job properly, simply because a large portion of people do so in most
situations without any special motives. In the hierarchy of the economy, the
managers are dependent on the higher ranks. They want to avoid confusion and
3s Although the creation of reserves, of course, also required the sending
of biased information to the planner, it concerns the organization of the
production process. The information structure is much more concerned with the
planning process.
3s Linz (1988a,b), draws a less strong conclusion. She differentiates
between operational capacity and design capacity The ministries are informed
on the design capacity, which can be read in manuals, and do have sufficient
technical expertise and experience to prevent over-ordering of inputs during
the plan formation. However, untimely or inadequate input deliveries decrease
the operational capacity below the design capacity, as dces the lack of labour
discipline, the competition for skilled labour between firms and production
delays associated with aging machinery and equipment. However, the manager
does need some consent from the planner for his demands for inputs above those
needed according to the design capacity. This points to a certain level of
cooperation between the planner and the manager.
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disorder in order not to disturb their superiors and they want to win their
approval, The managers identify with their jobs, which is sufficient to
explain why they send distorted information and create reserves. These are
necessary strategies with which to operate their firms successfully. In this
approach there is no strong competition between the planner and the manager,
but this relationship is a more cooperative one.ar
For the analysis of the operation of the economy, there is not a big
difference between the different types of motivation. From the manager's point
of view, a job is done properly if the planner sees reason to reward him for
his actions. The manager's self-interest does not necessarily contradict the
manager's interest in doing his job properly. It is a planner's problem to
formulate the conditions the manager has to fulfill to receive a reward. The
planner, thus, has to induce the managers to provide correct information on
the production possibilities within their firms and to state correctly their
input requirements needed to operate their firms. The planner must also induce
the managers to produce efficiently and use the entire production capacity of
their firms.
3.4.2. The actual information structure
In the official information system the planning process is a three-tier
procedure where information is transmitted from the planner to the firms and
vice versa. For the planner, it is important to collect information on the
production possibilities within the firms. This enables him to coordinate
production between firms and to ensure efficient production. Thus, a maximum
37 We could compare Kornai's approach towards managers' motivation in
socialist firms with that of Williamson (1975) because he adds behavioural
factors, such as satisficing behaviour to the microeconomic approach, while
Berliner's approach sticks to the rational choice model.
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contribution to the realization of the planner's preferences can be ensured.
The planner aims for two goals in the planning process. First, he wants to
know what the production in every firm will be, which of course is elementary
in planning. Secondly, he wants to use the means of production efficiently,
i.e. not to waste any resources. The firms have to provide the information on
the production possibilities. They can do this in the counter planning phase.
For the firms, it is important to fulfill the plans they receive in the
implementation phase. This brings the manager of a firm in a double position.
On the one hand, he has to provide information to the planner on the
production possibilities within his firm. On the other hand, he is responsible
for the production and he has to produce at full capacity. But, he has limited
instruments to influence the outcome of production.
Managers have the opportunity to plead their cases within the formal
information structure. In the counter planning phase, they can try to convince
the planner to revise the plan, for example, by allotting more inputs to their
firms or by lowering the required output plan. As indicated, the managers send
biased information to the planner to influence the plans that they receive.
However, the informal negotiations which go on between the managers and the
planner are just as important as the formal rights of the managers in the
counter planning and the misinformation of the planner. The managers can turn
to all the levels in the decision-making structure. They argue with the
ministries, but also with the planning bureaus or the party officials.
Berliner (1957, 225) notes that most of the important decisions that affect
the Soviet firms are being made on the basis of d'~rect negotiations between
the managers of the firms and representatives of the other organizations with
whom they have to deal. These bargaining processes stretch from the the major
decisions to maxters of details. Linz (1988a) and Richman (1963), however,
observe differences in the position of managers of consumer goods industries
and those in producer goods industries. Corrections to the annual plans were
much more difficult to attain for managers in the first group, as they
participated to a lesser extent in the important process of supply planning
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than do managers of the producer goods industries.3e
Not only do the managers of the firms try to exercise some influence in
the stages of plan formation, they also keep in contact with their superiors
duríng the execution of the plan. Very often, the manager of a firm is
confronted with supply failures or machine breakdowns which threaten the
fulfillment of the plan. In this case the manager can turn to the ministry to
explain his problematic situation and to plead for a downward revision of the
plan. Because of its ambivalent position, the ministry will often be willing
to do its best to help the manager out.39 The success of the manager in the
bargaining power, depends on the importance the ministry places on his firm
and on the quality of his network of relations. Although the ministry and the
manager are mutually dependent on one another, the decision-making structure
places the ministry in a dominant position. If the ministry were able to
concentrate on the operation of one firm it would be able to control the
entire process. The opportunity to do so is limited by the span of control of
the ministry, but it can select a particular firm for close control on any
occasion.40 This limits the power position of the manager of a firm.
38 The preferential treatment of the producer goods firms is consistent
with the Stalinist development model in the Soviet Union with its preference
towards heavy industry and construction that started in the Soviet Union in
1928 with the forced collectivization and the introduction of central planning
(Cregory and Stuart, 1990, Nove, 1989).
39 Because of the frequent problems in the supply of inputs and the
continuous pressure on the ministries for plan revisions, the ministries tend
to turn to empire building. They try to become self-reliant in every aspect,
which makes them more flexible and less dependent on firms that resort under
another ministry. Kroll (1988), analyzes this integration process in terms of
transaction cost economics, which is also discussed in chapter 2.
4o Even a close control over the operations of a firm dces not guarantee
its smooth operation. It is impossible to fulfill any plan, irrespective of
the monitoring that is exercised, if, for example, the required inputs are
lacking.
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3.4.3 The creation of reserves to operate the enterpríse
A well known characteristic of managers' behaviour in the centrally planned
economies is the hoarding of material inputs and labour. As indicated above,
the managers have to send distorted information to the planner in order to be
able to use the reserves. The planner, however, is aware of this strategy and
can react to it in a number of ways. F'or example, he can appeal to socialist
moral, he can intensify control over the firm, he can anticipate the managers'
behaviour by formulating taut plans in order to induce them to use the
reserves and he can relax his plans in order to eliminate the need to build
reserves. In this section we discuss the motivation to build reserves and the
consequences for the efficient operation of the economy.
The manager of an individual firm needs a reserve in order to be able to
maneuver within the institutional setting of a centrally planned economy. The
plan can be inconsistent and there are many uncertainties, especially with
respect to the supply of inputs and the operation of the firm. When a machine
breaks down, or when required inputs do not azrive, the manager will face a
shortfall of production. This will lead to underfulfillment of the plan. The
firm will not operate as well as it can, although this need not be the fault
of the manager. The consequences for the manager show in his income, which is
closely related to the realization of the plan, or in his cazeer perspective.41
If the manager succeeds in building a hidden reserve, he creates a safety
margin to fall back on should these events occur. The reserves can take
several forms, inputs, outputs and intermediates that can be used within the
firm itself, but also other products.42 It is important however to distinguish
between reserves in the form of stocks, as mentioned above, and reserves in
" The turn-over of managers was very high in the nineteen thirties but
slowed down after the waz (Granick, 1954, Andrle, 1976).
92 Masuch ( 1982), azgues that the hidden reserves can exist of anything,
production capacity, labour, inputs, time, information or relationships.
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the form of productive capacity. If the manager decides to use stock reserves
in one period to fulfill the plan, he might be able to replenish this stock in
another period. This would not be possible if he used excess productive
capacity to fulfill the target. Once he reveals his excess capacity he cannot
use it again as the planner would use this information in the formulation of
subsequent plans. Here, we concentrate on the use of reserves of stocks.
The easiest way to realize the plan is via a stock of outputs. Such a
stock can be created by reporting production below the actual production. This
can happen whenever actual production exceeds planned production and the
manager prefers to create reserves, rather than collect a bonus for
overfulfillment. It can also happen when production is already low, but the
manager prefers to suffer a smaller loss in income, in the present, by
underfulfilling the plan instead of suffering a(lazger) loss of income, due
to underfulfillment, in the future. Also, when the firm turns out output which
is not foreseen in the plan (for example red tractors instead of green
tractors) it may add this to its stock of finished products. The reserves do
not consist of just outputs produced by the firm itself. Sometimes, inputs
cannot be used in the production process. The firm receives inputs that it
does not use at all or that it cannot use in the production process because of
bad quality. Sometimes, it receives too much of an input, which means either
that it receives more inputs than planned, or it receives more of an input
than it can use in the production process. Because the level of production is
often restricted by only one or a few factors, other factors are in excess.
So, even if a firm is underfulfilling its target, it can build reserves.'~
The existence of hidden reserves threatens the efficiency of the planned
economy, means of production are left unutilized.4' The planner can mobilize
93 This is an important azgument in Kornai (1980), to argue that shortages
and slacks are complementary factors which cannot be netted out.
44 One can, of course, also argue that these hidden reserves are
conditional for the realization of the plan and efficiency in the socialist
economy has to be measured by the extent that plans are fulfilled. Here, a
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these reserves by formulating a taut plan. He speculates that the manager is
withholding production capacity or stocks and is underestimating the
production possibilities within his firm. In a taut plan, the planner sets the
production targets at a level that cannot be attained, with the stated
production possibilities, in order to force the manager to use his reserves.
This strategy gives rise to a vicious circle as the manager will respond to
the formulation of taut plans by trying to increase his reserves.95 The planner
can also turn in the opposite direction and reduce the tautness of the plan.
This would remove some of the necessity to create reserves and, thus,
contribute to the efficiency of the economy. Production can increase as inputs
or productive capacity can be mobilized. Some experiments have taken place in
order to reduce the plan tautness. Berliner (1988) describes an experiment to
reduce the plan tautness in the tenth Five Year Plan as having had disastrous
effects. The managers, contrary to expectations, increased their safety
margins. They apparently did not have much faith in the life span of this
measure and used the loosening of conditions to increase their reserves. The
managers' experiences and expectations accounted for this adverse reaction.
They have seen other reforms turned around and respond to this experience
(Kushnirsky, 1982, Hewett, 1988, Kowalski, 1986).96
The importance of plan fulfillment, taken together with the tautness of
more conventional definition of Paretian efficiency is used.
95 Another vicious circle arises when the planner analyzes the shortages
arising from the hoarding strategy as a shortage of productive capacity and
starts to implement investments to increase the productive capacity of the
economy. This would increase the shortages that lead the manager to increase
his reserves as a safety margin. (Masuch, 1982).
's Many of the reforms in the centrally planned economies increased the
scope of action of the managers, which caused vehement ideological discussion
within the policy circles. Decentralization of decision-making power would
fundamentally undermine the socialist, planned, character of the economy. The
necessity for reform usually ebbed away with its success, strengthening the
position of those in favour of strict central control (Brus, 1975).
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plans, explain why managers hoard materials and labour which they need in the
production process of the'~r firms. However, as akeady indicated, managers
hoard everything, whether they can use it in their firm or not. Stocks,
however, are not just means of production for the managers, they are also
means of exchange. Goods can be used to increase the reported production if
they are outputs, to increase the production itself if they are inputs, but
they can also be traded in order to attain other outputs and inputs. Berliner
(1957), found that a vast informal system of inter-enterprise procurement
developed, which operated side by side with the formal system. Within the
formal system the plan substitutes money as the means of exchange. The output
of one firm is planned to be the input of another. The firms have very little
opportunities to deal with other firms directly. As a consequence of the
planned character of the economy, an elaborate financial system does not
exist. Money is merely used as a unit of account and the financial paragraphs
in the plan are mirror images of the material flows. The financial plan serves
as a means of control for the central planner (Kushpeta, 1974). Investments
are also subject to planning which eliminates the necessity for a capital
market. Money cannot be an asset to generate a return via the interest on
capital loans. Firms do not have to save assets or turn to the capital market
to attract savings in order to cover losses or to finance investment.47
However, in the informal system of inter-enterprise procurement the managers
use their hidden reserves as means of exchange. This can be illustrated with
figure 3.4. This figure shows the flows of goods going into and out of one
firm in a planned economy. Other firms should be plotted behind (or in front)
of this figure.
,~ For consumers, the situation is different. They use money as a means of
exchange and as savings. They can deposit their money in a savings bank, where
they get a small rate of interest.
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If planning is perfect and no disturbances occur, the planner will distribute
all inputs and all outputs. All inputs will be planned inputs and the reported
production equals the true production. This is visualized in the vertical
arrows of the first 'column' in the firm. However, if planning is not perfect
and failures do occur and the manager runs a risk because he dces not receive
an income if plans are not fulfilled, the situation changes. As indicated
before, not all the input deliveries need to be required. Those will be
channeled into the hidden reserves. The same gces for production that will not
be reported. The manager will create hidden reserves, which he can use in
subsequent periods. The reserves will be used to guarantee an acceptable level
of reported production in the subsequent periods and, thus, will be used to




are a store of value to the manager, which he builds out of precautionary
motives.
In the case where the manager stores outputs, he can report this as
output in a following period. Input stocks can sometimes be used as inputs in
following periods as well. In those cases the stocks do not have to leave the
finn. In other cases, the manager has to use his reserves to trade with other
firms in an informal market to acquire the necessary inputs to fulfill his
plans. These informal actions are visualized in the second 'column' in the
firm. The box 'informal market' can be seen as a slice of a hidden tunnel
within the productive sector which connects the firms to one another. In this
respect the reserves are a means of exchange and they supplement the planned
economy with a barter economy. For the manager the reserves are an integrated
part of his decision-making process. The creation of reserves serves the
interest of the manager. He will, more easily, be able to fulfill the plan and
thus realize a bonus. One of the d'~rect effects is that the planner is not
informed on the production possibilities in the economy and will find it more
difficuit to realize his goals.
We can conclude, from the description of the operation of the centrally
planned economies, that the managers' motivation will lead to a number of
strategies that complicate the planner's task and lead to inefficient economic
performance. Means are left idle and the planner's goals are frustrated. In
fact, the centrally planned economy is much less planned than it looks at
first sight. The managers do have considerable discretionary powers and use
these to satisfy their own goals.
3.4.4 The importance of the motivation structure: the workers
In the previous sections, the managers are assumed to be the representatives
of the firm and emphasis is put on the relationship between the planner and
the managers. Within the finms the managers and the workers are supposed to
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operate as if they were a team. However, workers and managers may have
distinct goals, which can lead to different strategies. Because the result of
the firm, and thus the success of planning, partly depends on the willingness
of the workers to put effort into the production process, it is important to
discuss the position of the workers in the centrally planned economy. We have
to understand what induces them to work and what strategies they use to
realize their goals. Of course, it is important for the operation of the
economy to know how workers respond to strategies of both planner and
managers.
Historically, the willingness of the workers to provide labour inputs has
been a problem from the start, in the Soviet Union. In the early years of War
Communism and NEP, attempts were made to mobilize labour and to control labour
within the production process. All able-bodied persons were compelled to work
and the organization of production was built on methods that were similar to
those in the capitalist firms. In the 1930s one of the major problems for the
planner was to combat the upsurge of labour indiscipline, and in particular,
of turnover and absenteeism. In 1930, an industrial worker, on average, stayed
at a job for only eight months, while, in 1931, unauthorized absenteeism was
nearly six days for each worker (Barber, 1986, 59). In a stage of
industrialization, it is a familiar problem to mould people into the required
order and regularity of production processes. In 1930 and 1932, rewards were
introduced in the Soviet Union for those who remained in their jobs, while
those who left their job without permission were banned from working in
industry or transport for six months. Labour turnover and absenteeism both
dropped considerably (Barber, 1986, 61). In 1938-1940, new legislation was
introduced to counter turnover and reduce absenteeism. Work books were
introduced, recording the employment history of workers, and criminal law was
applied against absenteeism without permission. Nevertheless, the problems
persisted in the Soviet Union. Pravda (1979 ), reports high rates of turnover
in the sixties and seventies as well as lack of discipline, letters to the
press and collective protest as types of spontaneous workers' behaviour in the
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Soviet Union that influence the efficiency of production processes.48
As indicated above, the managers are limited in their powers against the
workers. The wage system is highly centralized with little discretion for the
manager, the full employment guazantee and the shortage of labour puts the
workers in a strong position vfs-à-vfs the managers. Of course, the managers
are not without instruments, they can offer some bonuses to the workers, but
productivity related bonuses may cause unwanted, non-socialist income
differentials between groups of workers (Rutland, 1986, La.ne, 1986b). Other
benefits like the distribution of apartments or the organization of holidays
are organized with the help of the trade unions. The effectiveness of ineasures
initiated by the manager partly depends on circumstances beyond his control.
The reluctance of workers to provide labour, showing itself, for example, in
high rates of turnover and absenteeism, is only partly directed to matters
that concern the production process. Inadequate housing, shortages in the food
supply or the prices of food are connected with the poor workers' moral and
the open manifestations of grievances, such as strikes and demonstrations, as
well (Pravda, 1979).
The shortages of consumer goods is a consequence of the planner's
preference to develop heavy industry and construction first. Workers and
managers are called upon to identify with the objectives that are declared by
the leading organs in society (Soos, 1986). Moral-political campaigns as well
as monetary rewards are used to induce workers to raise productivity (Rutland,
1986). The party organs and the trade unions are important mobilizing forces
that try to link the workers' goals with those of the planner. It is difficult
to get a clear picture of the responsibilities of trade unions and pazty
organs. As is already indicated, the position of the unions has been subject
to serious debate but developed into a part of the management troika. The
position of the party organs is even less clear as most management positions
4e Pravda (1979) adds moonlighting, pilfering and criminal offenses as forms
of spontaneous workers' activities that influence the efficiency of the
production processes.
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are subject to the nomenclatura system anyway. The success of the campaigns,
and rewards, nevertheless remained limited.
Campaigns and rewards are a reaction by the planner to the workers'
reluctance to cooperate in the system. If these don't work, the planner has to
adjust his goals and redistribute means of production into the consumer goods
producing sector. Attempts have been made to do so, but they were usually
short-lived (Brus, 1975, Bunce, 1980, Lafay, 1981).99 Nevertheless, they point
to the interaction between the planner and the workers, where the latter
engages ín informal activities frustrating the goals of the former. There is
not much evidence on this interaction as it is difficult to trace the
policy-making process in the Soviet Union.
3.5 Concluding notes
The centrally planned economy of the Soviet Union is by no means an economic
system that was first conceived on paper and subsequently put into practice.
The Bolsheviks succeeded in gaining state power in the revolution of October
1917 but did not have well developed ideas on the future of a socialist
society at that time. The revolution was a large experiment to establish an
alternative society from the capitalist one and the Bolsheviks were flexible
enough to respond to the results of their policies. There was a lively and
open discussion on the course of action on economic policy and there was a lot
of feedback between the development of ideas and the actual operation of the
economy. The communists had to withdraw their policies on numerous occasions.
It was not until the end of the 1920s that the power relations were crystalled
4s Some of the changes in policy came about from workers' unrest or
demonstrations. This goes especially for the smaller countries in Eastern
Europe, but these demonstrations reminded the Soviet Union of their
vulnerability.
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out and the Bolsheviks became the dominant political factor.
During the 1930s the institutions of a centrally planned economy were
built. A system which existed until the end of the nineteen eighties, but
which had not been an entirely static system. Although it was dominated by the
planner who had formulated the goals and the contents of the plans and who had
coordinated the allocation of the means of production and the outputs, the
planner was unable to operate the economy as if it was one big firm. He
depended on the information that he got from the managers. He also depended on
the willingness of both managers and workers to supply the necessary effort to
realíze the plans. He, therefore, has to motivate both the managers and the
workers to act in his interest. The appeal to the collective ownership of the
means of production did not suffice, the managers were motivated by premiums,
the workers by the wage level and the amount of consumer goods they were able
to buy with their income.
The planner had to respond to the strategies of managers and workers and
it is the subject of chapters 4 and 5 to describe the relationship between the
planner and managers (chapter 4) and the planner and the workers (chapter 5).
The first mentioned relationship is primarily concerned with the operation of
the plans at the firm level. It is possible to draw some conclusions from this
with respect to the operation of the economy as a whole. It develops into a
shortage economy. Some impulses can also be derived for a macrceconomic
analysis of the planned economy, most notably from the monetary functions of
the hidden reserves and the excess demand from the planner. The second
mentioned relationship steps outside the direct planning of production. There
has always been a consumer goods market and the workers were free to choose
their profession and the location of work. The planner has to implement some
macroeconomic policy, he has to balance the aggregate demand which can be
derived from total wages with the aggregate supply of consumer goods. He also
has to decompose the aggregate supply into goods that are in demand by the
workers.
C}IAP'IFR 4
THE PLANNER VERSUS THE MANAGERS
4.1 Introduction
The descriptions in the previous chapter show that the actors in the Soviet
economy do not operate as members of a team. The centrally planned economy
does not operate as one factory, which is the stylized ideal of a socialist
economy. It is an economic system consisting of many partially autonomous
units, linked through a central administration. It is a hierarchy with firms,
rather than a pure hierarchy, or a conglomerate, rather than a team (Ben-Ner
and Neuberger, 1988, Groves, 1973).1 The planner, nevertheless, is a dominant
actor in the centrally planned economy, he is the nerve centre who sets the
goals and to whom all are accountable.
The planner, however, cannot take for granted that the actors will act as
if they were members of a team. But, he is free to design the incentive system
through which the managers of the firms and the workers are rewarded. He has
to develop an incentive system which induces the managers and the workers to
act in his interest, which we assume to be the maximization of output. Of
1 Ben-Ner and Neuberger (1988, 842), define a pure hierarchy as a
structure in which the production units are completely dependent upon one head
for instructions regarding all the activities they carry out. In a hierarchy
with firms, the intermediary levels enjoy autonomy in devising some of their
own rules and deriving independent goals for themselves. Groves (1973, p.
618), defines a team-decision problem as, roughly speaking, a multi person
joint decision problem in which the decision makers base their decision
choices on different information, yet are motivated by a common goal.
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course, the planner wants to control the economy as much as possible, he wants
to decide which outputs are to be produced, in which quantities and in which
qualities. To be able to do that, the planner must be informed on the
productive capacity in the economy. So, one of the things the incentive system
has to bring about is to induce the managers to inform the planner,
truthfully, about the production possibilities within the firms. If Lhe
planner is informed he ís able to allocate the means of production in the most
efficient way to maximize production. Because the managers and the workers
have some discretionary power with respect to their input, labour power, the
second feature of the incentive system would have to be that it induces the
managers and the workers to use their input in the planner's interest.
In this chapter, we concentrate on the position of the managers and we
discuss the incentive systems that have to induce the managers of the firms to
act in the interest of the planner. We assume that the workers and the manager
of a firm act as a team, which is represented by the manager of this firm.2
Although, in the prevailing ideology in the socialist countries, the planner
expects full cooperation from the managers, in reality he is not so naive and
incentive mechanisms have been developed throughout the years to induce the
proper behavior by the manager of a firm from the point of view of the
planner. In most incentive systems discussed here, the basic principle which
guides the reward for the manager is, whether or not the manager is fulfilling
the plan. The manager is taken to be a bonus maximizer. In the traditional
system, which operated in the Soviet Union until 1965, the manager received a
fixed reward if the target was met, plus a reward (or a penalty) which varied
with the level of overproduction that he was able to produce (or the level of
underfulfillment of the plan)(Ellman, 1971, Mougeot, 1988). Because this
system induced the manager to bargain for slack plans, reforms were introduced
that encouraged the managers to adopt higher plans. For example, in 1971, the
2 The workers' motivation in this case becomes a problem for the manager
who has to secure that workers act as if they were members of a team. This is
the prevailing view in comparative economics where it concerns the planning of
production and this view is also be adopted in this chapter.
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informal bargaining for plans was replaced by a system which allowed the
manager to formally submit a counterplan. The managers were induced to adopt
high counterplans, but were penalized for deviations of the counterplan.
In section 4.2 we describe the most general case of the basic incentive
mechanism as it is formulated in Weitzman (1976). This basic model
concentrates on the truthful information that the manager is supposed to
transmit to the planner with regard to the production level. In this model the
level of production is uncertain and is described with a probability density
function. We illustrate the tension between the maximization of production and
truthful information. Weitzman's model has been widely discussed and numerous
additions have been made to bring it closer to real situations. The remainder
of this chapter is used to discuss some of these contributions. In section
4.3, we add managerial effort Lo the production function to provide the
managers with an additional instrument to maximize their bonuses. We also
discuss which influence the introduction of effort has on the planner's
strategy with respect to output plans, and which influence it has on the
likelihood of realization of the plans. In section 4.4 the planner is given an
instrument to directly influence the outcome of production, namely the
allocation of inputs. As is shown, however, the effective use of this
instrument, depends to a great extent on the information the planner receives
from the manager. The interaction between the planner and the managers is not
limited to a single period. Both will take the lessons from the past and their
expectations for the future into account. In section 4.5 we discuss the
ratchet principle, which links the firm's performance in the present period to
the target in the future periods. Finally, in section 4.6 we summarize and
evaluate the findings that emanated from the literature on incentive systems.
4.2 A basic incentive model
The planner cannot control the entire economy directly. He relies on ind'~rect
instruments to steer production. His main problem is developing an incentive
mechanism which will persuade the managers to produce an exact, predetermined
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amount of output and at the same time induce them to use all available means
in the most efficient way. Although the plan (issued to the managers in the
Soviet Union in the final stage of the planning procedure in the centrally
planned economies) contained figures for the quantity and the assortment of
output sales, input utilization, labour use and wages, profits, technological
development, investment, finances and socio-cultural activities, the
performance of the manager of a firm was basically linked to the fulfillment
of the output plan (Berliner, 1976, 405).3'4 This is reflected in the
literature on incentives, where most of the mechanisms are concerned with
output plans.
In most literature on incentive systems it is assumed that each firm
produces only one output. The system as it operated prior to 1965, in that
case can be written as (Leeman, 1970, Ellman, 1971):





where B is the value of the bonus and y is output. In this presentation the
level of output is at the discretion of the manager.s Bars indicate that it
concerns the pianned values of the symbol, hence y and g are the planned level
of output and bonus respectively. Finally, a is a parameter, fixed by the
planner, that rewards overfulfillment of the plan. The system, as it is
3 The total number of targets could mount up to 300. This would give the
manager quite some discretionary power in the selection of the targets that he
wants to fulfill because it would be impossible to fulfill all of them
(Hewett, 1989, 200).
4 According to an inquiry by the Russian Gosbank in 1974, the managers
received 40 to 60 percent of their income out of bonuses (Adam, 1979).
s There is implicit recognition that the manager does not have full
discretion on the level of production, but that he is limited by the input
allocation and the production capacity.
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described in (4.1), strongly motivates the manager to try to acquire modest
plans. The alternative cost of not fulfilling the target is that he will not
receive any bonus payment, so, in order not to miss out on this planned bonus,
he might underestimate the production possibilities in his firm. Of course,
low target plans would enable the manager to overfulfill the plan quite
easily, which would bring an additional bonus payment.s The managers would be
less inclined to bargain for easy plans and would accept higher targeted
plansif the penalty for underfulfilhnent of the plan were reduced. This
induces the manager to accept higher plans. Rewrite (4.1) into:
B- ay ~ a( y-y ) if y~y
B- aY f T(Y-Y) if Y~Y
a ~ a ~ Y
(4.2)
where 'a' and y are additional parameters fixed by the planner. We assume that
under normal conditions, i.e. inputs and production capacity are available,
production will always reach a minimum level.7 The first term in this system
induces the managers to adopt a high target plan. The second term involves a
reward in the case of overfulfillment, and a punishment in the case of
underfulfillment. The conditions imposed on the parameter values encourage the
managers to adopt a plan with the highest possible target, as overfulfillment
is rewarded at a lower rate than planned production, but, at the same time
they discourage the managers from adopting an overambitious plan that is most
likely to be underfulfilled.
6 The overriding importance that is attached to the exact realization of
the plan is often referred to as the Micawber principle (Dyker, 1981).
T We can also interpret the minimum production level as the minimum level
of production that the planner is willing to accept. A production level below
this level would carry severe consequences for the manager. To assure a
positive bonus the minimum production must at least be (y-a)y.
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Within this system, it is implicitly assumed that the planner and the
managers negotiate over the level of Lhe target. In the system proposed in the
Ninth Five Year Plan in 1971, this bargaining process was formalized into the
structure of the planning procedure. In the initial planning phase, the
planner presents the managers with an initial plan target. In the second part
of the planning process, the managers can revise these plans and formulate a
counterplan. Their performance is then judged with respect to the
self-selected target. Weitzman (1976) formalized this incentive system as
follows:8




The targetformulated by the managers, in response to the initial target
proposal, is given by y, while Q is the reward that the managers receive when
they accept a higher target than initially proposed. Weitzman concentrates on
the information-revealing aspect of the incentive system. The conditions
imposed on the parameters induce the managers to report targets that
truthfully predict production. Were it an indubitable prospect, the managers
would select a target that woul equal real production. This is illustrated in
figure 4.1.
If the managers know beforehand what the actual level of production will
be, they will select a target (y) equal to this level. If they select a lower
target they would overfulfill the target, and the extra production would be
rewarded with the value cx per unit, which is less than they would be able to
Weitzman (1976), offers the most generalized formulation of the
incentive system. Ellman's (1971) model, but also Fan (1975) and Bonin (1976 ),
are special cases of this presentation. See Vincentz (1981) and Mougeot
(1988), for a discussion of these types of incentive mechanisms.
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receive by adjusting the target upward. This would be rewarded with a factor ~
per unit. The managers would not be inclined to underfulfill the target as
this would reduce the bonus with a factor y per unit of underfulfillment.





Weitzman assumes that the system is characterized by a small amount of
uncertainty which permits the use of the expected value hypothesis. The
managers are risk neutral. The probability density function of y is f(y)
(Weitzman, 1976, 254). It is important to note that production in this case is
no longer at the discretion of the managers, but they have exclusive
information about the probability density function for the production. The
managers can use the self-selected target to maximize their bonus. Eor the
planner, it is important to know what relation exists between the choice of
the self-selected target and real output. The bonus-maximizing manager has to
choose the target which maximizes:
Y
max J(~ f~(Y-Y) t Y(Y-Y) f(Y))d(Y) f (4.4)e
~ , .








This problem is solved by differentiation of (4.4) with respect to y and
setting the result equal to zero. This gives:lo
9 The probability density function is defined on the interval (-oo,oo] which
suggests that it is described by a normal distribution. It would not make
sense, of course, to have negative production and it must be implicitly
assumed that we can neglect the probability of negative production. Recent
findings in Eastern Europe, however, suggest that there was negative
production, i.e. the value of the inputs was higher than the value of the
outputs. (This is, of course, calculated in world market prices which wete
irrelevant previous to the upheavals. )
'o The first derivative of an integral function, where the variable over
which the derivative is taken, appears in the limits as described by the
Leibniz equation:
w(x)
F(x) - f f(t,x)dt
cp(x)
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Using that (4.5) describes a probability density function (4.6) can be
rewritten into:
(Q-Y)P(Y~Y) f (~-a)P(Y~Y) - 0.
This is the same as:
P(Y~Y) - (7-R) - (Y-~)- (Y-~) f (~-a) - (Y-a).
(4.7)
(4.8)
The optimal target for the manager can now be calculated. The probability of
overfulfillment of the target should equal the ratio given at the right hand
side of (4.8). If the planner attaches a high value in order to know the
outcome of the production process in advance, he will have to increase this
ratio. He has to balance his preference for advance knowledge and his
preference for high growth. If there is a high likelihood of plan fulfillment,
because the managers choose low targets, the planner's coordination task is
easy. He can be fairly certain that the targets will actually be produced, but
the level of production will be moderate. If the planner prefers high
w(x) 8fF'(x) - f(y~(x),x) - f(cp(x),x) t f [~](t,x)dt
~p(x)
The first and second term in the derivation are called the Leibniz terms and
are canceled in Weitzman's solution.
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production he will have to accept a higher uncertainty whether or not his
growth targets will actually be fulfilled. The planner can manipulate the
parameters and in this way can induce the manager to adapt the target.
Comparative static analysis shows what happens to the managers' target choice
and the likelihood of plan fulfilltnent (Weitzman, 1976, Snowberger, 1977).
An increase in the penalty for underfulfillment (T) of the target induces
managers to reduce the target. The planner increases the probability with
which production will exceed the planned level. Similarly, an increase in the
reward for overfulfillment (oe) will result in a higher target and a reduced
probability that this target will be overfulfilled. An increase in the reward
for accepting a higher plan target (~) will lead the manager to increase the
target and reduce the probability for overfulfillment. The parameters can be
chosen differently for all outputs that are produced, reflecting the
importance that the planner attributes to exact plan-fulfillment of outputs.
Changes in the initial bonus (B) and the initial target (y) do not influence
the choice of the self-selected target.
The solution to the optimization problem becomes more complicated if risk
aversion is introduced. In that case, the managers want to maximize the
expected value of the utility of their bonus. Comparative static analysis of
the first order conditions will show the effect of a change in the planner's
parameters (cx, ~, ~y, B, y) for the selection of the manager's optimal target
(y). The effects of changes, in the reward for overfulfillment and
underfulfillment, are quite clear. They are the same for a risk-neutral and a
risk-averting manager. However, changes in the initial bonus (B) and the
initial target (y) will affect the choice of the manager's target in the case
of risk aversion, while the reactions to changes, in the reward that is given
for the acceptance of a higher target (~), are, in this case, disputable
(Snowberger, 1977, Ekern, 1979). The d'uection of the managers' reaction
depends on their absolute and relative risk aversion. Snowberger, for example,
suggests that an increase in the initial bonus will reduce the self-selected
target, as the manager will be better off no matter which target he chooses.
The loss of bonus, through selecting a lower target (~(y-y)), is compensated
by the increase in the initial bonus, while it increases the probability for
overfulfillment, which in turn results in a larger bonus for overfulfillment.
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Ekern (1979 ), however, argues that intuitively it is just as reasonable that
a
the increase in the initial bonus induces the manager to accept a higher
self-selected target. Because the manager will be better off in all situations
his capacity to accept risks increases. This might induce him to select higher
targets.ll
A change in the parameter structure induces the managers to accept higher
plan targets or to reduce their plans. As indicated above, an increase in the
reward for overfulfillment of the plan will result in higher targets. However,
nothing is said about the intensity with which the managers react to changes
in the parameter values, because nothing is said about the shape of the
probability density function which describes production. But the actual
density of the function influences the managers' reactions. If the probability
density function has a wide variance, the changes in the parameters need to be
much larger to provoke, for example, a five percent increase in the
counterplan compared to the situation with a small variance in the probability
density function. Also, the initial position on the density function will make
a difference in the managers' reactions. If the starting point is close to the
peak, (assuming that we are considering a single-peaked function) the change
in parameters needs to be bigger than if the initial position is away from the
peak to arrive at a similar result, with respect to changes in the
counterplans. A movement towards the peak will show characteristics other than
a movement away from the peak. Similarly, whether or not the density function
is skewed will make a difference in the managers' reactions. This means, that
for some outputs the planner can use a different strategy than for others,
which would complicate the planning process.
Another issue worth mentioning, is that the managers in this presentation
are operating mechanically. Once the parameters are fixed the managers
calculate their optimal strategy. They are not active actors in the sense that
11 Ekern (1979), develops the Pratt-Arrow absolute risk-aversion function
to describe the conditions for the managers' reactions to changes in the
parameter structure. The characteristics of the risk aversion are essential in
these reactions.
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their strategies make a difference in the outcome of the production process.
This deficiency is recognized by Weitzman, but he dces not elaborate on this
issue as he is mainly concerned with the information-revealing properties of
the incentive system. Others, however, did pick up this issue of direct
manager's influence on the outcome of production processes. This is the
subject of the next section.
4.3 The influence of managers on the level of production
In chapter 3, we illustrated that the managers contribute to the fulfillment
of the plan. They build stocks of inputs to counteract the uncertainties in
the supply system. These stocks function as an insurance against failure to
realize the plan targets. Another possibility for the managers to influence
the level of output is via the organization of production, for example, via
increased monitoring of the workers. Keren (1972), summarizes the manager's
influence on production as effort, e.12 The introduction of effort enables them
manager to influence the outcome of the production processes. Production,
further, remains dependent on a random factor 6 which is described in a
probability density function f(B). Miller and Thornton (1978) suggest a
'production function':
Y - Gíem) f B
f(B) ~ 0 B ~ B 5~
f(B) - 0 otherwise.
(4.9)
( 4.10 )
lZ Keren (1972), defines effort in this context as a labour augmenting
quality above the innate and acquired abilities of the manager. To focus on
this factor, all other factors on which production depends are assumed
constant.
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The production function has positive, diminishing marginal products in both
arguments, i.e. G'(e )~ 0, G"(e ) ~ 0 and once B is known, the inversem m
G-1(y-B) exists, because of monotonicity of G.
The introduction of effort into the production function yields an
additional instrument to the managers, with respect to their goal, i.e. bonus
maximization. They have to determine both the counterplan and the level of
effort ( Miller and Thornton, 1978, Bonin and Marcus, 1979). Although the use
of effort increases the possibilities of exact plan fulfillment, it is not a
costless instrument. Measuring the disutility of effort in monetary terms
enables effort X(e ) to be introduced directly into the Weitzman incentivem
system ( 4.3 ):
B- B t~(Y-Y) f a (Y-Y) - X(em) if Y? Y
B-~ f~(Y-Y) f Y(Y-Y) - X(em) if Y ~ Y
0 ~ cx~~~ Y,
X( e)~ 0, X' (e )~ 0, X" ( e )~ 0.
m m m
(4.11)
If there were no uncertainties in the production process, the managers, like
before, would select a target equal to the level of output and a level of
effort such that the marginal cost of effort, X'(e ) equals the marginalm
reward of effort, ~G'(e ). However, if production is determined in am
stochastic process as well, the situation is different. The manager has to
select a target in the counter-planning phase. Given the choice of target, the
manager subsequently observes the value of B and will select a level of effort
which maximizes his bonus. He will select a level of effort where marginal
cost of effort equals marginal revenue. Three situations can be distinguished.
Firstly, the observed B is low, to an extent that increasing effort to produce
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the exact tazget would not maximize the bonus, as the marginal cost of effort
would exceed the marginal revenue. The individual manager, in this case, would
select an upper level of effort e where X'(e )- YG'(e ) and the targetma ma mn
would be underfulfilled. A second possibility, is that the manager observes a
very high value of B and the maximization of the bonus will result in a level
of effort that causes overproduction, as the marginal revenue for effort
exceeds the marginal cost. In this case the manager would select the lowest
level of effort em~ where X'(emt) -~~(emt)' If the manager
chooses the upper
level of effort for situations where B ~ B ~ B and the lower level of effort- a
for situations where B~~ 9 5 ~, a third level of B can be observed in the
range Bn~ 9 ~ B~. In this range, the manager can vary'effort in the range
e ~ e ~ e and can maximize his bonus at e- G-1(y-B) and a level ofm~ mn m
production which equals the self-selected tazget (Miller and Thornton, 1978).
The optimum level of effort, given any level of the target y and observing the
level of B, can be described as:
r
e -e if BSBSB
m mu - n
- C-'(y-B) if Bac B c Bl
- em~ if B~5 B 5~
( 4.12 )
The introduction of effort into the basic incentive system gives the managers
more influence on the realization of the targets. It increases the probability
of a more exact plan fulfillment because the managers can use their effort in
order to realize the target, thus preventing under or overfulfillment of the
target. Eor a given target, the manager is able to determine the optimal level
of effort, observing the outcome of the stochastic process B. Miller and
Thornton (1978), continue by describing how the manager chooses the optimal
target, given the rule by which he determines his effort. They implicitly
assume the manager to be risk neutral. The manager selects a target which will
maximize his expected bonus:
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Y
e o , .
~(B f Q(Y-Y) f Y(Y-Y) - X(emu))f(B))d(e) f
B i . .
J(B f~(Y-Y) - X(G 1(Y-B)))f(B)d(B) tB
A . .




This problem is solved in the same way as (4.4) was solved, i.e. by
differentiating this expression with respect to y and setting the result equal
to zero. This yields:
B e
u t . . „




Because X'(G'(y-e))(a(c 1(y-e))~ay) is y when the middle term is evaluated at
B~ and also in the interval B ~ B ~ Bu and it is oc when the middle term is
evaluated at Bu and also in the interval 9~~ B 5 8, ( 4.14 ) is the same as:
~ - E(X'(G ~(Y-e))(a(G lÍY-B))IaY)I. (4.15)
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The reward for an increase in the self-selected target should equal the
expected value of the marginal cost of effort which ís needed to exactly
fulfill the target.
In a case where effort is not applied, we can apply comparative static
analysis to analyze the planner's influence on the managers' behavior via
manipulation of the parameters. The planner, in this case, not only influences
the selection of the target, he also influences the likelihood that the target
will be fulfilled. This complicates the analysis with respect to the manager's
reaction to changes in the parameters. All other things equal, comparative
static analysis yields that an increase, in either the reward for
overfulfillment, or the punishment for underfulfillment, will result in the
choice of a lower target, which reduces the probability of underfulfillment.
However, an increase in the reward for overfulfillment will increase e~ as
well and an increase in the punishment for underfulfillment will increase e.mu
The latter change will reduce the probability of underfulfillment even
further.
An increase in the reward for planned production will lead, ceteris
paribus, to an increase of the self-selected target. But it will also change
the interval [9u,B~] and will increase effort for any level of observed B. If
the planner raises the punishment for underfulfillment 7 and the reward for
selecting a higher target ~i simultaneously, in such a way that the manager
would select the same target as before, he will still increase the probability
that this target will be fulfilled, because of the increase in e. However,
mn
it is impossible for the planner to calculate the probability of plan
fulfillment, as this depends on the values of B and B, which in turn depends
v 1
on the disutility of effort (Miller and Thornton, 1978).
The introduction of effort, together with the introduction of a random
factor in the production function, enriches the basic incentive system, while
preserving its main purpose, the incentive for the manager to reveal expected
production truthfully. A further generalization of the system would involve
the inclusion of risk aversion by the manager. The managers would then also
respond to changes in the initial target and the basic bonus. The uncertainty,
with respect to plan fulfillment, would increase for the planner as the
managers' reaction to changes in the planner's target and the initial bonus
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would depend on their risk aversion. This does not differ from the situation
discussed by Snowberger (1977) and Ekern (1979).
A further generalization would be a discourse on the influence of the
random factor to the likelihood of plan fulfillment. The distribution of the
random factor remains undiscussed, although the systems work best with
continuous, single-peaked, normal functions.13 An important feature of the
introduction of effort is the increased probability that the plan will be
exactly fulfilled. However, the distribution of the random factor may be such
that either underfulfillment or overfulfillment is very likely, but exact plan
fulfillment is unlikely. This can occur, for example, if a manager is unable
to realize the plan due to an input being delivered after a specific dead line
in the planning period, but could easily fulfill the plan if the input is
supplied before this deadline. An illustration is given in figure 4.2, where
part A gives the distribution of B and part B gives the combinations of effort
and production.
The effort, that the manager is willing to spend in the distribution of B
as it is drawn in figure 4.2, is either at the maximum value or at the
minimum. The likelihood of exact plan fulfillment is low, as in the original
Weitzman model. Although the incentive model concentrates on the truthful
reporting of production by the manager to the planner, it does not elaborate
on how the planner will use this information. Bonin and Marcus (1979), argue
that the planner can compare performances of managers of a collection of
production units which have the same production conditions, i.e. a similar
distribution of B. The more responsive managers, i.e. with a lower disutility
of effort, will be more likely to fulfill the plans. The planner can use this
information to identify the more responsive managers and assign them to
sectors with high uncertainties, or with high priority to plan fulfillment.
13 With the exception of Bonin (1976), who discusses the effect of a
unimodal and negatively skewed distribution of the probability density
function f(B) in the Fan (1975) reward mechanism.
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The less responsive managers can be assigned to other sectors. Of course, the
planner can only rank the managers according to responsiveness if he has
information on the distribution of B in the firms. But he only observes the
level of output and it is not very likely that f(B) is the same function in
every firm. Therefore, it is not easy to identify the responsive manager from
the others. The allocation of managers, however, is not the only allocative
instrument the planner holds. He also allocates inputs, which gives him some
direct influence on the level of output. This reduces the randomness of
production even further. This is the subject of the next section.
4.4 The planner's influence on the level of production
In the previous sections, we assumed that the planner did not influence the
organization of production in a d'uect way, but that he tried to influence the
managers' decisions by adjusting the parameters and by setting the initial
output plans. In the basic incentive model, production was randomized. In the
extension of this model, the managers were given the opportunity to exercise
some influence on the outcome of production. The planner did not influence the
production process, neither had he any information on the distribution of the
density function of production. This, of course, reduces the planner's powers
to a level which one would not expect in a centrally planned economy. The
planner should have at least some idea of the possible levels of the initial
output plans and thus of the range of production possibilities. Because, in a
centrally planned economy, the allocation of ineans of production is
centralized, the planner knows approximately how many inputs are used to
produce the output.l, The centralized allocation of inputs, however, provides
the planner with an instrument to directly influence the level of production.
14 Of course, if the planner neglects the existence of an informal market
he would be able to establish a direct connection between the inputs allocated
to a particular firm and its output.
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If a firm dces not get any inputs, it will not turn anything. But, if one firm
receives more input than another one operating under the same conditions, and
with the same technology, it should show a better output than the other firm.
The planner can use the instrument of allocation to influence production
in the economy. But, he has to know about all the production functions in the
firms in order to be able to maximize production. For this, he relies on
information from the managers. The planner, therefore, has to design an
incentive system which will induce the managers to provide correct information
on productivity. In a situation where production only depends on the inputs
received, and the allocation of input to a firm depends on the information
provided by the same firm, Loeb and Magat (1978), show that in the Weitzman
incentive mechanism, the dominant strategy of the the manager of this firm is
to report falsely on his production possibilities, i.e. to adopt a high
target. If other firms report truthfully, the manager of a single firm may
increase the input allocation to his firm by transmitting false information on
his production function, in order to increase his production and his bonus.
If, however, the input allocation to a particular firm dces not depend on
information on the production functions, but depends on the information given
by all the other firms, the incentive to report truthfully is restored. This
type of incentive system is introduced by Croves (1973).
Miller and Murrell (1981), discuss the Croves mechanism for a situation,
where production depends on the allocation of inputs and on the level of
effort. The managers are able to influence the outcome of production by
altering their effort. They discuss an economy with two firms (i - 1,2) which
operate with the following Cobb-Douglass production functions:
cx 1-cx
H~(e~,k~) - e j jkj j if e~ ~ éf
o~ 1-cx
- é ~k ~3 ; if ei ~ é~,
( 4.16 )
where ki is the amount of inputs allocated to firm i. For the sake of
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simplicity, it is assumed that éj - ki. This implies, that for every level of
input allocation there is a level of effort above which the marginal level of
effort is zero. There may be a discontinuity in the production function at the
level of é~. The bonus formula is given by:




The superscript f indicates forecasts by the other manager with respect to his
effort and production, the parameter T~ indicates the disutility of effort
which is measured in the same measure as is production.
The managers will maximize their bonus in the usual way, i.e. by
differentiating the bonus function with respect to ei and setting the result
equal to zero. This yields:
1
ei -(ai )(1~~ ) k~ if e~ ~ é
i
r 1
e- k if e ~ é.




T - (al )( 1-aj )~ (4.19)
1
only:
J~(k~) - T~kj if Tí 5 1
-k ifT ~1.i i-
The bonus of firm i will be:
r
Bj - Jj(k~) f J~~(k~~) - Tiei
( 4.20 )ls
(4.21)
The planner's problem is to allocate the inputs to both firms in order to
maximize overall production. In (4.20), it is clear that the planner allocates
all inputs to the firm whose manager has reported the highest value of T.ls For
the managers, the problem is to decide which message to send to the planner.
Because the situation is symmetrical we deal with manager 1. We can describe
the following pay offs for this manager:
(i) Bl -(1-rl)K, if T~ ~ TZ and Tl ~ 1;
(ii) Bl - TIIC(1-al), if TÍ ~ TZ and Tl ~ 1;
(iii) Bl - K, if Ti ~ TZ and TZ ~ 1;
(iv) Bl - TZK, if Ti ~ T2 and T2 ~ 1.
1 1
ls If ej ~ é~, then T`a~ k~ ~ ki and thus Tia~ ~ 1 and T~ ~ 1.
's Miller and Murrell ( 1981), mistakenly reverse the condition Tzl in
(4.20), which suggests that a high T will result in a high production, given
the input allocation, without violation of the upper limit of effort. We have
to assume that the manager will forecast a level of production ( a value for T)
without consideration of the maximum ]evel of effort.
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If Tl ~ 1, the manager will want the other firm to receive all inputs if
(1-rl )K ~ T2K, which will result in Ti ~ TZ and will want to receive all
inputs if (1-rl)K ~ TZK, resulting in Ti ~ TZ. The optimal strategy for
manager 1 in this case if Ti - (1-rl).17 Similarly, if TI ~ 1, the manager will
want all inputs to go to the other firm if Tl(1-cxl) 5 TZ, resulting in Ti 5 TZ
and he will want to receive all inputs if Tl(1-cxl) ? T2, resulting in Ti ~ TZ.
In this case the optimal strategy will be Ti - Tl(1-ocl). Thus, we conclude,
that in both cases the manager will underestimate the value of Tl and his
forecast to the planner will be independent of the forecast of the other
manager. This is, therefore, a dominant strategy leading to a Nash equilibrium
(Miller and Murrell 1981, 259). The manager can report a low value of T by
exaggerating the disutility of effort, which is an unobservable input.18
Although the centralized input allocation increases the planner's
influence on the outcome of the production processes, it dces not necessarily
increase the planner's information on the production capacity. There is no
incentive system which both induces the managers to report truthfully and
results in efficient production. Of course, the planner has to take the
managers' reactions into account. As he cannot be certain about the true
production capacity in the firms, there is an element of uncertainty in the
managers' reactions to changes in the planning parameters. This uncertainty
becomes an important factor if we extend the analysis of incentives to a
situation with two or more periods. The planner has to anticipate the
managers' strategies, and, at the same time, the managers have to anticipate
the planner's behavior. In the next section, we discuss the planning process
and the managers' and planner's strategies for a situation with a longer time
horizon than one period.
17 Ti -(1-rl ) ~ 1, while Tl ? 1.
18 Manipulation of information on or~ is more difficult as an increase on
the one hand increases aj~r~, but on the other hand reduces l~ai.
4.5 The manager and the ratchet effect
In a single period model the choice of the target depends on the information
the planner receives from the manager, on the allocation of inputs and on his
goals. We assume that the planner is interested in the full use of the means
of production in order to maximize output. Within a planning period the
planner can formulate a taut plan to force the manager to use all of his
capacity, i.e. to exert himself. By definition, a taut plan is a plan likely
to be underfulfilled. The formulation of taut plans might, on the one hand,
result in higher production. On the other hand, however, a taut plan increases
the uncertainties with respect to the fulfillment of plans. If a necessary
input is not delivered to a particular firm, this firm faces problems in
realizing the planned output. This situation is likely to occur,if the firm
that produces this necessary input is also faced with a taut plan. Taut
planning results in a very difficult task, with respect to the allocation of
intermediary goods. In a developed economy, the complex interdependencies will
result in a high level of uncertainties. The planner may, therefore, prefer to
set more modest targets which are more likely to be fulfilled (Keren, 1972,
Ickes, 1956).
In a framework with several periods the planner extracts information from
past performance of the manager as well. The interaction between the planner
and the manager stretches over a longer period of time. Both will take the
time factor into account. Within the basic incentive system the future is
incorporated by means of the ratchet effect. The ratchet is a feedback
mechanism which makes the present target dependent on past performance. If
managers are able to fulfill a taut plan in one period Lhe planner could be
inclined to think that they will be able to do so in later periods as well.
However, this need not always be the case. The managers is only able to use
their hidden stocks once to realize a taut plan. The planner, in this case,
might be successful in mobilizing reserves, but if he subsequently adjusts the
plan for the next period upwardly, it will result in an underfulfillment of
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the target. If the managers, on the other hand, had succeeded in the past to
create a hidden production capacity they would continue to be able to realize
future taut plans. The managers' strategy with respect to taut plans would
differ according to the situation. In the literature on incentives, it is
implicitly assumed, that through effort the manager reveals capacity, rather
than stock (Lohmann, 1986).
In a situation with more than one period the managers' problem becomes
deciding on a chain of production levels which will maximize their bonus over
the entire period under consideration. Snowberger (1977, 1979), extends the
basic incentive system and formulates a two period model with certainty of
production levels in which the manager chooses a self-selected target which
maximizes a utility function containing two elements:19
U( B, Yl ), (4.22)
where B is the sum of the bonuses in both periods and U~ 0, U ~ 0, U- ~ 0s es y i
and U- - ~ 0. The bonus B in a single period is copied from the Weitzmanrlrl
incentive system (4.3), which - because of the condition of certainty - can be
19 A similar contribution is Holmstrom ( 1982). Gindin ( 1970), provides a
graphic presentation of a similar two-period optimization problem of the
manager. Gindin uses the slightly different Micawber principle in the bonus
mechanism. At the target level, a discontinuity is introduced to induce the
manager to produce at least the target level of output. The manager only
receives a bonus if he produces the target while overfulfillment is rewarded
at a piece rate. Miller and Thornton (1978), incorporate a decrease in the
present value of the earnings into their bonus formula:
B- B f~(Y-Y) f a(Y-Y) - X- ó(Y-Y) -~V(Y-Y) if Y?Y
H f~(Y-Y) f Y(Y-Y) - X- ó(Y-Y) -~V(Y-Y) if y~y.
This preserves the structure of their analysis but changes the parameters, Q,
a and Y into ~4'- ~-ó-y,, a'-a-ó and Y'-Y-~h.
written as:
Bj - ~i f ~(Y~-Yy). i - U,1. (4.23)
The future target yl is used to incorporate future effects and is calculated
according to:
y, - yo f ó(yo-yo)
0~6~1.
(4.24)
The target is automatically adjusted with a fraction ó, the ratchet, of the
over or underfulfillment of the target of the previous period.ZO An increase in
the target of the second period makes it more difficult to fulfill the plan,
which in turn causes a penalty for underfulfillment of the plan. Because the
model is formulated for a situation of certainty, the manager will choose his
target equal to actual production. The optimum level of the target for the
manager is calculated by differentiation of (4.22) with respect to the
manager's target and setting the result equal to zero. This yields:
,BUB f óUy - 0.
i
(4.25)
There exists a trade off between appreciation of the bonus that can be
~ In this case the ratchet is a fraction of the over or underfulfillment
of the target. Often, an automatic growth of the target is incorporated. Other
constructions can be formulated as well.
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collected in the present period and appreciation of the increase in the future
target, which makes it more difficult to collect future bonuses. As in the
case of a single period, it is possible to apply comparative statics to
analyze the reactions of the managers to changes in the parameters. Because
the model is formulated for conditions of certainty, the planner finds no use
in changing the penalty for underfulfillment Y or the reward for
overfulfillment cx as is the case in the basic incentive model with randomized
production. The reaction to changes in other parameters depends on the
specifics of the utility function. Snowberger expects an increase in the basic
bonus B to decrease production. The manager will still receive the original
bonus. The lower production will cause the future target to be lower as well.
This may lead to a higher bonus payment in the second period. An increase in
the initial bonus for the first period would induce the manager to increase
production in this period in order to realize the target and not be penalized
for underfulfillment. An increase in the first period's production will,
however, also increase the target in the second period. If the manager
underfulfills the target in the first period the target for the second period
will be adjusted downward. The reaction to changes in the reward for announced
production ~ is ambiguous, too. If the firm is underfulfilling the target y 0
anyway the manager can try to reduce his losses as much as possible by raising
production and the future target will be reduced as it is. If the firm is able
to overfulfill the target, the effect of an increase in ~ can run either way.
The managers usually have a longer time horizon to consider than just two
periods. For a situation that contains more than two periods it is more
difficult for the managers to decide on an optimal strategy. Yunker (1973),
discusses the strategy of the managers with regard to plan fulfillment if the
target at the end of the time horizon under consideration is fixed. This
target is determined by assuming that the firms will exactly fulfill the
target in every period, and applying a ratchet principle which determines the
target in any period as the target in the previous period plus a fraction of
production in the previous period. If the managers fulfill the target in the
final period they have on average fulfilled all targets and they will be
evaluated as a successful managers. Although the managers are successful in
terms of average plan realization, it is not clear whether they produce at the
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level which uses all production capacity.
The planner is not only interested in the realization of the plan, but
also in maximizing production. Dietz and Uffhausen (1981), develop dynamic
decision-making models which can be used to analyze managers' behavior with
respect to production decisions in a period of time and concentrate on the
relationship between plan fulfillment and the capacity of the firm. The model
is formulated in growth rates of production, the target and production
capacity respectively.21 The planner formulates a target which holds a ratchet:
yjt i - ay; f ( 1-b)Y~,
y0 - y0e'
(4.26)
where y' and y' are growth rates of production and the target respectively. If; ,
production equals the target, next period's target will increase with the rate
of growth. The target in the first period is exogenous. The bonus system is
similar to the systems described in section 4.2:
Bj - RYi - Y(Y~-Y~)





21 If the bonus is calculated with respect to absolute values, a constant
productive capacity exists and the initial target is below capacity, the
target will grow towards the capacity level, but will not surpass it. If
reference is taken to rates of growth, and capacity grows as well, the target
may exceed capacity.
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This system induces the manager to produce at a growth rate that equals the
growth rate of capacity, but at the same time imposes a penalty for deviation
of the planned growth of output. To simplify calculations, the penalty is the
same for both overfulfillment and underfulfillment of the plan.22 The growth of
production is only limited by the growth of capacity:
T T
E y' ~ E Y' - Y' ,
i -0 ~ j ~p i O,T
(4.28)
where Y' is the growth of production capacity, which is linearized to simplify
calculations.~ The capacity constraint limits the rate of growth over the
entire time span under consideration, but dces allow all kinds of growth paths
in between.29 The managers' problem is to maximize the present value of the
bonus payments over the time span under consideration:
T
max E Bj(lfr)-i ,yo, ..,yTI:O
(4.29)
22 Weitzman (1980), develops a decision rule for a multi-period situation
with a bonus that only compares real production to the planned production.
23 T T
The non-linearized version of (4.28) is !1 fy~ ~ II fY~, where fyj is
izo i~0
the growth rate of actual output and fY~ is the growth rate of capacity. It is
linearized by setting yi- ln fy~ and Y~ - ln fY~ which is set equal to the
growth rates of production and the target.
24 Keren et al. (1983), develop a similar model, but specify the production
capacity more precisely: Y~ -(lff)tYo ~ rl, where rl is a random variable to
capture uncertainty in production, with a density that is single peaked and
the same in all periods. It is independent in all periods and its expected
value E(q~J is zero. Keren et al. formulate the solution for only two periods,
as lengthening the time horizon makes the solution very complex.
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where r is a discount factor, which for reasons of simplicity is set equal to
zero. The solution is calculated by means of dynamic programming (Bellman,
1957).~ The manager first maximizes the bonus of the final period:




-~YT f T(YTYT)lf yT C yT.





This means that the managers maximize Lheir bonus in the final period by
producing at maximum capacity. Because the managers no longer have to worry
about the ratchet effect, since it concerns the final period, they will use
all of the remaining capacity and production growth will be the maximum
attainable. The managers may be overfulfilling the target as well as
underfulfilling the target in this period. If they are underfulfilling the
target the marginal bonus in the final period is (~ t y), while in a situation
of overfulfilling the target, the marginal bonus in the last period will be (~
- y). The managers then continue to determine the optimal level of production
~ According to Bellman's optimization principle the optimal output that is
calculated for the final period is also the optimal output in the final period
if the outputs for both the final and the penultimate are calculated.
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growth in the penultimate period:
~




where the asterisk indicates that the bonus in the final period is at its
optimal value. The bonus in the final period can be rewritten as a function of
the target in the final period, which is a function of the production in the
penultimate period and the optimal production in the final period, which is
also a function of the production in the penultimate period. The managers can
use the possible capacity growth over the time span of two periods and they
are free to decide in which period they want to use the growth potential.
However, if a manager decides to employ the entire growth potential in the
penultimate period he cannot produce a growth rate in the final period:
~
dyT~dyL-1 - -1.







and solved by calculating:
~ y~ ~ y~dB,r- 1 BBTd ,I, ÓBTd T ~
.} ~ } - ().
e ~ e - i edyT-1 ayTdyT-1 ayTdyT-1 ~
( 4.35 )Zs
For period T-1 the managers have to determine a level of production. A high
level will influence the bonus in the final period in two ways. First, it will
raise the target, and secondly, it will reduce the maximum growth rate in the
final period. The effects of the decision on y' on the bonus of both periodsT-i
can be categorized into four situations:
(i) the managers are overfulfilling the target in both periods, their marginal
bonus will be ( ~-Y) for period T-1 and it can be calculated to be (-~f(lfa)Y)
in period T, summing up to be ( ay) for both periods;
(ii) the managers are overfulfilling the target in the penultimate period, but
underfulfilling in the final period, in which case their marginal bonus would
be (Q-Y) f (-~-(h-cx)Y), which is (-2Y-ocY);
(iii) the managers is underfulfilling in period T-1 and overfulfilling in the
final period, which results in (2y}a~y) as the marginal bonus;
(iv) the managers are underfulfilling the target in both periods and receive
(-aY)-
If the managers are underfulfilling the plan in period T-1 and
overfulfilling in period T(situation (iii)) they can increase their bonus by
increasing production. This will increase the bonus in period T-1, but it will
also increase the bonus in period T, as long as they are able to fulfill the
target in the final period. The same can be said about a situation where the
managers are overfulfilling in both periods (situation ( i)). The managers
increase production in T-1 to the level that will exactly fulfill the plan in
period T. If the managers are underfulfilling the target in the final period
they have an interest in reducing the target for the final period and they
26 Because the bonus function is partly linear the optimum cannot be
calculated by differentiating and setting the result equal to zero. The point
is sought where the sign changes. If the calculation results in zero the
solution is indeterminate.
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will reduce production growth in the penultimate period. The optimal strategy
for the managers would be to use period T-1 for 'correction', meaning that for
the last period they would receive a plan that they could fulfill exactly and
which would result in the use of full capacity.
The managers continue their maximization problem by maximizing the bonus
revenue over the final three periods and so on until they arrive at the
problem of maximizing total bonus with respect to the choice of production
growth in the first period:
T ~
Max Bo(Yó) f E B~(Yó)-
y' i ~i0
(4.36)
The bonuses of all subsequent periods are formulated as a function of the
production growth in the first period and the target in the first period,
which is fixed exogenously. Differentiating (4.36) and collecting terms gives:
lfcx(T-1 )tcac
(Q (-~f) Y) f (-~ (f~-) 1 fcx ( T-1 ) ) ~ 0.
If the time horizon is lengthened (4.37) converges to:
(-If) r (fI-) Y ~ o,
(4.37)
(4.38)
which means that situations, where both the first period and all others
together result in either overfulfillment or underfulfillment, show a very
small trade off, the gain from an increase in production is encountered by the
future losses, and the optimal level of growth cannot be determined. The
optimal strategy if the plan is easy to fulfill, i.e. is overfulfilled in the
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first period, is to decrease production to the level of exact plan
fulfillment. This maximizes bonus in the current period and increases the
potential to overfulfill targets in the future. If, on the other hand, the
initial plan is a taut one, the optimal strategy for the managers is to
underfulfill this target to an extent that the future target will be set to a
level that they can just fulfill and which is consistent with the growth of
capacity. The managers, in this way, use the first period to 'correct' the
plan in order to receive future plans that they can just fulfill and no more.
This result seems consistent wíth the managerial behavior in the Soviet
Union, where managers fulfill or slightly overfulfill the target (Bain et. al,
1987, Berliner, 1957 j. In the model, however, the planner only sets a target
once and follows the ratchet formula to adapt the target. Thus, the planner's
reaction is predictable for the managers which simplifies the managers'
decision-making process. The planner in this model does not exercise a great
deal of influence on the outcome of production processes. He sets the initial
target, the ratchet and the reward parameters. The production process is left
at the discretion of the managers.
4.6 A short evaluation of incentive models
In the previous sections we discussed a number of contributions on incentive
mechanisms in a centrally planned economy. In these contributions the economy
consists of two type of actors, the planner, who would like to control every
aspect of the economy, and the managers, who represent the firms in which the
production takes place. The planner depends on the managers to provide him
with information on the economy to enable him to draw consistent plans which
will maximize his goal, which is usually taken to be attaining maximum growth.
The managers are taken to be bonus maximizers, while the rules for receiving a
bonus are set by the planner. The incentive mechanisms serve two goals, on the
one hand the planner wants to receive truthful information on the production
possibilities in the firms, on the other hand he wants to maximize production.
The basic incentive system, as it is formulated by Weitzman (1976), to
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which many other contributions refer, induces the managers to report
truthfully. However, it dces not say anything about the level of production,
as output is deterministic. The managers have no discretionary powers with
respect to production, but react mechanically to changes in the parameters.
They transmit truthful information with respect to the likelihood of the level
of production. As is indicated above, there is no reference or discussion on
the shape of the probability density function. However, if production is only
uncertain in a short interval, guaranteeing a minimum level, the reaction of
the manager to changes in the parameter values will be limited. The
probability of overfulfilling the self-selected target, which is the criterium
for determination of this target, depends greatly on the interval and the
shape of the density function. If the density function is not single peaked or
continuous, production can be either lazge and overfulfilling the tazget, or
limited and underfulfilling the tazget. The latter may lead to problems if the
output is used in other production processes.
In the incentive models there is usually a single output. If there are
many outputs the planner faces the difficult task of setting all parameters to
reflect his preference structure. Of course, the interdependencies between the
firms increase the level of uncertainty in the economy, especially when the
managers aze officially not allowed to find alternative suppliers if the
planned input is not supplied. The introduction of effort adds real
discretionary power of the managers to the incentive model as they are able to
influence the outcome of the production process. This increases the likelihood
of exact plan fulfillment, which is an important factor in a planned economy.
However, the managers have an interest in hiding capacity and exaggerating the
disutility effect of their effort to receive plans that are easy to fulfill.
The planner can respond by formulating taut plans and applying a ratchet
principle to disclose reserves. This changes the focus in the incentive
systems from revealing information on the production capacities prior to the
actual production stage to revealing information as a result of the production
stage. The incentive system ís directed towards the maximization of production
rather than towards a priori knowledge of production. Of course, the planner
dces have some information of the expected level of production. The planner
wants to make full use of the means of production and anticipates the
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underestimation of capacity by the manager by formulating a taut plan. The
effectiveness of this strategy, however, depends on the disutility of
manager's effort, and the planner has no information on this disutility. In a
dynamic framework the formulation of taut plans results in underfulfillment of
the plan to correct the target. Including the ratchet in the analysis can only
be done by dropping the element of effort and uncertain production. The
manager is only limited by capacity.
A problem, which generally appears in the discussion on the incentive
mechanisms, is that they apply only under very simplifying assumptions. Once
an author relaxes one of these assumptions to approach the complexities of a
real centrally planned economy, it becomes difficult to determine an optimal
strategy for the managers and the planner. Therefore, one should be very
careful when drawing conclusions, with respect to the actual operations of the
centrally planned economies on the basis of the incentive literature. The
contribution of the incentive literature can be found in the structuring of
the immense complex of relationships between the planner and the managers in a
centrally planned economy. By discussing one aspect at a time it is possible
to become more precise in the formulation of the conditions needed to operate
a planned economy and to analyze its actual operation.
The literature on incentives concentrates on the relationship between the
planner and the managers, more specifically between the planner and the
individual managers. The managers only communicate with the planner, the
planner tries to induce each manager to act as if they, the planner and the
manager, formed a team. This approach provides information about the operation
of individual firms, but, unfortunately, it does not say much about the
operation of the economy as a whole. The interdependencies between firms and
the vast informal network between managers in a centrally planned economy
cannot be taken into consideration. Another issue that cannot be taken into
consideration is the fact that firms are hierarchies in themselves. In the
incentive literature it is assumed that managers and workers work as a team.
The team approach reduces the number of actors with whom the planner has
to deal with to the number of firms. Because the focus is on the planning and
realization of output, there is no reference to the demand side of the
economy. This is not a serious problem if the planner is dealing with only a
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limited number of managers because it can be assumed that they can spend their
income. But, if we consider that the firm does not just consist of a single
manager, but of a manager and workers, the planner cannot confine himself to
output planning. The workers and the managers want to spend their income,
thus, the planner has to take conditions of demand into consideration. In the
following chapter we develop a model in which the demand factor plays a
dominant role. The team approach also causes the neglect of the different
interests of workers and managers. As indicated above, the firms are
hierarchies in themselves where the managers are the principals and the
workers are the agents. The managers have to develop an incentive mechanism to
induce the workers to act as if they were member of a team. However, the
managers in a planned economy do not have many discretionary powers with
respect to the workforce. It is almost impossible to fire workers in a
socialist firm and the wages are, for a major part, centrally planned.27 This
means that the socialist managers are limited by the planner's policies in
their position towards the workers. This is discussed briefly in chapter 6.
Z7 The managers have some discretion in the wage determination of the
workers in their firm, as they often control the bonus funds which are
available for the workers and because there is some degree of freedom in the
determination of pay rates for overtime, in the share of piece rates versus
time rates and so on.
CHAP"TER 5
THE PLANNER VERSUS THE WORf~RS
5.1 Introduction
Within the formal decision-making structure of the socialist economy (of the
Soviet Union), the workers do not explicitly have any say. They may exercise
some influence as members of party committees, but they are expected only to
execute the plans. Within the information structure, their position is also
modest. Whether their information is used or not depends on the managers of
the firms. The planner deals with the managers when it concerns the planning
of production. The managers deal with the workers in the organization of the
production process. However, as indicated in chapter 3, the managers' position
towards the workers is not a very strong one.
Because of state ownership of the means of production, the planner,
rather than the manager, is the formal employer of the workers. The planner is
committed to full employment. This, of course, limits the managers'
disciplinary power in, for instance, cases where the workers in other
circumstances would be fired because of low performance.l Also, the planner,
rather than the managers, determines the wage rates for the workers. Bonuses
shared out ambng the workers are few and the managers do not have many
possibilities with which to influence the workers' incomes.2 On the other
1 Bowles (1985), or Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), describe the cost of job
loss as an important determinant in the workers' behavior in market economies.
Managers can use this to discipline the workforce.
Z As indicated before, the motivation system is not formulated very
explicitly, but, with respect to workers, the planner relies on the wage
system as well as on indirect rewards, such as distribution of housing and
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hand, the managers have hardly any incentive to reduce the workforce, because
a large employment will facilitate the realization of plans. The managers
hoard labour as well as material reserves.3 The demand for labour, exercised
by the managers to create reserves in their firms, also reduces effectiveness
of disciplinary measures as the workers can easily find other firms to hire
them.
The planner's involvement with the workers is not restricted to their
professional life. Because the planner formulates the production plans he also
decides how much should be produced to satisfy consumer needs. Furthermore,
the planner fixes the prices that consumers, i.e. the workers, are expected to
pay for the goods. Thus, the planner determines the nominal as well as the
real wages and the available consumer goods. We can, therefore, establish an
interdependent relationship between the planner and the workers, because to
realize the planned output, the planner needs the labour input in the
production processes. The planner has to take the workers' reactions into
account when he determines the wage levels and the distribution of output. If
the workers are unable to buy any products, they can react by withdrawing from
the production process.4
In this chapter we concentrate on the importance of the workers'
reactions to the performance in a centrally planned economy. In section 5.2 we
first discuss the relationship between the realization of economic growth, a
major goal, and the realization of consumption. We return once more to the
1920s, to discuss the model for economic growth that was formulated by
Fel'dman in 1928 and in which we can find an argument for rapid development of
the industrial sector. An alternative growth model is presented which stresses
vacations. The planner also appeals to socialist ethics to induce the supply
of labour by the workers.
3 Maintaining full employment is not very difficult in the centrally
planned economies, because managers exercise an insatiable demand for labour.
This managerial behavior is often sanctioned by the ministries (Kornai, 1980).
4 This has to be an informal withdrawal as the workers in a socialist
country do not only have the right to a job, they also have the obligation to
work.
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the importance of a consumer-goods sector. In section 5.3, we discuss the
basic framework to describe the interdependencies between the supply of labour
by the workers and their position on the consumer-goods market in the planned
economy. Subsequently, in section 5.4, we present a model to analyze the way
the workers in a planned economy spend their time. We will distinguish between
three ways of time-spending, in the production process, in the shopping
process and leisurely. In section 5.4, we concentrate on the production
process and make a simplifying assumption with respect to the distribution of
the output. In section 5.5, we discuss the influence on the workers'
decisions, and we include a more realistic approach with respect to the
distribution of output in a centrally planned economy. Section 5.6 sums up the
results of our exercises.
5.2 Crowth in a sociallst economy
As was described in section 3.2, in the early years, after the Communist Party
had seized power, the Soviet Union suffered an economic crisis. In the period
of War Communism, the economy turned into utter chaos. The recovery, which set
in with the introduction of the NEP in 1921, was damaged by the 'scissors
crisis' in 1922-1923. It was not until the 1930s that the the rulers had the
the power to be able to enforce the cooperation they needed to realize their
program. An important goal of the communist rulers has always been to
industrialize the country and to generate high economic growth. In the 1920s
there was a lively debate within the Communist Party concerning the correct
path of development.
Outside the political debate, Fel'dman (1964)5 developed a growth model
5 Fel'dman worked for Cosplan in the 1920s and was concerned with long
term planning. However, he did not participate in the industrialization debate
and it may be for this reason that it took until Domaz (1957) before his
contribution to the theory of economic growth of 1928 became known outside the
USSR. We use the Domar presentation to describe the Fel'dman model.
120 CE[ppTER 5
of a closed economy with two sectors, one producing producer goods (capital
goods), the other producing consumer goods. Fel'dman was concerned with the
shares of both sectors in the production of income for different rates of
growth. In his model, existing capital is not shiftable between sectors, once
a capital good is installed in either of the two sectors it stays there
forever, it dces not depreciate either. The production in the producer goods
sector is independent of production in the other sector and labour is always
available in any quantity and composition. There are fixed technical
ccefficients (Jones, 1975). The only limiting factor for economic growth is
the availability of capital. New capital is produced in the producer goods
industry, after which, it can be allocated to either the industry it comes
from or to the industry producing consumer goods. The fraction of investment
going into the producer goods sector is the key variable of the model (Domar,
1957).
The growth rate of investment is defined:
~- tdl Ii -N~I -f?(Ie(vi)),~-vi -vi -vi o (5.1)
where I is total investment, Ii is the investment in the producer-goods
sector, ~ is the share of investment going into the sector producing
investment goods, vi is the marginal capital ccefficient for this sector, I 0
is initial investment which is set at 1 and t denotes time. From this we can
derive that the rate of growth of investment increases if a larger fraction of
investment is allocated to the producer-goods sector. Another issue concerns
the rate of growth of the consumer-goods sector and the overall rate of growth
respectively. The growth rate of the consumer-goods sector equals:
~
dC Iz (1-~fC)a(vi)t
~ - vz - vz ' (5.2)
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where C is the output of the consumer-goods sector, Iz ís the investment and
vi is the marginal capital coefficient in this sector. If the planner decides
to plough back all of the output of the investment sector into itself, i.e. ~
- 1, there will be no rate of growth of consumption. If all output of the
producer-goods sector is allocated to the consumer-goods sector, i.e. ~- 0,
the growth rate of the producer-goods sector, of course, will be zero, while
the consumer-goods sector will grow at a constant rate (lJvz). If a large
fraction of the investment sector is ploughed back into itself and a small
fraction is allocated to the consumer-goods sector, consumption grows at an
initially, slow pace. However, in the longer run the exponential will start to
dominate and the rate of growth of the consumer-goods industry will accelerate
to equal the rate of growth in the investment sector.
The overall rate of growth is defined as the sum of the growth rates in
both sectors:
dY dC di
dt - ~t } ~t ' (5.3)
where Y is total income. The growth rate of income will, in the long run, also
equal the rate of growth in the producer-goods sector. Jones (1975),
illustrates the time needed for the growth rates to converge, in a table which
is reproduced in table 5.1. He compares the growth rates for income and
consumption for three different values of ~e. Income is set at an initial value
of 10, while initial consumption is set at 9. The marginal capital
coefficients vi and vz are both set at a value of 3.
The growth rate that evolves equals the product of the fractíon of
investment goods allocated to the producer-goods sector and the productivity
of capital (~Jv). This ratio is high if ~ is high and if the capital
productivity (lJv) is high. It can also be derived that for high values of ~
the growth rates converge at a faster pace than for low values of ~.
table 5.1 growth rates of income and consumption in the
Fel'dman model of growth
growth rate growth rate growth rate
with fa - 0.3 with Ea - 0.6 with p- 0.95
year y C y C y C
1 3.56 2.79 3.93 1.78 4.40 0.25
2 3.79 2.99 4.60 2.13 5.75 0.35
3 4.03 3.21 5.34 2.54 7.39 0.4?
4 4.27 3.43 6.16 3.02 9.33 0.65
5 4.52 3.66 7.04 3.57 11.54 0.88
10 5.76 4.88 11.93 7.43 23.31 3.88
15 6.91 6.11 16.61 12.33 29.50 12.82
20 7.87 7.21 18.32 16.72 31.20 24.32
40 9.65 9.50 20.00 19.92 31.67 31.65
45 9.78 9.69 20.00 19.97 31.67 31.66
50 9.87 9.81 20.00 19.99 31.67 31.67
source: Jones ( 1975 ), table 5. 1
The results that can be derived from this presentation seem to support the
position of unbalanced growth in the industrialization debate in the Soviet
Union. A rapid development of the producer-goods sector will cause the
consumption-goods sector to initially lag behind, relative to the growth of
income,but the growth rate will increase in a later phase and the more so if
the producer-goods sector is developed more strongly.
The model is only restricted by the availability of capital, while labour
is in ample supply. Although this may be the case in the Soviet Union, in the
beginning of the industrialization drive in the 1930s, the availability of
labour poses problems in the longer run if the growth rate exceeds the growth
rate of labour supply and all labour is being employed in the production
process. Fel'dman is not concerned with this problem, as he concentrates on
the economic structure as it evolves once the distribution of investment
between both sectors is fixed. The planner's role is limited to determining
the fraction of investment going into the producer-goods sector. However, if
all labour is being employed, the growth rate cannot be maintained and the
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planner has to change the fraction of investment going into the producer-goods
sector.s The exhaustion of labour forces the planner to change his plans.
To illustrate this point, consider again a closed economy with two
sectors, one sector producing producer goods, the other producing consumer
goods. This time, however, the availability of capital is limited and labour
is restricted. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a constant level of
labour supply. We further assume that it is possible to reallocate capital and
labour from one sector to another and that the planner, at the start of every
period, decides on the fraction of investment going into the producer-goods
sector. Both sectors operate with identical Cobb-Douglas production functions:
Yi - K~` L~, (5.4)
where yi is the level of production in sector i and K~ and L~ are the level of
producer goods and labour allocated to sector i. We fix the supply of labour L
at 1000 units. Suppose that the planner aims at a rate of growth of the
producer-goods sector of ten percent (g - 0.1). This would lead to the
condition:
9K - Yl - K~ L~ -(K1~L1)~I.1 -(K~L)~ Ll. ( 5.5 )
In table 5.2, we summarize the allocation of capital and labour between the
two sectors that is needed in every period to realize the planner's target. We
also calculate the output of both sectors. The initial capital stock is set at
16000:
e The growth rate can also be increased if capital productivity (lwj)
increases. Because we concentrate on the distribution of investment and its
consequences we assume a constant ca.pital productivity.
table 5.2 alloc ation of capital and labour in a two sector
economy
year K L L1 LZ K~ KZ yl yZ
0 16000 1000 400 600 6400 9600 1600 2400
1 17600 -- 420 580 7384 10216 1760 2434
2 19360 -- 440 560 8515 10842 1936 2464
3 21296 -- 461 539 9828 11468 2129 2486
4 23426 -- 484 516 11338 12088 2343 2497
5 25768 -- 508 492 13090 12679 2579 2498
6 29345 -- 532 468 15079 13265 2832 2491
7 31179 -- 558 442 17398 13781 3115 2468
8 34297 -- 585 415 20063 14233 3425 2430
9 37727 -- 614 386 23164 14563 3771 2371
10 41500 -- 644 356 26726 14774 4149 2293
From this table we can see that to maintain a growth rate of ten percent in
the producer-goods sector, the planner has to reallocate an increasing
fraction of the output of this sector back into itself. The planner, from the
very beginning, has to reallocate labour from the consumer-goods sector to the
producer-goods sector. Although the output in the consumer-goods sector
initially increases, albeit at a slow rate, it shows a negative growth from
period six onwards. Extension of the table would show, that in the twentieth
period, the output of the consumption sector even becomes negative.
If workers tesponded to the decrease of output of consumer goods by
withdrawing from the production process, the output of the consumption sector
would become negative in an earlier period. This reaction would reduce the
labour supply for both sectors and necessitate an even larger reallocation
from one sector to the other in order to maintain the growth rate. Consumption
would decrease at a faster pace. The planner could only conclude that a ten
percent growth rate would be too ambitious and would have to adjust the rate
of growth downwardly, he would have to take the workers' reactions into
consideration or he would, in the long run, frustrate his own goals. That is
why, in the following section, we examine the workers' reactions to the
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5.3 Workers' reactions in a planned economy
The workers do not have formal decision-making powers in a centrally planned
economy and do not have an explicit position in the information structure. As
indicated before, the motivation structure is not explicitly formulated, but,
in the socialist ideology it is assumed that once the means of production are
state owned the workers cannot be exploited and will exert themselves only in
their own interest. It is, therefore, not surprising that in the socialist
economies, ideological campaigns are, on account of the planner, an important
part of the motivation strategy . However, the planner is not entirely naive,
he knows that he also has to use the wage instrument and other material reward
incentives as instruments to motivate the workers.
The effectiveness of these instruments depends entirelyon the workers'
reactions. If they have a socialist conscience, the campaigns might be
successful enough to increase the workers' willingness to work. More often,
the planner has to rely on the material rewards to induce workers to provide
the required labour input. In this respect, it is important to note that in a
centrally planned economy the supply of consumer goods is determined by the
planner, who, also determines the prices to be paid for these goods. The price
mechanism does not operate to bring an equilibrium between supply and demand.
Price changes have to be a conscious act by the planner, who, in the socialist
countries, has been very hesitant in using this instrument to adjust the
prices for consumer goods.7 Because wages have been adjusted upwardly, thus
increasing effective demand, the planner should increase the supply of
consumer goods if he wants to prevent a situation of excess demand in the
market for consumer goods. Such a situation would frustrate the workers'
7 The socialist countries committed themselves to providing the basic
consumer needs at low prices. Significant price increases have been the cause
of popular unrest on a number of occasions.
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desire to purchase consumables, which in turn would render them less
responsive to planner's appeals to increase their supply of labour, even if
the planner increased the wages.
This situation, of quantity adjustments rather than price adjustments,
has been the subject of a number of contributions on the concept of general
disequilibrium.e The focus, in these contributions, is on situations of
rationing or quantity restrictions. Barro and Grossman (1971), construct a
model with two markets, the labour market and the consumer-goods market.
Workers, on the one hand, supply labour and on the other hand, exercise demand
for consumer goods and money balances. Because they assume price and wage
rigidity, equilibrium in the markets is established via quantity adjustments
in supply and demand. A macroeconomic equilibrium is reached, when both the
labour market and the consumer-goods market clear. However, both markets are
interdependent, a disequilibrium on either one of them would have
repercussions for the situation on the other market. For example, in a
situation of excess demand on the commodity market the workers are unable to
satisfy demand. They are forced to save, or substitute leisure for
unobtainable commodities by supplying less labour, or a combination of the
two. If the workers supply less labour and the demand for labour is not
reduced we arrive at a situation in which both the labour market and the
consumer-goods market are characterized by excess demand. Another situation
would be that of excess supply of commodities which makes it impossible for
the suppliers to sell their production. They are forced to build up stocks of
supply which induces them to reduce production and thus reducing the demand
for labour. If the workers do not reduce the supply of labour or increase
their demand for commodities, it would lead to a situation where both the
commodity market and the labour market would be in excess supply.
The concept of quantity adjustments is appealing to planned economies, as
8 The inspiration for this line of thought comes from the existence of
unemployment. Apparently, prices and wages do not clear markets, which results
in unemployment. Some contributions are Patinkin (1965), Glower (1965), Barro
and Crossman (1971), Malinvaud (1977 ). See for a survey of these and other
contributions, Drazen (1980) or Rothschild (1981).
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prices and wages are not being used to bring about equilibria. There are major
differences between the market economy, for which the models of general
disequilibrium are developed, and the planned economy. In a socialist economy
there is a special kind of labour market. Although the workers are free to
decide where to work and what profession to choose they are obliged to work.
On the other hand the socialist state has committed itself to full employment.
As indicated above the wage is not subject to negotiations between the workers
and the planner, but is planned, although some flexibility is built in via
bonuses and non pecuniary rewards, such as housing facilities, holidays, and
access to consumer goods. In the market for consumer goods, supply is planned
and prices are fixed, usually for a long period. Therefore, disequilibrium
does not show in the labour market and has to be analyzed differently. A
common way is to describe a situation with excess demand in the consumer-goods
market as a situation of repressed inflation (Nuti, 1986).
Portes (1981), developed a macroeconomic model for a centrally planned
economy, where he distinguished between households and the planner. According
to this model, households in a planned economy do not differ from households
in a capitalist economy. They supply labour, while demanding goods and money.
The supply of labour depends on the real wage and on the initial real value of
their money holdings. However, in situations where consumer goods are rationed
the labour supply will also depend on the supply of goods. The demand for
goods is a function of the real wage and real money holdings. In a situation
of excess supply of labour the demand for goods is also a function of the
labour demand. In this respect there is no difference with the models of
disequilibrium in market economies. But, in a market economy there is no
planner.
The main task of the planner in Portes' model is to equate the aggregates
of supply and demand in all markets. The planner himself exercises the demand
for labour and determines the supply of consumption goods and the real wage
rate. Furthermore, the planner exercises a demand for goods for his own
account. Portes assumes that during the plan construction the planner
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maximizes his utility function.9 However, the formulation of the plan takes
place prior to its implementation and the outcomes realized may differ from
the planned ones for several reasons. The planner may have had false
expectations on the values of the money stock, or the stock of productive
capital.lo He may also be misinformed with respect to the consumption demand,
labour supply and the production functions. According to Portes, the planner
follows a rule of the thumb, with respect to adjustments in the implementation
of the plan, especially with respect to the supply of consumption goods. The
planner will realize his own demand and will limit the demand for labour to
the expected supply at a planned wage.
Similar to the Barro-Crossman approach, Portes distinguishes four types
of disequilibrium. Both the labour market and the goods mazket can be
characterized by excess demand or excess supply. With respect to the goods
market, Portes (1989), summarizes his empirical work stating that he did not
find evidence for chronic shortages. Real supply of consumer goods often
exceeded the planned amount of consumer goods in the period 1957-1980 in four
of the centrally planned economies.ll In later yeazs there seemed to be a
rising pressure of demand on the consumer-goods mazket. With respect to the
labour market, there may have been an excess supply in the 1950s when large
labour reserves still existed in agriculture but not enough industrial capital
stock to employ them. In more recent yeazs, we are more likely to find excess
demand on the labour market.
It may be beneficial for the planner to formulate an unbalanced plan,
i.e. a plan with excess demand for consumer goods (Portes, 1981). As long as
9 Portes does not specify this utility function. he just states that the
planner maximizes a utility function which has the flow of goods purchased by
the households and the flow of goods purchased by the government as its
variables.
'o Productíon is a function of labour services sold by the households and
the expected stock of productive fixed capital (Portes, 1981).
11 Portes and Winter (1978, 1980 ), examine Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary
and Poland. Other empirical work is Portes and Winter (1977) and Portes
(1977 ).
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the households increase the supply of labour as a reaction to wage increases,
the planner can increase production and his consumption, while holding the
supply of consumer goods constant by raising wages and employing more labour.
The households will accumulate money holdings. This will work as long as the
households expect the supply of consumer goods to rise in the future, but the
instrument will fail if this expectation does not materialize. The planned
economy, however, dces not have a fully developed labour market. People cannot
withdraw their labour from the production process.12
The flexibility of the supply of labour has to be found within Lhe
context of full employment. Within the production process, the workers have
limited opportunities to shirk or to reduce their effort, for example, through
absenteeism and moonlighting. This, of course is very difficult to depict.
Brada and King (1986), use the Portes framework and combine this with the
problem of the optimal tautness of plans as it is discussed in the previous
chapter.13 They link the workers' reactions to the tautness of plans. If the
planner observes that his plans are not realized he can formulate a taut plan
to increase production. At the same time he has to induce the workers to
increase their labour supply, which he can do by increasing the wage. If,
however, the consumer goods market is characterized by excess demand and the
workers do not expect an increase in supply they will not respond to wage
increases. Therefore, the formulation of a taut plan may work in the short
run, if workers maybe anticipate a rise in the supply of consumer goods, but
if a situation of excess demand persists, they will adapt their expectations
and will not respond to wage increases by increasing labour supply, and the
12 We will ignore the effects of the existence of a second economy to which
the people can flee, although we realize that its existence exercises an
effect on the operation of the economy as a whole. See, for example, Calasi
(1985), Feldbrugge (1986), Stahl and Alexeev (1985), Bennet (1990, 1991) for
accounts on the second economy.
13 Brada and King (1986), use the concept of optimai tautness as developed
by Keren (1972) and apply this to the relationship between the planner and the
workers.
only effect wage increases will have, will be an increase in money holdings.'a
5.4 Workers in a planned economy: a model of time-spending
In a planned economy, workers are supposed to supply their labour in order to
realize the plans formulated by the central planner. However, it is not
self-evident that workers indeed supply this labour. Historically, the planner
had problems drawing the workers into the labour process. In more recent
years, workers informally withdraw their labour from the production process,
for example, by shirking and moonlighting. l3ecause the planner emphasizes the
production of producer goods there are pervasive shortages in the
consumer-goods market. This reduces the effectiveness of wage increases as an
incentive to the workers to increase their labour supply as they are not
sufficiently able to buy consumer goods with the extra income they earn by
supplying the extra labour. The wage increases predominantly add to their
money balances. In the short run this may not be a problem, but, as indicated
in the previous section, in the longer run, households must be able to
actually purchase goods for consumption. Therefore, in the long run, the
planner has to take into account the workers' preferences, because if he fails
to do so, the workers may react in a way that would frustrate the realization
of the plan.
In this section, we formulate a model which concentrates on the way that
workers spend their time.15 In the first place, workers are expected to employ
part of their time in the productive process. This provides the planners with
an output and the workers with an income. The planner is free to distribute
the output in any way he chooses. Secondly, workers may spend their time
Ia Kowalski (1986, 1988), presents a similar analysis of workers' reactions
to taut plans in a situation of excess demand and links it to the shortage
context that is developed by Kornai.
is This model was first presented by Clombowski and De Kort (1990).
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shopping around, i.e. go looking for places where goods are available, stand
in line to obtain the goods and take them home. Finally, workers spend time on
leisure activities, sporting activities,sleeping, eating, making love, et
cetera. For the planner, it is particularly relevant that the workers spend
the planned amount of time in the production process. The workers, however,
will decide on the way they wish to spend their time in a process maximizing
their utility function.
In order to analyze the workers' decision on how to spend their time,
consider a static one-product model in which production, represented by y,
depends in a proportional way on the number of hours that are productively





These productive hours are provided by the workers. To keep it simple, we
assume that there are no other restrictions in the course of production. We
concentrate on the role that workers play. So as not to complicate the
analysis, the model consists of only one sector, which produces a single
output. The total product is distributed between the workers and the planner.
The planner claims a certain share (1-~ ) of this product, which he can use in
any way he chooses. The analysis focuses on one period only. The share of
product that the planner dces not claim for himself is available for the
workers to consume. It is not predetermined that all available consumption
goods are actually, consumed by the workers. Thus, a quantity restriction can
be formulated:
q - ~Y ~ 0, (5.7)
where q represents the actual amount of products that are bought and consumed
by the workers. Because the planner claims a share (1-~) of production for
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himself, a share ~ of production is available for the workers' consumption.
The share ~y allocated to the workers, is the maximum amount of
consumption that the workers can possibly attain. In order to actually get
hold of these consumption goods, the workers have to shop around. They have to
locate the consumption goods, and it takes time to actually buy them, e.g. one
has to queue before being served, and it takes time too to transport the goods
home. The time that workers have to spend in the shopping process, which is
denoted t~, is assumed to depend linearly on the amount of actual consumption:
t - hq.
c
Total time (t) is made up of one further way of use, leisure (t~),




The workers are assumed to have identical preferences and to maximize
consumption and leisure according to a utility function of a Cobb-Douglas
type:
U - Aqcxtl - o`.
I ( 5.10 )
It is to be noted that although consumption and leisure enter the utility
function d'~rectly, consumption depends on the production and circulation time
simultaneously. Consumption, furthermore, is limited by income. Workers cannot
spend more on consumption than their real budget allows them, which is
formulated in an income restriction:
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(5.11)
The workers' budget depends on their income w, and on the price level p, which
is fixed by the planner. The workers receive a regular income, which is a
product of the official working hours (t ) and the money wage per hour (l).
0
The official working hours are determined by the planner (with or without the
consent of the workers) as is the wage level per hour. The planner will set
the official working hours, the wage per hour, the price level, and the share
of production available for workers' consumption, in such a way that the
entire share of production for the workers is consumed and there is no excess
income, that is to say the quantity restriction as well as the income
restriction are equally binding. This situation is called the 'ideal planning'
situation and represents the planner's preferences. Workers, however, spend
their time in order to maximize their Cobb-Douglas utility function and the
optimal amount of time spent in the productive process, from the workers'
point of view, need not be identical to the planned amount of productive time.
The planner tries to prevent this violation by imposing a penalty on the
workers for deviations of the planned productive time. When they are caught
being absent during official working hours, workers have to pay a fine. The
fine is deduced from their wage. So, if they go shopping, or take leisure
during official working hours, they run the risk of having their regular wage
reduced, which tightens their income restriction. The workers' income (w) can
now be described as:
w - Ito - br(to-t ).
P
(5.12a)ls
ls Because the workers do not know whether they will be caught shirking or
not, we should actually formulate an expected value of workers' income.
However, we assume that all workers behave identically and that the average
income is properly described with expression (5.12a).
134 G7IAP"TE~.R 5
The second term contains the penalty for the worker caught shirking. The
actual penalty that is deduced from the regular wage if the worker is found to
be absent during working hours is given with 'b', while 'r' is the control
intensity and represents the probability that a worker is actually ca.ught
whilst shirking. The product of the two then is the expected fine per hour
that the worker is absent. (The time of absence, of course, is tó tp.) In
order to secure a positive wage we assume:
l ~ br ~ 0. (5.12b)
The model contains six variables, i.e. q, x, t, t, t, and m. Besides the
p c !
above mentioned 1, t, p, ~, the planner decides on b and r.l' The parameters
0
in the model are A, B, cx, and h. The ideal planning solution would establish
equilibria between demand and available consumption goods, on the one hand,
and between available consumption goods and real income on the other. The





17 The control itself has to be exercised within the enterprises, and, for
example, by the manager. In an extended model the control intensity could be
made a function of reward for the manager.
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P
l-~ ( 5.17 )
i ~ - h g - h,BBto
i ~ - t - (1th~B)to
( 5.18 )
( 5.19 )
This situation represents the planner's preferences. The plan variables all
depend on the number of official working hours. (A relatíonship between l and
br still needs to be established. ) The question now becomes, whether or not
the ideal planning situation will actually be the outcome of the production
process. This depends on the time that workers spend in the production
process.
The optimal solution from the workers' point of view is a maximization of
the utility function (5.10) subject to constraints. To formulate the
constraints, rewrite the quantity restriction (5.7), using (5.6), (5.8), and
(5.9) into:
QB ~3B
q ~ t - t.
1 t h~B 1 f h~8 ~
(5.20)
Similarly, the income restriction (5.11) can be rewritten, using (5.8), (5.9),





t . ( 5.21)
p t brh ~
E3cpressions ( 5.20 ) and ( 5.21) describe the set of possible combinations of q
and t~ which are drawn in figure 5.1. The upper boundaries of the region of
feasible combinations can be derived from (5.15) and (5.16) if the inequality
sign is changed into an equality sign.
figure 5.1 Set of feasible solutions for the workers
t
The intercepts of both restrictions with the q axis can be read from (5.20)
and ( 5.21) by setting ti equal to zero. The intercepts with the t~ axis are
calculated to be
( 5.22 )
for the quantity restriction and
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!
t~ - t f (-)to
br
(5.23)
for the income restriction respectively. Because the worker will always
receive a positive income, even if he dces not work at all (cf. equation
5.12b) the quantity restriction will always have the smaller intercept on the
t~ axis. If the quantity restriction has the smaller intercept with the q axis
as well, the íncome restriction would not become effective at all.18 If, on the
other hand, the income restriction shows the smaller intercept with the q axis
we obtain an intersection between the upper boundaries. This is the more
interesting case as the planner aims for both restrictions to be effective in
the 'ideal planning' situation. In order to create this situation it has to be
assumed that
t ~ (1~hQB)to (5.24)
as otherwise there would be no positive leisure time. The ideal planning
situation is represented by the intersection of the quantity restriction with
the income restriction, which in figure 5.1 is indicated with t~,q`. It can be
calculated by equating (5.20) to (5.21). This will result in:
CD l
q} - (- - 1)to and
C - D br
D 1
















The workers' problem is to find a combination t~,q within the set of feasible
solutions that will maximize their utility function. For this maximum, three
situations can be distinguished. Firstly, the optimum may be reached when the
income restriction is effective, while the quantity restriction is not.
Secondly, the quantity restriction is effective, while the income restriction
is not, and thirdly, both restrictions are effective at the same time, in
which case the optimal solution, from the workers' point of view, will
coincide with the ideal planning situation. It is impossible to predict which
situation will apply as this is the result of the workers' optimization
process.
To find the optimal solution, from the workers' point of view, we have to
apply the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. However, we don't know which constraint will
be binding as this is an outcome of the model. In order to find out which
situation applies in our small-scale problem, we solve the maximization
problems, which arise from combining the preference index to be maximized,
with either of the two restrictions in the form of equalities. The quantity
restricted problem results in:
max L(q,t~,a) - Aqo`t~-a f ~(Ct-Ct~-q), (5.29)
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while the income restricted maximization problem gives:
max M(4,t~,1~) - Aqo`t~-a f F~(D(t-to-tl) f Dtp(~ - q). (5.30)
Differentiating the respective Lagrangians with respect to each of their






which is solved by
.
q - atC and (5.29b)
:
t~ - (1-oc)t. (5.29c)
This shows that in a quantity restricted solution t~ would depend only on a.






which is solved by
. ~
q- cxD(t f (- - 1)to and
br
. ~




Before solving the optimum we have to determine which case applies. To do so
consider figure 5.2.





The straight line Q runs through the origin and the intersection of both
equations (point P). It has slope e, where e follows from tan e- q}~t~. This
situation represents the 'ideal planning' situation. As we have indicated, the
optimum solutions, from the workers' point of view, are indicated by specific
. .
q ~tl ratios (See (5.29a) and (5.30a)). Belonging to these ratios are a slope
El for the quantity-restricted solution (tan el - aC~(1-a)) and a slope e2 for
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the income-restricted solution (tan e2 - q ~t~ - aD~(1-a)). Consider the
quantity-restricted solution. If cx is sufficiently small, the slope e~ will be
smaller than e, and the straight line running through the origin with slope e i
will hit the quantity restriction before hitting the income restriction. This
situation is indicated by line Ql, which intersects the quantity restriction
at Pl. If e2 is larger than e, the slope of QZ is larger than the slope of Q,
and QZ will intersect the quantity restriction to the left of P, at PZ. In
this case, however the quantity restriction is not binding, but we have
arrived at an income-restricted area. We can, thus, derive the conditions to





the quantity restriction is effective. However, it is also possible to depart
from the income restriction to arrive at the conditions that separate the
income-restricted solution from the quantity-restricted solution. The result
of these calculations gives
(5.32)
for the quantity restriction to apply. Since C~ D, there exists an overlap in
the separating conditions. Within this area both restrictions apply.
Summarizing all this in terms of o~, we distinguish three separate intervals:
qt~t~
a ~ quantity-restricted solution; (5.33)
C f q}~t~
4}~t} 4}~t}
5 a ~ intersection solution; (5.34)
C t q}~t~ D f q'~t~
qt~tt
~ cx income-restricted solution. (5.35)
Whenever the intersection solution (5.34) applies, the ideal planning
situation coincides with the workers' optimum and the plan will be realized.
If (5.33) applies, the quantity restriction is effective and workers prefer
not to spend all of their income.19 If the income restriction (5.35) applies,
the workers cannot buy all available consumption and there is excess supply.
The planner may set the parameters and observe whether or not this
configuration leads to the ideal planning situation. In prínciple, the
parameters ~, l, to, b, r, and p are at the planner's disposal, to adjust the
situation. The price level, as well as the fine, the control intensity, the
wage rate, the number of official working hours, and the share of output that
is left for workers consumption are more suited for immediate changes. In the
longer run the parameters B and h could also be considered to be at the
disposal of the planner as they can be envisaged to allow a better
organization of the production process, the introduction of better technology
to raise labour productivity, or an improvement in the distribution of
consumer goods, which reduces the necessary circulation time. From (5.20) and
(5.21), we derive that a change in ~ shifts the quantity restriction only,
while changes in l, p, b, and r affect the income restriction only. Shifts in
19 This situation could be referred to as being a situation of 'forced'
savings, although within the confinements of our model the workers are free to
spend their time. The 'forced' character is a result of the circumstances
which ase imposed by the planner.
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the official working time influence both restrictions. However, the ideal
planning situation requires that both restrictions are considered
simultaneously.
To observe this, let us assume that the planner formulates a set of
parameter values which satisfy the conditions of 'ideal planning' and
subsequently observe a quantity-restricted solution, from the workers' point
of view, which means that the workers spend less time in the production
process than was originally planned. The result is that the planned production
will not be realized. In order to induce workers to increase their time in
production, the planner can raise the share of production which is allocated
to the workers, i.e. raise ~. It has to be assumed that the change in ~ will
not be that large that it will turn the workers' optimum from a
quantity-restricted solution into an income-restricted solution. An increase
in ~ will cause the quantity restriction to turn clockwise around its
intersection with the tl axis (cf. 5.20). The income restriction is not
affected by a change in Q. The workers will not change their choice of
leisure, i.e. tl remains as before (cf. 5.29c), but q~ will increase (5.27 and
5.29a). As the income restriction remains in position, it means that t~ will
increase and q} will decrease, hence the disequilibrium will decrease as
(tl-ti) and (q}-qi) will decrease.
It is to be noted that an incidental increase of ,B can be used to repair
the situation of excess income. However, a permanent increase in ~ alone will
lead to a violation of the conditions of 'ideal planning'. If the planner
increases the share of output allocated to the workers, he has to increase
their incomes as well in order to enable them to buy the extra available
production. Of course, in a quantity-restricted solution this will not change
the workers' optimum, but if the planner is concerned with the formulation of
ideal plans and simultaneously raises income and the share of production,
available to the workers, he will also lift the income restriction upward (cf.
5.26). The position of the ideal planning situation in this case changes
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again, as q} and ti will increase according to (5.30) and (5.31).~ The shift
in the 'ideal planning' situation, as a result of an increase in the share of
production going to the workers, and an increase in the wage level, is
illustrated in figure 5.3.
figure 5.3 Movement of the ideal planning situation
9
t t
It is not evident as to what happens with the disequilibrium if the planner
increases ~ and I simultaneously. An increase in J3 reduces the disequilibrium,
ceteris paribus, but an increase in l increases the disequilibrium, ceteris
paribus. If the planner is just concerned with reducing the disequilibrium and
zo The planner can also reduce the price, to increase the workers' real
income or any other parameter that influences w~p. A price reduction would
lift the income restriction upward and turn it clockwise azound the q axis
(cf. 5.21).
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is not concerned with the conditions for the ideal planning situation, he can
also increase the price level. This would not affect the position of the
workers' optimum as it would only affect the position of the income
restriction. The income restriction would turn anti-clockwise around its
intersection, with the t~ axis leading to a fall in q} and a rise in tl and
thus to a reduction of the equilibrium. Changes in the control intensity (r)
or in the penalty, which is imposed on the worker if he is caught shirking
(b), are bound to have similar effects as they only appear as a product in the
income restriction. Changes in either b or r do not change the position of the
'ideal planning situation', they merely rotate the income restriction around
the intersection of the income restriction with the quantit restriction. The
'ideal planning' situation is ca.lculated for a situation where the workers
exactly supply the exact planned amount of productive time and where neither
the value of the penalty nor the control intensity matter.
We end this section with a numerical example. Consider the following
parameter values, which satisfy the conditions of 'ideal planning':
A- 1, B- 1, b- 4, r- 0.1, to - 8, l- 0.8
p- 1, ~- 0.8, a- 0. 4, h- 0.5, t- 24
In the 'ideal planning' situation this will result in:
t~ - 12.8, q}- 6.4.
The quantity-restricted solution applies because
t ~ R t
t- 48~7, t~ - 14.4, t~ - 192~70, q- 192~35 and
P
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q~~tl ~ q`~t~. The workers spend less time productively than was planned.
Their income is reduced due to fines, but they still earn a higher net income
than the value of the products that become available to them. If we now assume
that the planner will raise Q from 0.8 to 0.85. All other things equal, this
will give:
t k i 4
tp - 128~19, t~ - 14.4, t~ - 272~95, q- 544~95 and
t~ - 208~15, q} - 272~45.
Comparing both solutions, we find that the relative equilibrium measure
(q'-q~)~q' declines from 1~7 to 1~19 and (tl-t~ )~ti declines from 1~8 to 1~26.
However, a rise in ~, ceterus paribus, would violate the ideal planning
situation. The planner can repair the conditions for the 'ideal planning' by
increasing l from 0.8 to 0.85 together with the change in ~f. In this case we
obtain
r s ~ a
tP - 128~19, tl - 14.4, t~ - 272~95, q- 544~95 and
t~ - 12.6, q} - 6.8.
The workers' optimum does not change with respect to the increase in ~, as a
rise in income dces not change the quantity restriction. In this case the
.
relative disequilibrium measure (q}-q )~q} increases from 1~7 (0.1428) to
0.1579 and (t~-ti)~t~ increases from 1~8 to 1~7. So, if the planner takes into
account the conditions for the 'ideal planning' situation and raises ~ and 1
simultaneously, the disequilibrium increases rather than decreases. In both
cases, whether the planner increases only ~ or increases both ,B and l, the
workers will respond by reducing their productive time. This will result in
decreased production. Because the planner has also reduced his own share in
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the production, this reduced income strikes him even harder. This is an
unfavourable situation for the planner and past experiences in the centrally
planned economies suggest that the planner is not always willing to adapt the
situation to suit the workers' preferences. He sticks to the planned
productive time and expects the workers to comply with the plans. He does not
take the trade off between productive time, circulation time and leisure into
account.
The model that is presented in this section is a one-period one-sector
model. Extensions into a multi-period framework and a multi-sectoral framework
would provide additional insights. In the Fel'dman model it was shown that a
balanced growth in a two-sector model is linked to the quantitative relations
between both sectors. A high rate of growth requires a high rate of investment
in the producer-goods sector. A transition, from a path with a low rate of
growth to a path with a high rate of growth, requires additional investment in
the producer-goods sector. Translated into our one-period model an attempt to
speed up growth would mean a decreasing share of output allocated to the
workers. The quantity restriction is more likely to become binding, which
will, because of the workers' reaction, lead to underfulfillment of the plan.
The planner will be forced to reduce the growth rates. Of course, the planner
could try to speed up the technical process in order to relax the constraints,
but the centrally planned economies do not have an excellent record in this
respect.
5.5 Queueing and the influence on the workers' time-spending
In the previous section we studied the quantity-restricted solution to the
workers' optimization problem. It turned out that the workers' optimum, with
respect to the amount of time spent leisurely, was independent of the level of
consumption. It also turned out that the workers consumed the entire amount of
production that was available for consumption. The distribution of consumption
goods seems to be very well organized. This smooth operation of the
distribution system comes forth out of the linear circulation function.
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However, in a quantity-constrained economy, the shopping process is more
complicated than described in the previous section (cf. 5.8). Goods are spread
among numerous distribution outlets. In the case of shortages in a particular
shop, the consumer is forced to stand and wait in long queues or to look
elsewhere for the product. If it is not available at all, the consumer is
forced to save his income or to substitute (which in a one-product model, of
course, is ruled out).Zl Another important factor in the centrally planned
economies is the poorly developed retail system. This opens up the possibility
that the level of consumption is not restricted by the available consumption,
but by the limited sales capacity (Bennet, 1993).ZZ
In this section we have a closer look at the workers' consumption. We
assume that whenever the share of output available for consumption is
diminishing, í.e. when consumers have already bought part of it, it takes more
time to locate the remainder of the output. Therefore, the circulation
function (5.8) is rewritten into:
t~ - h4 } ~Y 4,
( 5.36 )23
where q~(Qy) measures the share of available production akeady consumed at a
certain point of time and g is a parameter which can be interpreted to
summarize the quality of the retail system. A high value of g hints at a badly
developed distribution system, which increases the time spent in circulation
if a larger share of that available production has already been consumed. The
si See Kornai (1980, 65-83) for a thorough description of the shopping
process in a shortage economy.
22 Bennett (1993), formulates a similar model to ours, but he distinguishes
between two kinds of employment, i.e. production and sales. His analysis
concentrates on the trade off between consumption and the circulation time.
za It is impossible to exactly describe dynamic effects within a single
period in the way it is done in this function. We prefer, however, a simple
expression to illustrate our problem.
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circulation time depends on the available amount of consumer goods and on the
actual level of consumption. The rest of the model is maintained and we will
again concentrate on the quantity-restrained solution.
To solve the workers' optimization problem, we first establish the
efficient trade off between leisure and consumption under the new conditions.
In order to find this trade off we have to break up the workers' optimization
problem into two parts. This can be done in either of two ways. On the one
hand, it is possible to start from a given level of consumption and then
maximize the amount of leisure. This will give leisure as a function of
consumption which we can subsequently use to maximize workers' utility. On the
other hand, and this approach is followed here, it is possible to start from a
given level of leisure and formulate a problem of maximization of consumption:
max q
s. t. t- t f t t t
p c 1






This maximization problem is solved by formulating the Lagrangian and
differentiating it to each of its elements and setting the differentiations




8L~3tp - al ~ a38 - 0,
( 5.38 )
( 5.39 )
8L~8t~ - a1 - az - 0, ( 5.40 )
ac~aX - a29q2 - a3 - o,
QY
plus the conditions (5.9), (5.36) and (5.6).
(5.41)
The condition that has to be fulfilled in order to solve this system is
calculated to be:
9Bq - QY2. ( 5.42 )
Rewriting the time constraint (5.9), using (5.36) and (5.6) we are able to
write leisure as:
il - t-~-hq-~
and subsequently, using (5.42), as:
tl - t - h4 - (~~)`f~ q~`,
( 5.43 )
( 5.44 )
which is the required trade off function between leisure and consumption that
we are looking for.
The efficient trade off between leisure and consumption can be used in
the workers' optimization problem which is formulated as follows:
max U - Aqo`ti-a (5.45)
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s. t. tl - t - hq - Kq~, where
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(5.46)
To solve this problem we will again formulate the Lagra~igian artd differentiate
this function with respect to q and t~ and set the results equal to zero.
After due calculations this will result in:
ti - a q} 2cx q
and using (5.44) we get:
t- á q} K 2 a~ q~'
This can be reformulated into a quadratic equation:
va } (ltcx)Kv- cxt - 02 cx zÍ '
where v- q1~2. Solving this for v will give:







Z' Of the two possíble solutions, only the one with the positive sign is
which we can use to determine the optimal level of consumption for the workers
and subsequently the optimal allocation of time over leisure, production and
circulation.
Let us again use a numerical example to illustrate the operation of the
model. Consider the following parameter values, which satisfy the conditions
for the 'ideal planning' situation:
A- 1, B- 1, b- 4, r- 0.1, to - 8, l- 0.8
p- 1, ~- 0.8, a- 0.4, g- 6, h - 0.75, t- 24.
The 'ideal planning' situation in this case would result in:
t~ - 11.2, q} - QY} - 6.4.
The workers' optimization would give the following results:
t~ - 5.042, ~y~ - 4.034, qs - 3.389, t~ - 7.583, and tl - 11.375P
which is not consistent with the 'ideal planning' situation. More noteworthy,
however, is that although we are considering the quantity-restricted solution
in the workers' optimum, neither the income restriction nor the quantity
restriction is binding. We can calculate the workers' income w to be 5.217
.
which will lead to a ratio q ~(w~p) - 0.650, thus the workers do not spend
their entire income. From the optimal values it can also directly be seen that
relevant, as it does not make sense to have negative values for time spent in
the production process.
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q ~(~y )- 0.840, which indicates that not all available consumption goods
have been bought, implying that the quantity restriction is not binding
either. Although we concentrate on the quantity-restrained solutions of the
workers' optimization problem, there seems to be no shortage of consumer
goods.
In order to understand why neither the income restriction, nor the
quantity restriction is binding, let us return to the prablem of maximization
of consumption under a time constraint (eqs. 5.37, 5.6, 5.36 and 5.9). Above,
we concentrated on the efficient trade off between leisure and consumption.
When we established this relationship we directly inserted it into the
workers' optimization process to calculate the optimal mix of leisure and
consumption. However, consumption is a function of production time and
circulation time and in the following we concentrate on this relationship.
The first step begins by fixing a certain level of leisure. This leaves a





If the workers spend this time entirely in production, the available amount of
production would, of course, be maximal. However, consumption would then be
zero, as no time is left for circulation and the workers cannot buy the
available consumption goods. On the other hand, if the workers spend all of
their time in the circulation process, they will not consume either as there
is no production available to them. Thus, there exists a trade off between
production time and circulation time and the workers have to find the optimal
combination which will maximize consumption, subject to the condition that
this maximum level of consumption is available (cf. 5.7). To determine the






which gives us consumption as a function of production time. Differentiation
of (5.52) with respect to t and setting the result equal to zero will give
P
the optimal production time
tt~ - - ~t~- (h9~B~ } 9Z)~
P
( 5.53 )~
and hence, according to (5.51), the optimal circulation time. This is
illustrated in figure 5.4.~
Of course, consumption cannot exceed the available amount of production
(cf. 5.6 and 5.7) and therefore, it is necessary to check if the optimal
combination of t~~ and t~~ is feasible. In figure 5.4 two alternative
P ~
quantitative constraints are drawn, ~1BtP, which intersects with the trade off
function before it reaches its maximum and ~ZBtP, which intersects beyond its
maximum.27 In the latter case, if the intersection lies to the right of the
maximum of (5.45) this maximum is unattainable because of the limited
availability of production, i.e. ~2Bt~~ ~ qs~. The highest attainable level of
P
consumption is where both restrictions intersect and the available production
will be fully consumed, in tPl,ql. In the first case, if the intersection
lies
left of the maximum, in tP2,q2, the optimal
value of productive time will be
~ Again, only the solution with the positive sign will be calculated.
~ It can be proven that (5.52) describes a skewed dome with its maximum
for a value of t on the interval [O,i~zH].
P
27 In order to have an intersection of the two functions it is necessary
that 8(5.52)~8t at t -0 exceeds ~B, i.e. H~h ~~B.P P
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the one that maximizes (5.52). In this case consumption is not limited by the
availability of production.









If we start from the point of intersection, it pays for the workers to
increase production time to increase the availability of goods, which then
takes less circulation time to find and to buy these goods. In this case there
:. ..
will be (,Q1Bt - q ) supply of goods that will not be consumed. Thus, the
P
optimum level of consumption dces not necessarily coincide with the
consumption of all available production.
We can now proceed with the second step, i.e. to vary the level of
leisure and analyze its effect on the relationship between t and t. We
p c
assume a given production function. If we reduce the amount of leisure, this
is the same as increasing the value of H, the asymmetrical dome-shaped figure
of figure 5.4 will become larger. We can prove that a dome with smaller H is
entirely enclosed by a dome with higher H, which is illustrated in figure 5.5.
figure 5.5 consumption as a function of production time
for two levels of H
Hi H2 t P
For small values of H the quantity restriction (5.7) may not be restrictive.





and, thus, that the circulation time diminishes with respect to t. This means
P
TIIE P[.ANNER VFRSUS TF~ WORKF,RS 157
that for higher values of H(smaller values of tl) it becomes more likely that
the quantity restriction will become restrictive and stay this way for even
higher values of H. Thus, the trade off between consumption and leisure may
consist of a linear part, where q-~y, for small values of leisure and a
non-linear part, where q ~ ~y for levels of leisure that exceed a specified
level. Analogously to figure 5.1, we can draw the set of feasible solutions
for consumption and leisure for the situation with the new function for
circulation time. This is given in figure 5.6.
figure 5.6 Set of feasible solutions for the workers
with a non-linear circulation function
4
If we use the parameter values of the numerical example we can calculate the
level of leisure which divides the quantity-restriction into a linear part and
a non-linear part and the accompanying values of production and circulation
time and the level of consumption:
t~ - 8.4(H-15.6),tP-6,t~-9.6,q'-~y'-4.8.
We can use these results to explain why the optimum values that were
calculated above result in a situation without shortage of consumer goods. We
notice that the intersection of Q1 and the quantity restriction is
unattainable. The workers' optimum that was calculated above is on the
non-linear part of the trade off restriction, which explains why there is
still some production available for consumption.
Like before, the planner can change the parameter structure to attain an
equilibrium. Again, we have to consider small changes in order not to switch
from a quantity-restricted solution to an income-restricted solution. Let us
consider again a change in ,0 and l from 0.8 to 0.85. The 'ideal planning'
situation will become:
ti - 12.6, q} - 6.8.
The workers' optimum becomes:
. . : : .
t~ - 11.414, tp - 4.977, t~ - 7.609, q- 3.509, ~y - 4.231
The workers will increase their consumption, but reduce their production time.
Leisure is reduced as well, while the circulation time increases. The relative
.
disequilibrium measure (q}-q )~q} increases from 0.4705 to 0.4840, while
(t;-t})~t} increases from 0.0156 to 0.0941. If the planner dces not take into
account the trade off between circulation time and production the ideal
planning situation will never be attained. In this case, as already can be
seen from figure 5.6, it is impossible to attain the ideal planning situation,
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because for tl - 12.6, the workers are not able to consume the available
consumption. Unless the planner improves the retail system, i.e. reduces g,
the system is bound to create disequilibrium from the beginning.
In this section we take a closer look at the level of workers'
consumption in a centrally planned economy. The important conclusion that can
be drawn from this is that even in a quantity-restricted situation there may
be consumption goods available to the workers. A badly functioning retail
system may cause the circulation time to rise to unnecessarily high levels. We
will not expand this approach at this point because it would lead us to the
informal or the second economy in the centrally planned economies. These
informal markets have been important in the operation of the centrally planned
economies, particularly in the distribution of consumer goods . Our interest
here mainly concerns the operation of the official economy and the
possibilities for central planning. In this respect, we can conclude that the
introduction of the quality of distribution strengthens the conclusion from
the previous sectíon. The planner is forced to reduce his growth target
because of the workers' reactions. To relax the constraints the planner could
try to improve the retail system, but the centrally planned economies do not
have an excellent record in this respect.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we discuss the importance of the workers' preferences and
strategies for the operation of the centrally planned economies. In the
centrally planned economies the planner has traditionally emphasized the
development of the producer-goods industry. In the Soviet Union in the 1930s
an extensive program of industrialization was executed. An argument in favour
of rapid industrialization can be found in Fel'dman's two-sector model of
economic growth. In this presentation, high shares of investment in the
producer-goods industries, in the long run, will lead to high rates of growth
in the economy. One of the conditions for this development, however, is the
availability of labour. As we pointed out in another simple two-sector model,
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the limited availability of labour could force the growth rates of the economy
down to a considerable extent.
We developed a one-sector model to discuss the workers' reactions to
planner's behavior. The workers optimized the allocation of their time over
three types of activity, working, shopping and leisure. We concluded that
workers' reactions to being quantity restricted resulted in modest growth
potential. Workers withdrew their labour from the production process, because
the income they earned did not enable them to buy consumer goods anyway. This
insight helps us to understand the situation of excess demand in centrally
planned economies. In a multi-period analysis we would have to add a workers'
preference for money holdings, but if the situation arises, that the money
holdings exceed the workers' demand for them, we have a situation as it is
described in the one-period model. The workers' preferences for money holdings
will depend on their expectations with respect to the ability to use them in
the future to buy consumer goods. The additional complication of the shopping
process leads to an additional insight, namely, that an economy that is
characterized with excess demand can, at the same time, be an economy with a
considerable supply of consumer goods.
This finding could be used to support Kornai's argument, that in a
shortage economy, shortages and slacks can very well go together. The
argument, however, is different. Kornai concentrates on the complementary
character of goods in the production process, if one particular input is short
of supply, others will be ample. In our model, we only have one input, i.e.
labour, and one output, and the supply of consumer goods is a result from the
workers being constrained in the ways they spend their time. The findings can
also be used to support Portes' findings, that the supply of goods often
exceeded demand, which would lead to rejection of the hypothesis of repressed
inflation in the centrally planned economies. Of course, it would require
empirical work with respect to the workers' preferences with respect to
leisure, consumption and, in a multi-period framework, savings, to determine
which situation prevails. A one-product one-period model can only serve to
present the arguments, it cannot be used to explain the actual operation in
detail.
CEIAPTER 6
A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY WTI7i THREE ACTORS
6.1 Introduction
In this study we have fceused on the relationship between the planner and the
managers and the planner and the workers respectively. In a centrally planned
economy, the economic decisions are guided by the planner's preferences, but
if he wants to realize his own goals, the planner h.as to take the goals and
the strategies of both the managers and the workers into account. In the model
presented in the previous chapter, it is implicitly assumed that the economy
is organized as one factory and that there are only two types of actors, the
planner and the workers.l But, there are firms in a socialist economy as well,
which have an internal hierarchy of their own. The existence of firms is, of
course, recognized in chapter 4, but there it was assumed that workers and
manager form a team vis-à-vis the planner. This resulted in a situation where
we also recognized only two types of actors, the planner and the managers. We
did not discuss the relationship between the managers and the workers within
the firms. However, the operation of the centrally planned economy and, thus,
the question of whether or not the planner is able to realize his goals partly
depends on the operation of the firms, with their internal hierarchy.
The goal, in this chapter, is to integrate the approaches of chapter 4,
the pianner versus the managers, and chapter 5, the planner versus the workers
into an analysis with three distinct actors, namely the planner, the managers
I It is assumed that all the workers behave in the same way.
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and the workers. Therefore, we no longer analyze an interaction between two
actors as is described in section 3.3. (The planner versus the manager and the
worker or the planner and the manager versus the worker. ) We integrate the
three possible principle agent relations into one structure as in figure 6.1.







As before, we do not go into the complex relationships within the
decision-making hierarchy and use the planner as the representative of the top
level in the economy. In this presentation, the planner has to deal with the
manager and the workers at the same time, but the manager also has to deal
with the workers. The pianner sees the manager as the representative of the
firm and depends on him for the formulation and the realization of the plan.
But, he also has to plan a balance between the workers' wages and the amount
of consumer goods available to the workers. The managers, like before, have to
deal with the planner. They have to inform him about the production
possibilities of their firms and report production. But, they also have to
deal with the workers, to whom they are principals and on whom they depend for
the realization of plans. The position of the workers differs from that
described in the previous chapter. Here, instead of the planner, they face the
managers as their direct superiors, as the managers organize and monitor the
production processes. But, the planner remains on the scene and also plays an
indirect role. Because we drop the assumption that the managers and the
workers are teams, represented by the managers, as is done in chapter 4, or
that the managers do not play a role, as is done in chapter 5, we create a
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situation with three separate actors who are all mutually interdependent.
Because we do not explicitly discuss the relationship between the
managers and the workers, while it can be an important factor in the operation
of the centrally planned economy, we go into this relationship briefly in
section 6.2. Subsequently, in section 6.3 we formulate a small model to
illustrate the interdependencies between the three actors. The position of
each of the actors and the possible coalitions between the actors is
elaborated on in section 6.4. In this section too, we point to some directions
of further research into the functioning of centrally planned economies, for
which this study may be a starting point.
6.2 The manager versus the workers
The management of a socialist firm is formed according to the principle of
one-man authority. The firm could be perceived as a centrally planned
institution of its own in which the manager performs the duties of the central
planner. The manager is, however, limited in his power, with respect to the
workers. There are institutional limitations, such as labour legislation and
trade unions, as well as non-institutional limitations on managerial authority
(Andrle, 1975). The non-institutional limitations are of interest here as they
refer to the problems the managers have in motivating the workers. The
managers have to deal with many forms of violation of discipline, ranging from
coming late to work and extended breaks to absence from the workplace and
excessive drinking during working hours (Andrle, 1975, 79). Another problem
concerns the high turnover among the labour force. The managers have to rely
on official and unofficial incentives to motivate the workers. Workers often
receive housing via their firm and holidays are often organized via the
working place as well. This provides the managers with some instruments with
which to discipline or motivate the work-force.
Another instrument concerns the payment of bonuses. Adam (1980) indicated
that for workers, the share of bonuses in their income increased over the
years and that they received a larger share of the bonus fund of the
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enterprise at the expense of the managers. Because the bonus fund itself
increased substantially, the workers' larger share did not affect the absolute
level of the bonus payments to the managers, who also increasingly depended on
bonuses to supplement. The greater dependency of the workers on the bonus fund
could indicate the strong position of the managers, vis-à-vis the workers,
with regard to their discretionary powers in the distribution of the bonus
payments. On the other hand, the larger share that the workers receive from
the (increasing) bonus fund could indicate a strong workers' position. Pietsch
(1986) and La,ne 1987), among others, link this strong workers' position to the
situation of full employment.
The labour market is a seller's market. One of the reasons for this is
the insatiable demand for labour, exercised by the managers, in order to
realize planned targets. The situation on the labour market, where workers and
managers oppose each other, is influenced by the institutional characteristics
of the economy, i.e. by the fact that it is a planned economy and the managers
have to realize the planner's goals. The workers, too, are affected by the
planner's strategies. Of course, the full employment guarantee puts the
workers in a very strong position, with respect to the managers, but on the
other hand, the planner directly intervenes in the workers' situation by ways
of informal pressure or productivity campaigns (Soos, 1986, Rutland, 1986).
The informal pressure can be exercised via the party cells within the firms,
while the campaigns are usually more official and of a larger scale and aim to
impose the planner's preferences onto the workers.2 The workers have to
identify with the planner's goals and the campaign is a moral appeal to the
workers to work hard and diligently.
Another way to encourage the workers to work hard has been the
introduction of the brigade, as the basic type of labour units in the eleventh
Five Year Plan, and to embed the brigades as the primary cell, not only of the
economic, but also of the social organization, by means of law (Lane, 1987,
Z The party cells can be interpreted as the planner's presence within the
firms (Ruble, 1982).
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Teague, 1986).3 This system provides an incentive to economize on labour
employed, to stabilize labour mobility and enhance labour discipline, to
involve workers in management and to increase personal responsibility for the
state of affairs in the brigade. A brigade helps the managers to increase
their span of control, as they delegate part of their responsibility to the
brigade. It also helps to decrease free riding, as within the brigade system
the worker's individual contribution can be monitored more easily by the other
workers, and a comradely correction of shirking can be expected.
The effectiveness of this system, however, is limited due to the specific
characteristics of a centrally planned economy. Despite experiments to raise
productivity, the main indicator for success remains the gross output target.
This weakens the incentive to maximize output per worker, which is the
implicit goal of the brigade system. When the experiments to raise the labour
productivity resulted in redundancies, this proved to be a problem as this was
incompatible with the commitment to full employment.! Furthermore, the planner
frequently intervened in the operation of the firms by changing plans and
reallocating inputs to other sectors, et cetera. The discretionary powers of
the managers and the workers are always limited by the dominant position of
the planner in a centrally planned economy. The outcome, in a centrally
planned economy is a result of the interplay between the planner, the managers
and the workers. To be able to discuss the interaction between the planner,
the manager and the workers we present a simple model of a centrally planned
3 Lane {1987, 186), distinguishes the contemporary brigades from the old
brigades. The old brigades were a collection of individual specifications,
with workers having individually targeted assignments and being paid according
to their personal output, and a contemporary system which seeks to specify
inputs, wages and outputs for a group of workers as a whole. The new brigades
specify targets for a group of workers as a whole.
4 In 1967, an experiment was introduced, which granted the Shchekinskij
chemical combine a fixed wage fund and the right to reduce the number of
workers, provided that output was not reduced. The benefits of this operation
were passed on to the remaining workers. Although the experiment was a success
and the method was introduced across industry, it did not last beyond the
early 1970s. It was only possible to replace the laid-off workers in isolated
experiments (Kushnirsky, 1982, 42).
economy with three distinct actors.
6.3 A centrally planned economy with three actors
One of the major differences between the centrally planned economy and Lhe
market economy concerns the decision-making power which guides the productive
sector. Within a market economy, the firms are independent legal entities with
full liability for their actions. The firms depend on their ability to sell
their products in the market for their income. Socialist firms have only a
limited range of decision-making powers. They can not decide on the assortment
or the level of production independently, nor can they determine their
investment programs. These decisions belong to the discretion of the planner.
In a planned economy the firms have to follow the planner's preferences, with
respect to production, rather than the consumers' preferences and firms are
resource constrained rather than demand constrained.s
The consumers have ,more or less, to accept what the planner decides,
with respect to the supply of consumables. However, at the same time, the
consumers are the workers, who have to supply the labour needed to affect the
production. As indicated in chapter 5, a situation can arise where 'rational'
workers reduce their supply of labour when they become rationed in the goods
market. This means that the planner is restricted in his decisions. The
planner also depends on the managers for the realization of the plans, as they
are responsible for the organization of the production process. If the planner
fails to take the workers' preferences or the manager's preferences into
account, he is likely to formulate an inconsistent plan.
5 Demand-constrained hints at the market dependency of firms. They have to
limit their activities to the extent that they can earn an income in the
market, where demand for their products is expressed. Firms can also be
resource-constrained if the level of activity of a firm depends on the
resources that are allocated to them by hierarchical institutions (Kornai,
1979).
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The manager,in turn, depends upon on the planner and the workers for the
realization of the imposed plans. He needs to receive sufficient supplies and
to have sufficient productive capacity to reach the targets, and the workers
have to be willing to supply the required labour effort. To receive the
inputs, the manager can plead his case with the planner in the formal system
as well as turn to the informal system (cf. figure 3.4). To induce the workers
to supply their labour the manager can use the proverbai carrot and stick. The
carrot, for example, being an extra bonus or a non-pecuniary reward, the stick
being an intensive monitoring of workers' activities in the production
process. The manager can also try to reorganize the production process in such
a way that labour productivity increases.s
The specific feature of a centrally planned economy is found in the
dominant position of the planner. He tries to control the production process
and decides on the allocation of income. In the following, it is assumed that
he takes a part of the income for himself, to consume or to invest, and leaves
the rest for the firms, or rather, to the managers, to divide between
themselves and the workers. This results in the following scheme of income
distribution.




planner f i rms
manag er s workers
6 This would be similar to the labour augmenting quality of management in
Keren (1972), i.e. to manager's effort.
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From the division of the income, it appears that the workers depend on both
the manager and the planner, with respect to the share of the income that they
receive. The manager depends on the planner, while the planner has full
discretionary power, with respect to his share in the income. To determine the
level of income which each of the actors receives it is important to know
which income can be distributed. For that, we have to establish a production
function. Production per head depends in a positive way on effort of the
representative worker (e ). We assume that employment and the number ofw
working hours are fixed and that this is captured in (p). Total production (y)
then can be described as:
Y - Pew ( 6.1)
0 ~p~1,p~0.
Because we formulate the model in real terms, production equals income, and
thus, the income depends on the workers' effort. In the longer run the planner
or the managers could affect the income by raising productivity, i.e. raising
(p), or by increasing the numbers of workers employed or the number of hours
worked per worker, which is captured in (p). In the short run, however, the
level of income is decided upon by the workers' effort. As noted above, first,
the planner takes a share of this income, and subsequently, the managers claim
a share. We assume that the planner is a Stackelberg leader, with respect to
the managers, and that the managers are Stackelberg leaders, with respect to
the workers. The planner's income depends on the fraction of total income,
which he decides to take for himself and on the level of total income, which
is determined by the workers. Similarly, the income of the managers depends on
the fraction of the total income, which they decide to keep for themselves and
the level of this total income. Finally, the workers' income depends on the
share of income they receive and the effort they put into the production
process. To determine the optimal behaviour for the actors, and thus, to
describe what happens in our planned economy with three actors, we need to
formulate objective functions. It is assumed that workers will maximize their
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utility function, in which income is valued positively and effort reduces
utility. The manager and the planner both maximize their income.
We start our analysis of the planned economy with the workers'
optimization problem. The workers maximize a utility function:
Max U - U(w, e ) (g.2)
w
au~aw ~o, au~ae ~o, a2U~ae2 ~ o,w w




The workers' wage is proportional to the level of output (y):
w- F~IY, (6.4)
where (~ ) is determined by the manager and will be taken as given by thei
workers. Thus, the workers are Stackelberg followers with respect to the
managers. The workers maximize their utility function with respect to the
level of their effort. If we insert (6.4) and (6.1) into (6.3) we can
formulate the workers' maximization problem to be:
max U - ~ PeP - ne2
e 1 w w (6.5)
w
and solve this by differentiating with respect to e and set the result equal
w
to zero:
P{~1Pew 1 - 2qew 0.
The optimal level of workers' effort (e~ ) is:
w
,~ 1, ( 2-P )
eW - ((PF~iP)~(2rl)) -
(6.6)
(6.7)
This optimum describes a maximum as the second derivative of (6.5) with
respect to e is negative. The corresponding output is found by inserting thew
optimal level of workers' effort into the production function (6.1):
PI(z-P)
Y(l~l) - P((PI~1P)I(2t1)) - (6.8)
It can be seen from (6.7) and (6.8) that the level of workers' effort and,
therefore, of production, depends on the reward (P1) the workers receive per
unit of production. The workers will increase the level of their effort if the
manager increases the reward for output, i.e.
.
dew~d~l ~ 0, ( 6.9a )
this effect, however, declines for larger levels of workers' effort, because
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.
d2eW~d~ai ~ 0. ( 6.9b )
We can use this information in the approach of the manager's optimization
problem.
The manager is taken to be an income maximizer. It is assumed that the
planner deduces a share (~Z) of the income for himself, which leaves a share
(1-~aZ) per unit of production, which the manager can divide between himself
and the workers. Thus, the managers are Stackelberg followers with respect to
the planner. The managers maximize their personal income (N), with respect to
the reward (~I) that they pay to the workers for a unit of output, according
to the following objective function:




Civen the workers' strategy, with respect to their effort, the manager is able
to manipulate the production level with the unit reward that he pays to the
workers. The manager's income is maximized by differentiating (6.10) and
setting the result equal to zero. This yields:
(1-l~Z-Irl)Y'(~i) - Y(F~1) - 0, (s.ll)
which can be rewritten as:
Y'(l~,) {~,IY(l~,) - 1~,~(1-}~zPl). (s.12)
Differentiating ( 6.8), with respect to (P1) and multiplying this result by
Pi~y(~1), grves us a constant expression for the left hand side of (6.12):
Y'(l~l) I~1IY(l~l) - PI(2-P)-
:





This optimum describes a maximum income for the managers because the second
derivative of N, with respect to ~1, is negative. From (6.14) it can be seen,
that the managers' decisions, with respect to the optimal reward for the
workers, depend on the share of income that the planner keeps for himself
(P ). This information can be used by the planner to determine his optimalx
strategy, with respect to the division of the income.
The planner is also taken to be an income maximizer. He maximizes his




Production is written as a function of ({~2) because ({~Z) determines (~cl ),
.
which in turn determines (e ) and (y). We can, therefore, rewrite (6.15) into:w




The maximization problem is solved as usual, by differentiating (6.16) with
respect to Pz and setting the result equal to zero. This yields:
Y f I~zdYldl~z - 0,
which is the same as:
(6.17)
(dYldF~z)F~zIY - -1. (6.18)
Expression (6.18) gives the elasticity of income for changes in the share of
income that the planner decides to keep for himself. It is also given by (cf.
(6.8) and (6.14)):
(dYldF~z)PzIY - - PPzI((2-P)(1-uz)), ( 6.19 )
which, together with (6.18), can be used to calculate the optimal value of ~a :z
.
l~z - 1-PI2. ( 6.20 )
It can be seen from (6.20) and (6.1) that the planner will take more than half
of the income for himself. Given this outcome the manager will decide to pay
the workers
I~IY- (P2~4)Y




Thus, for our simple model of a centrally planned economy with three actors,
where the planner is a Stackelberg leader with respect to the manager, and the
manager is a Stackelberg leader with respect to the workers, we have
calculated the resulting income and its division among the planner, managers
and workers.
6.4 A discussion of a centrally planned economy with three actors
In the simple state of affairs that is described above it is easy for the
managers to determine the optimal share of income that they should distribute
to the workers, as they know their reaction function. Similarly, it is easy
for the planner to determine which share of income to keep for himself, as he
knows the reactions of the managers. All actors can manipulate one instrument,
the planner determines p2, the manager determines ~~1, while the workers are
able to manipulate their effort. The problem is reduced to three consecutive
optimization problems, with a restricted form of interaction.
This, of course, is a very simplified presentation of the centrally
planned economy. Sabel and Stark (1982), in a qualitative approach, argue that
the planned economy should be interpreted as a system of bargaining, as a
complex web of strategies and counterstrategies among managers, planner and
workers. They define the bargaining regime by three fundamental political
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facts, which are explicitly related to the situation in the centrally planned
economies of Eastern Europe. Firstly, the Communist Party claims to be the
sword of universal progress. Secondly, the party's monopoly of political power
is identified with historical rationality. The party controls the state and
the state controls social development in the interest of the population.
Planning is an instrument to increase economic efficiency as it extends the
state control over the economy. Finally, the operation of the centralized
economy must substantiate the claim that the economy is socialist and the
state is under the control of the workers. The context for social conflicts in
Eastern Europe is formed by the ideology of continuous economic advance, the
centralization of economic control in the hands of self-proclaimed custodians
of a higher rationality and a system of price and employment guarantees. The
bargaining system that developed under these conditions allows the workers to
establish de facto rights that go beyond the original guarantees tendered by
the dominant groups (Sabel and Stark, 1982, 445-446).
If we allow the actors to communicate directly and to form coalitions it
is difficult to determine the optimal division of the income among the three
actors. In our presentation, for example, we can formulate a coalition between
the planner and the manager. This will act as a Stackelberg leader, with
respect to the workers, to increase their income on account of the workers and
subsequently the planner and the maanger will bargain among themselves to
divide the extra income they earned by forming a coalition. Similarly, the
manager and the workers may form a team, which acts as a Stackelberg follower,
with respect to the planner, and subsequently, divide the income among
themselves. It would be more difficult to form a coalition between the planner
and the workers, because in the decision-making structure of the centrally
planned economies the managers are intermediairies between the workers and the
planner.
However, if we are concerned with the operation of the firms in centrally
planned economies we can distinguish all types of coalitions. We will give a
few examples. The workers look to the planner for support to protect them from
unemployment or to strengthen their position, with respect to the manager, in
conflicts concerning piece rates, working hours et cetera. The managers and
the planner can work together to increase the workers' effort or to reduce the
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labour force turnover. Finally, the managers and the workers can connive in
order to receive slack plans, or to get plan revisions if they fail to realize
the plan, or work together to increase their joint effort to realize a taut
plan after all. We have a coalition of workers, with the manager for one issue
at one time and a coalition of workers with the planner for another issue at
another time. In this more realistic presentation, it becomes difficult to
formulate an optimum for each of the players as it becomes increasingly
difficult to formulate simple goals and unambiguous strategies.
This argument can also be illustrated in our simple presentation. Let us
assume that production is a function of inputs, provided by the planner,
effort by the managers and effort by the workers. We then have to introduce a
utility function for the managers as well, that includes the disutility of
their effort and the managers' income in the arguments. Also, the planner's
income-maximizing function has to be adapted, because we now explicitly
distinguish between consumption and investment in the planner's use of his
income. We limit ourselves here to a graphical presentation of these kinds of
extensions in figure 6.3:
figure 6.3 The distribution and production of income
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In this figure, the solid lines illustrate the decisions made by the actors,
the planner decides on the share of the income that he will allocate to
himself and on the investment. The managers decide on the share of income they
pay to the workers and on the level of effort they will put into the
production process. The workers, as before, will decide on their effort. The
dotted lines indicate the consequences of these decisions. The decision on the
distribution of income by the planner and the managers, which is similar to
that in figure 6.2, exercises an influence on the behavior of the managers and
the workers via their respective utility functions. This is illustrated in the
diagonal lines. Of course, these decisions directly influence the income of
the planner and the managers.
The level of income is only one argument in the utility functions of
managers and workers, and there is only a relationship between the share of
income which both the managers and the workers receive and the effort that
they put into the production process via the utility function of both managers
and workers. The exact level of effort depends on the workers' and the
managers' utility functions respectively.T The division of the income share
that can be determined by the managers also depends on the managers' utility
function. This raises some problems for the planner, because the planner does
not know this function and, therefore, cannot know whether the managers act in
a way that serves the planner's preferences best. The uncertainty, which
results from this, becomes bigger if production becomes dependent on a random
variable that can only be observed by the managers. The planner then has to
formulate an incentive system, which induces the manager to take decisions on
the basis of information that the manager has, but the planner has not, that
still maximizes the planner's preferences. This is a principal agent problem,
~ The manager's effort and the workers' effort may be interdependent, for
example, if the manager increases his control intensity, he can induce the
workers to increase their effort and vice versa, if the workers provide a high
level of effort, the manager may be induced to reduce his effort.
178 CFIAI'TER 6
which for the relationship between the planner and the managers is described
in chapter 4. The managers face similar problems with the workers. They are
unable to monitor all factors that determine the level of production and
depend on the workers to act in their, the managers', interest. Also, the
workers' utility function and their effort, are unobservable. The managers
have to formulate an incentive system, with respect to the workers.
In our presentation, the workers' income is determined by the managers.
However, in a centrally planned economy the planner exercises considerable
influence on the workers' income and on the supply of consumer goods.
Therefore, the planner will be concerned with the incentive system which
induces workers to act in the planner's interests. We could introduce this
feature in our simple model by changing the way in which the workers' share of
the income is determined and give the planner an instrument to d'~rectly
determine part of the workers' income. Thus, the workers' income depends on a
part that is paid to them by the planner and a part that is paid by the
managers. But again, the planner cannot observe the workers' effort nor their
utility function and it is difficult to design the appropriate bonus mechanism
to induce the workers to act in the planner's interest. Also, the planner has
to take into account which effect his decision, with respect to the workers'
income, will have on the behavior of the managers. An increase in the workers'
reward for increasing their effort might induce the managers to reduce their
reward. The planner then, unintentionally, increases the managers' income,
rather than the workers' income. The unobservability of the managers' and
workers' utility functions, and of their effort, gives them a leeway in their
position, with respect to the planner, and, in the case of the workers, also
with respect to the managers. The managers, for example, can exaggerate the
disutility of their effort in a discussion with the planner in an attempt to
receive more inputs from the planner, which, ceteris paribus, facilitates the
realization of output plans.
Another type of extension of the simple model would be to extend its
operation to more than one period. In that case the workers' and the managers'
effort, for example, would also become dependent on the expected income in the
subsequent periods. The planner, in this case, may induce the managers and the
workers to increase their effort by promising them a larger income in the
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future. This can be attained via a larger share in total income for the
managers and the workers or via an increase in total income. This can be a
fruitful approach, if the manager and the workers indeed expect an increase in
their consumption in the future as a result of an increase in their effort.
If, however, for one reason or another, they did not expect to benefit from an
increase in their effort, such a promise by the planner would be ineffective
(Kowalski, 1986, 1988). Neïther the workers nor the managers would then
increase their effort. The discussion on the ratchet principle, in chapters 3
and 4, shows how the managers might take the future consequences into account.
If a higher production would lead to a higher target which would subsequently
make it more difficult to realize future plans and future income, the managers
would not be very inclined to increase their effort to raise production. In
this case, too, there are interdependencies between all three actors and, for
example, a willingness by the managers to increase their effort to raise
production may be frustrated by the workers' reluctance to cooperate.
Similarly, the planner can threaten the managers and the workers with a
reduction in their incomes unless they increase their effort. However, if the
manager and the workers anticipate that the planner will bail them out anyway,
they will not be impressed by the threat and provide only weak effort
(Schaffer, 1989). The same goes for the relationship between the workers and
the managers. For example, if the managers threaten penalize the workers
through their income unless they perform to a certain standard, but then fail
to carry out his threat, the workers will not be impressed. In this respect,
this institutional setting of a centrally planned economy is important too. In
a situation of guaranteed full employment, the workers are in a strong
position. This position is further strengthened by the importance of plan
realization for the managers' incomes, which results in a demand for labour by
the managers who want to create reserves. Thus, although the workers' position
would weaken if the planner would be willing to accept unemployment, it would
still remain very strong if the planner did not, at the same time reduce the
importance of plan fulfillment as a criterium for managers' income.
Nevertheless, other outcomes of the bargaining process between the manager and
the workers would be possible. Also, if the planner would be willing to
increase the share of income available for the workers' consumption, the
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relationship between the manager and the workers becomes different. The exact
outcome of processes would, of course, depend on the specific utility
functions of all actors and on their evaluation of the strategies of the other
actors.
Of course, numerous extensions of the simple model can be formulated. One
of the conclusions, from the studies of centrally planned economies by
comparative economists, is that the amount of information which is needed to
completely control an entire economy is too much to be handled by a single
center. It is impossible to formulate a model of a centrally planned economy
which encompasses every aspect of society. If it had been possible, the
centrally pla,nned economies of Eastern Europe might have had a better chance
in succeeding in their socialist experiments. Our aim in this chapter, and in
this study, therefore, has been of a more modest nature. We can only try to
describe the behavior of actors in a centrally planned economy, in restricted
situations, with as many characteristics of a centrally planned economy as we
can possibly allow. The most important characteristic in this respect has been
the planner's attempt to control every aspect of the economy and his
relucta.nce to pay attention to the preferences of other actors in the economy.
Among other things, this has been a major cause for the failure of the
socialist experiment.
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SAMENVATTING
In dit proefschrift wordt het functioneren van centraal geleide economieën
bestudeerd aan de hand van de interacties tussen verschillende actoren in de
besluitvormings-hiërarchie. Als voorbeeld voor een centraal geleide economie
wordt de Sovjetunie beschreven. De motivatie om een economie planmatig vanuit
een centrum te besturen is vooral ingegeven door de marxistische kritiek op
het functioneren van het kapitalisme. Het kapitalisme wordt in deze benadering
gezien als een inefficiënt systeem dat leidt tot verspilling van
produktiemiddelen en tot een onrechtvaardige uitkomst in de inkomensverdeling.
De arbeiders klasse wordt een deel van het haar toekomende produkt onthouden.
In het klassieke Marxistische gedachtengoed, waarop de autoriteiten in de
centraal geleide economieën zich beroepen, wordt planning als een
cobrdinatie-mechanisme aangemerkt dat superieur is aan de coërdinatie via de
markt. Doordat van te voren bepaald wordt welke produktie wenselijk is,
voorkomt planning dat er maatschappelijk niet noodzakelijke produktie
plaatsvindt. Om deze allocatie van produktiefactoren te kunnen plannen moet de
planner, ofte wel de autoriteiten in een centraal geleide economie, volledig
geïnformeerd zijn over de aanwezige produktiefactoren en over de
produktiemogelijkheden. Omdat de planner niet in staat is vanuit het centrum
alle produktieprocessen te overzien moet bovendien de medewerking gegarandeerd
zijn van actoren buiten het centrum. Deze moeten de planner voorzien van de
noodzakelijke informatie om een optimaal plan te kunnen formuleren en ze
moeten meewerken om het plan uit te vceren. Dit rcept de vraag op onder welke
voorwaarden de actoren buiten het centrum de veronderstelde medewerking
verlenen aan de formulering en de uitvoering van de centraal vastgestelde
plannen.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de achtergrond van dit probleem beschreven. Deze
valt min of ineer in twee onderdelen uiteen. Als eerste wordt de vraag
behandeld of een centrale planner de co8rdinatie via de markt kan vervangen.
Deze vraag is uitvcerig bediscussieerd in de jaren twintig en dertig, waarbij
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de nadruk lag op de hoeveelheid informatie die de planner kan verwerken. Oskar
Lange ontwikkelde zijn model van het concurrentie socialisme als een antwoord
op de uitdaging van de Oostenrijkse school die de stelling verdedigde dat de
markt de beste institutie is voor de verwerking van alle noodzakelijke
informatie. Het tweede onderdeel betreft de problemen die zich voordoen bij de
organisatie van de besluitvorming. Dit is moeilijk te herleiden tot één
belangrijke discussie. Voor deze studie zijn twee benaderingen relevant die in
elkaa.rs verlengde liggen. Enerzijds gaat het om een analyse van de individuele
(kapitalistische) onderneming, die opgevat kan worden als een centraa.l geleide
economie in het klein. In dit verband worden een aantal neoklassieke analyses
van de onderneming weergegeven, waarin een onderneming beschouwd wordt als een
samenwerkingsverband van individuen die hun krachten bundelen om er
individueel voordeel uit te behalen. Omdat het samenwerkingsverband niet tot
in de details omschreven is en de participanten geen volledig overzicht hebben
over alle activiteiten binnen de samenwerking kan er evenwel een neiging
ontstaan bij individuen om zich te verrijken ten koste van anderen. Dit
eigenbelang staat ook centraal in de tweede benadering die in dit verband aan
de orde komt. Het gaat hier om de zogena,amde neoinstitutionalistische
economie. Hierin wordt getracht, om vanuit de neoklassieke uitgangspunten van
individuele nutsmaximalisatie en rationeel handelende individuen een
verklaring te geven voor het optreden van belangengrcepen en van de staat. De
inzichte uit beide benaderingen worden vervolgens afgezet tegen de
institutionele vormgeving van een centraal geleide economie.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt inrichting en het functioneren van de Sovjetunie
beschreven. In dit land is gepoogd een centraal geleide economie in te
richten. Vooral de ínrichting van de economische besluitvorming zoals die
sinds de invoering van vijfjaren plannen in 1928 is gaan functioneren geldt
als hét voorbeeld van een centraal geleide economie. Aan de economische
sturing via vijfjaren plannen gaan 10 jaar vooraf waarin de communisten met
meer en minder succes pogingen dcen om de economie van de Sovjetunie op
communistische leest te schceien. In deze eerste tien jaar, de periode van het
'oorlogcommunisme' en van de 'Nieuwe Economische Politiek' worden belangijke
discussies gevoerd binnen de communistische partij over de organisatie van de
economie en het economisch beleid. De discussie spitst zich vooral toe op de
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vraag in hoeverre de Sovjetunie zich mcet en kan richten op de
industrialisatie van de economie. Vooral de houding van de bceren in de
overwegend agrarische Sovjetunie geeft aanleiding tot heftige debatten over
het beste ontwikkelingsmodel voor de communistische staat. Een aantal pogingen
om de economie te centraliseren en de nadruk te leggen op de ontwikkeling van
een industriele structuur leidt schipbreuk op de tegenwerking van de bceren.
Ook tijdens de periode vaa~ de ceutraal geleide economie blijkt dat
verschillende actoren niet volledig meewerken aan het realiseren van de door
de planner gestelde doelen. Uit verschillende studies en twee grote
interviewprojecten, in de jaren vijftig en de jaren tachtig, blijkt dat de
managers van de bedrijven de planner voorzien van onjuiste informatie omtrent
de produktiemogelijkheden en de feitelijke produktie in de bedrijven. Ze
creëren reserves. Dit leidt er toe dat niet het volledige produktiepotentieel
benut wordt. De redenen voor dit managers' gedrag moeten gezocht worden in het
grote belang dat de realisering van de plan dcelstellingen heeft voor de
beloning die zij ontvangen. Dit maakt dat de managers een strategie voeren die
hen in staat stelt met de grootst mogelijke waarschijnlijkheid de
geformuleerde doelstellingen te bereiken. Alhcewel de planner anticipeert op
deze strategieen is het niet te voorkomen dat de plannen veelal inconsistent
en onrealistisch zijn. Evenmin als de managers blijke de arbeiders in de
Sovjetunie gemotiveerd te zijn om zich volledig in te zetten voor het bereiken
van de, door de planner geformuleerde, socialistische idealen. De
Sovjetbedrijven hebben te maken met een hoog verloop, een hoog verzuim en een
geringe motivatie om kwalitatief gcede produkten te maken. Een van de oorzaken
die hiervoor aangegeven wordt ligt in de nadruk die de planner sinds de
invoering van de vijfjaren plannen legt op de ontwikkeling van de
produktiegcederen industrie. De verwaarlozing van de consumptiegcederen
industrie heeft tot gevolg dat de arbeiders hun inkomen niet kunnen besteden.
De bevindingen die in hoofdstuk 3 worden beschreven met betrekking tot
het gedrag van de managers van bedrijven en van de arbeiders worden in de
hoofdstukken 4 en 5 in een analytische vorm gebracht. In hoofdstuk 4 ligt de
nadruk op de verhouding tussen de planner en de managers en op de formulering
en realisatie van plannen. De managers en de arbeiders opereren als een
eenheid en staan tegenover de planner. In aansluiting op de literatuur die in
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dit hoofdstuk aan de orde komt wordt verondersteld dat de dcelstellingsfunctie
van de managers de doelstellingsfunctie van de eenheid is. We gaan er van uit
dat de managers hun inkomen maximaliseren. Het is in dit geval voor de planner
belangrijk om een beloningsfunctie voor de managers te formuleren die er voor
zorg draagt dat de managers, wanneer zij hun inkomen maximaliseren zij
tezelfdertijd de doelstellingen van de planner realiseren.
In de meeste mechanismen die we bespreken hebben de managers op twee
momenten de mogelijkheid om hun beloning te beinvlceden. Tijdens het
planningsproces kunnen ze aangeven wat de mogelijke produktie in hun bedrijf
is en tijdens de uitvoering van de planning hebben ze de mogelijkheid om de
feitelijke produktie in overeenstemming te brengen met de geplande produktie.
Een belangrijke functie van de beloningsfuncties is de manager aan te sporen
tot het verstrekken van juiste informatie over de produktiemogelijkheden in
zijn bedrijf. Een andere functie is om de managers aan te sporen tot het
leveren van inspanningen om de feitelijke produktie in overeenstemming te
brengen met de geplande. Dit maakt het de planner mogelijk om de middelen
efficient toe te wijzen. In dit hoofdstuk worden verschillende mechanismen
gepresenteerd die ontwikkeld zijn om managers te prikkelen tot het verschaffen
van juiste informatie aan de planner en tot het verrichten van inspanningen
die de realisatie van de grceidoelstellingen mcet bespcedigen. Zelfs in de
meest eenvoudige, hier besproken mechanismen blijkt het onmogelijk een is een
bonus regel te formuleren die gelijktijdig de inkomens van de managers
maximaliseert en de realisatie van de doelstellingen van de planner
bewerkstelligt. Alhoewel complexer bonus regels meer elementen van de
realiteit proberen te incorporeren, is het bereiken van zowel inkomens
maximalisatie voor de manager als groei onbereikbaar.
In hoofdstuk 5 ligt de nadruk op de verhouding tussen de planner en de
arbeiders. In dit geval vormen de managers een team met de planner, waarbij de
dcelstellingen van de planner als de norm genomen worden. In dit hoofdstuk
wordt aansluiting gezocht bij een macroeconomische invalshcek voor een
centraal geleide economie. We gaan er van uit dat arbeiders hun nut
maximaliseren, waarbij het nut wordt bepaald door de hceveelheid consumptie
die de arbeiders realiseren en de hceveelheid vrije tijd die ze beschikbaar
hebben. Er wordt een één-sector model geformuleerd waarin de centrale plarmer
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het loonnivo vastlegt, alsmede het prijspeil, het aantal uren dat de arbeiders
behoren te werken, de straf voor het afwezig zijn als dat ontdekt wordt en de
intensiteit waarmee op afwezigheid gecontroleerd wordt. Het consumptienivo
hangt af van de hoeveelheid produktie die beschikbaar is voor consumptie, de
zoektijd die nodig is om de consumptiegoederen te bemachtigen en het inkomen
van de arbeiders. Er bestaat een macrceconomisch evenwicht als de loonsom voor
de arbeiders gelijk is aan de waarde van de produktie die beschikbaar is voor
consumptie. De arbeiders maximaliseren hun nut door hun tijd te verdelen over
produktietijd, 'winkeltijd' en vrije tijd. Het wordt onder andere aangetoond
dat ambitieuze plandcelstellingen, zich uitend in een grote claim van de
planner op het produkt, kunnen leiden tot het niet realiseren van de
doelstellingen, omdat de arbeiders hun produktietijd terugbrengen. Een ander
resultaat is dat een betere organisatie van de verdeling van de consumptie
goederen kan leiden tot een grotere produktieve inspanning van de arbeiders.
In hoofdstuk 6 worden de lijnen uit de eerdere hoofdstukken samengebracht
in een eenvoudig één-sector model waarin de planner, de managers en de
arbeiders als drie afzonderlijke actoren opgenomen zijn. De planner en de
managers streven naar inkomens maximalisatie, terwijl de arbeiders een
nutsfunctie maximaliseren, waarin inkomen en arbeidsinspanning als variabelen
opgenomen zijn. Het inkomen wordt geproduceerd door de arbeiders. We gaan er
van uit dat er een hiërarchische verhouding tussen de planner en de managers
bestaat waarin de planner optreedt als Stackelberg leider. Er bestaat ook een
hiërarchische relatie tussen de managers en de arbeiders, waarbij de managers
optreden als Stackelberg leiders. Uit de analyses blijkt dat de planner door
beleidsaanpassingen die rekening houden met de voorkeuren van de arbeiders en
de managers de onevenwichtigheden in de economie kan verminderen. Er is in de
voormalige centraal geleide economieën echter geen politiek dan wel
maatschappelijk mechanisme actief geweest dat deze beleidsveranderingen tot
stand had kunnen brengen.
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